July 31, 1945 Tuesday

Yesterday, I received a long letter from my wife containing plenty of news.

Immediately after the occupation of Manila, Gen. Maeda, Chief of Staff of the Army of Occupation, sent a message to Vargas, then Mayor and a ranking Member of the Cabinet, giving instructions that a governmental organization be created to carry out the policy of the Japanese contained in a proclamation issued by Gen. Homma, Commander in Chief, par. 3 of which provides:

The authorities and the people of the Commonwealth should sever the relations with the United States of America and trust the just and fair administration of the Army, obeying faithfully all its commands, cooperating voluntarily with it in its stationing and activities here and supplying military supplies when asked.

In his inaugural address at the opening session of the First Congress of Philippines on June 9, 1945, Speaker Jose Zulueta quoted the declaration of prominent people (34) assembled at the house of Speaker Yulo in response to Gen. Maeda’s orders.

In response to the Message of Your Excellency as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, on the 8th of January 1942, through Hon. Jorge B. Vargas, we have duly taken note of the contents thereof and respectfully express our gratitude for your Excellency’s words of solicitude over the welfare of our people.

We beg to inform Your Excellency that, in compliance with your advice, and having in mind the great ideals, the freedom and the happiness of our country, we are ready to obey to the best of our ability and within the means at our disposal the orders issued by the Imperial Japanese Forces for the maintenance of peace and order and the promotion of the well-being of our people under the Japanese military administration. Consequently, we have constituted ourselves into a provisional Philippine Council of State and we are immediately proceeding to draft our Articles of Organization in line with your Excellency’s advice.

I am not sure that the above is the exact text of the letter we signed. I took notes of all that happened and what were said in the meetings held in the house of Speaker Yulo, but unfortunately I lost them all when my house was burned.

I recollect very distinctly that we drafted and redrafted our answer many times. In the original draft instead of “advice” in the second paragraph it was “order”, we wanted to make the people know that we did not voluntarily offer our services, but that we were ordered to organize some form of administration. Our proposition was not accepted by the Japanese and we had to accept “advice” as a substitute. Instead of the “great ideals” and “freedom”, we used “independence” in the original. It will be remembered that from the very beginning we did not want to accept anything unless the independence of our country was assured. Without such assurance we were prepared to suffer whatever consequences our refusal may bring. The Japanese, on the other hand, did not want anything inserted referring to our independence. But in view of our insistence, they communicated with Tokyo for instructions. Tokyo apparently agreed to our demands; in fact, on the 21st of January, Premier Tojo delivered a speech before the Diet which, among other things, announced their policy of granting our independence upon compliance of certain conditions. The authorities, insisted in the use of “grand ideals” and “freedom”. Upon an inquiry, however, this was clarified to mean independence.

The inaugural speech of Speaker Zulueta was pronounced unanimously as an excellent speech. It showed that Mr. Zulueta has matured to statesman. His defense of the collaborators was superb. His statement of facts, however, was not exactly correct. We did not immediately constitute ourselves as Council of State. The meetings in the house of Speaker Yulo were informal. Those who attended were called by the Speaker to consider the order of the Japanese Military authorities. The statement in our answer about constituting ourselves into a provisional Council of State was the first mention of any Council of State, and as may be seen, it was only provisional and had yet to be approved by the Japanese military administration.

A newspaper has published that persons close to official circles have given the news that “small collaborationists” may be released when the Japanese pockets still in existence in the Philippines are wiped out, inasmuch as military security could no longer be endangered. “Big collaborationists” like members of the Cabinet of the last Republic, will be detained during the duration of the war, but they may be released upon the guarantee of the Philippine government.

To me, this is not good news. Why should there be any distinction between big and small? Insofar as military security is concerned, the small collaborationists are just as dangerous, if not more dangerous, than the big collaborationists.

The guarantee required of the Philippine government will place us in the vortex of politics. We will be placed into the hands of politicians. This is precisely what I have been fearing. I fear that our release or continuation under detention would depend upon whether it will favor or prejudice the political aspirations of the official concerned.

In connection with our letter mentioned previously, it should be added that we purposely used the word “obey” in order to indicate that we were being ordered, thereby attaining the purpose we had in wishing to use the word “order” in the first part of the second paragraph.

On July 25, 1945, there was a Reuter’s dispatch from Washington, substantially saying as follows: Senator Albert Chandler (Democrat, Kentucky) and a member of the Senate Military Affairs Committee told Reuter today, “I shall make use of the Senate Debate on the ratification of the San Francisco Charter to bring to the attention of my colleagues the question of the political future of India.

“I have studied with great care the reference in the Charter to dependent territories, and I would like to clarify the position that India would occupy in this new world organization.

“The Charter promises ultimate independence to all countries and I would like to know what steps can be taken by the new organization to bring about India’s complete freedom and independence.”

The Senate voted against the United States’ participation in Pres. Wilson’s League of Nations. This time the participation in the new league was approved and thus commits America to full-scale cooperation in the New World order. There are many causes of the failure of the former League of Nations. To me, one of them which I consider one of the main causes, is the failure to draw in the United States. Any world organization without the United States cannot endure. This is not only because of the greatness and importance of the United States among nations but also because she has assumed a virtual protectorate of the North and South American continents. This protectorate will extend to the Philippines.

I have already commented on the San Francisco World Charter insofar as its provisions referring to dependent peoples are concerned. I criticized this provision for not being clear and specific enough. There should not be the least doubt that the Charter will insure independence to small states and dependent peoples. Colonization must be eliminated for all time. This is necessary, not only to prevent wars between two or more nations, but also to avoid revolutions, rebellions, massacres, or just individual cases of killing, imprisonment or political persecution. If this policy had been implanted about the middle of the 17th century, there would not have occurred the American revolution; there would not have been recorded the many bloody revolutions of South American countries; we would not have suffered on account of our revolution against Spain. Rebellions of dependent peoples have caused death and untold suffering of a great number of people. Massacres, like that of Amritzar, India, have taken place because of the libertarian movements on the part of the people. How many lives have been lost for the cause of liberty! How many have languished in Britain for heading or championing separatist or liberal movements! How many have been deported, banished from the country that has given them life, and separated from their dear ones! All these horrors must be prevented at all costs.

* * * * *

            Autograph hunting continues. To Dr. Lanuza, I said: “Together we shall be up to the end of the journey.” What I mean is that having suffered together we shall be united in all efforts to win our vindication and to serve our country.

To Mr. Carmona: “I shall never forget the days when we together shared equally the joys and sorrows of life. This has cemented the friendship which binds me with you.”


June 22, 1945 Friday

Hope for our release is just like a stock market; it goes up and down. One day everybody appears happy; the next day, disappointment and deep sorrow reign. Today we are all in high spirits for a reason which I shall now explain.

The urgent need for a separate toilet for the officer class has been felt for some time. Plans were drafted by Engineers Paez and Bayan. Construction was commenced a few days ago under the direction of the two engineers and the supervision of Don Teofilo Sison. This morning, while Mr. Bayan was on his job, the Colonel-Superintendent came although it is not inspection day. This Superintendent, unlike his predecessor, comes quite frequently. Engineer Bayan since his arrival had been having trouble with his teeth. He had consulted Army dentists who believed that all his remaining teeth should be pulled out and a complete set of false teeth be made. Evidently, the Colonel was told about it and he probably remembered it. The Colonel urged Mr. Bayan to have his teeth work done. Mr. Bayan answered that he would prefer to have it done in Manila as it would be very inconvenient for him. He explained that if all his teeth were pulled out, he would need a special diet. In Manila, in his own home, his family could prepare his special food. The Colonel answered that such special food could not be provided by them, but he would make arrangements whereby he would be served before everybody else. Engineer Bayan made the following remarks evidently in order to reinforce his refusal to have his dental work done here: “I expect to be released soon”. Mr. Bayan was probably not aware that he released a trial-balloon to find out something about our possible release. The Colonel spontaneously stated: “The probability is 90% that you will be released without trouble as the government is very interested in you. That is the way I look at it.” Adding, “So you are going to wait.” “Yes”, answered Mr. Bayan.

Those who heard this exchange lost no time communicating to others the good tydings. Senator Sebastian ran inside our barracks to tell us the conversation he heard. Naturally, we all became very anxious and listened very attentively to the narration of the Senator. Not contented with secondhand news, Mr. Bayan was shoved into the midst of the happy crowd and made to repeat the conversation. He was cautioned to use the exact words of the Colonel. Mr. Bayan was very accommodating. He kept repeating the conversation every time a new listener came around, notwithstanding his difficulty in talking on account of the condition of his teeth.

There was general rejoicing in the quarters of the officer class. The rejoicing soon spread to the quarters of the enlisted class. The whole morning the conversation was the topic of vivid comments. There were different versions as to the application of the ninety per cent. Senator Sebastian who heard the conversation gave his version as follows: “Ninety per cent will be released.” Recto concurred with this version, adding that the ten per cent referred to Mr. Bayan who will have to remain so that work on his teeth could be finished. The new version did not in any way dampen the enthusiasm as everybody expects not to be included in the ten per cent. The enthusiasm was such that the “bread and water” ration given us at the mess was devoured in no time. In his bewilderment, Mr. Bayan approached the ration table more than once. Don Quintin Paredes became a disciple of Dr. Samari, predicting that comments will continue for two days.

The expression “without trouble” has been interpreted by some to mean that there will not be any formal inquiry. Others believe that he meant that our cases are meritorious ones.

No news referring to us has provoked as much enthusiasm as this one. It is pointed out that the Colonel is in a position to know and he must have based his statements on some tangible facts. He could not have referred to the interest of the government unless he knows it positively.

God bless the Colonel. He certainly has revived our fading hope.

Sensational news are reported in the newspapers we have just received.

The first is to the effect that Representative Emilio de la Paz of Rizal, who was defeated by Representative Jose Zulueta of Iloilo for the Speakership, hurled charges that his defeat meant that there were still vestiges of Japanese influence in Congress. When informed that the Committee on Internal Affairs of the House of Representatives would require him to substantiate his charges, he stated that he is prepared to prove them. Many interpret the act of de la Paz as one of spite because of his defeat. I am willing, however, to grant him the benefit of a doubt. I credit him with sincerity and courage to denounce what he thinks is an evil or inconsistency in the acts of our public officials. As a matter of fact, if the acts attributed to many of us in this prison constitute collaboration, there are many members of Congress who are collaborators. I think I have already named somewhere in these writings some Senators guilty of the same acts for which we have been detained. In the House there are many who took active part in the pacification campaign. Some of them have amassed fortunes for activities during the Japanese regime. One was connected with a business providing lumber to the Japanese. A probe will perhaps disclose facts which may be the basis for the charges of Representative de la Paz.

The second news is to the effect that Cabili had accused President Roxas of the Senate of having sent him a form letter urging him to surrender to the Japanese. On the surface, the charge seems to be serious, if true. I do not know the facts, but there may be a satisfactory explanation for this. The date when the letter was written is very pertinent. Roxas after his appointment as Brigidier General, was placed in charge of the military operations in Mindanao. He was the head in that Island. When Corregidor was occupied by the Japanese, Gen. Homma declined to accept the surrender of Wainright and his men unless Wainright surrendered the rest of the USAFFE in the Philippines, being the Commanding General with jurisdiction over the whole Philippines after the departure of Gen. MacArthur. By radio and letters, Wainright communicated this condition for surrender set by Gen. Homma to all the District Commanders in the Philippines ordering them to surrender. Brigadier General Roxas probably only transmitted the order of Gen. Wainright. Roxas will undoubtedly clear up the situation.

Col. Peralta, the patriot and guerrilla hero of Panay, whose exploits won for him one of the highest decorations given to military men, wrote a letter to Pres. Osmeña, urging the latter to follow a moderate policy on the collaborationist problem for the sake of unity. I already had a high opinion of Col. Peralta. With his letter, my admiration for him has heightened even more. His motive for recommending such a policy is sublime and highly patriotic. It shows his intense love for his country. In war time, he had risked his life so that the liberty for which our forefathers had shed their precious blood, could be attained and preserved. Now in peace time, he urges unity as disunion at this crucial period in our history may cause us to lose whatever liberties we may have already won and even endanger the independence of our country which is already assured. I think much more will be heard of Col. Peralta. He will some day be in a position of great responsibility in our country. I have never seen him. It shall be a pleasure and an honor to meet him.

Dr. Moncado brought news substantially confirming the statement of the Colonel. I am still pessimistic.


June 18, 1945 Monday

Discussions have been raging as to whether the policies and acts of America in the Philippines at the present time are correct. The almost unanimous opinion is that America is committing a blunder in the Philippines and, consequently, alienating a good portion of the Filipinos. They say the acts of the Americans in the Philippines after the reconquest, especially concerning the alleged “collaborationists” are uncalled for and unjustified.

The reason it out this way. America came to the Philippines under the most suspicious circumstances. She fought Spain to save the Cubans from the atrocities of Spain. As an incident of that war, Dewey entered Manila Bay, destroyed the Spanish fleet, and later with the American Army, set foot on Philippine soil. It is said that Dewey promised Aguinaldo that America would respect the independence of the Philippines which the Filipinos had won from Spain. Because of that promise the Filipinos helped the Americans. Later, when the Spaniards left, the Americans refused to leave the Philippine soil. Fighting between the Americans and the Filipinos began. As was to be expected we Filipinos were vanquished, America decided to occupy the Philippines.

The Filipinos were heartened when President McKinley announced America’s policy in the Philippines. He said that the Philippines would be prepared for self-government. America had been true to that policy. Little by little we were granted government powers. Filipinos were called to run the provincial and municipal governments. An elective assembly was created which, with the Philippine Commission, exercised the legislative powers. Later, the Senate was created. The Legislature, composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, was created and to it was granted all legislative powers. This was in accordance with the Jones Law approved in 1916. Almost all the government positions were given to Filipinos. Naturally, we were all very grateful to America. In the same law there was a definite promise that independence would be granted upon the establishment of a stable government.

Some discontent arose when later independence did not come notwithstanding the promise contained in the Jones Law. However, the law had not been definite and clear as to when independence would be granted. All doubts were cleared up when in 1935, the Independence Law—Tydings-McDuffie Act—was approved. It provided for independence after ten years. This ten year period was thought to be necessary for economic readjustment since Philippine export trade was almost wholly with America. Notwithstanding our opposition, it established free trade and other economic policies that intertwined the Philippine economic system to that of the United States. In accordance with the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Commonwealth of the Philippines was organized, to cover the 10 year period of readjustment. As the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act intended to facilitate the readjustment were not satisfactory, we sent Missions to the United States to work for the necessary modification. I was a member of one of those Missions. We met very little success in this connection. When the war broke out in 1941, we had covered over one-half of the readjustment period.

Needless to say, the Filipinos were filled with gratitude towards the United States. The Americans could have enslaved us, but they preferred to treat us as free people. They could have exploited our country, reserving for themselves the abundant resources of the country, but they preferred to leave them for us to enjoy. They could have imposed terms which would reserve for them certain rights or which would grant them preferential advantages. Instead, however, they would allow us to have absolute freedom in our future relationship with America. America meant to give us the kind of independence we had worked for. The readjustment period will expire in 1946, so that in that year we shall have our independence.

How can we now work against the interest of America under these circumstances? It is unthinkable. The Japanese did not do anything in the Philippines, something they should have done, to get the sympathy and support of the Filipino people.

Before her occupation by the Japanese, there was a good portion of Filipinos in sympathy with Japan. This was because of race and geographical considerations. They sincerely believed that the destiny of our country was with Japan and that we will have to be a member of a League of Nations composed of the Far Eastern countries. In view of the announced policy of Japan of not considering us as enemies and of recognizing our independence very soon, naturally the Filipinos expected to be treated as equals.

But from the very beginning, the Japanese conducted themselves in such a fashion that they alienated the Filipinos. One of the acts was to require the Filipinos to bow to the Japanese sentries. Bowing is a practice in Japan which is good and can very well be obeyed. But the Filipinos were not accustomed to such a practice; they thought they were being made to salute the Japanese, to acknowledge them as superior and master of the Filipinos. This the Filipinos could not accept, as a consequence, many failed to salute and were immediately punished. The worst part of it was that, on occasions when the Filipinos obeyed, the Japanese sentries insisted in having the bow executed properly, although the correct form had never been communicated to the Filipinos. The usual punishment for not saluting is slapping. High government officials and prominent people did not escape punishment. Slapping, perhaps caused more people to hold themselves aloof from or even to hate the Japanese than any other act of the Japanese.

Those incidents showed that the Japanese did not respect our customs, did not know the psychology of the Filipino people. Even soldiers not on sentry duty and Japanese civilians indulged in this pastime. The ranking Japanese officers saw the effects of slapping and other abuses being committed by the Japanese soldiers and civilians and they endeavored to stop them, but they met with very little success. General Tanaka himself toured the whole country for the purpose, and it was in that trip that he contracted the sickness which kept him in bed for many months.

The Japanese civilians had a pretty good share in the commission of abuses. Their hands were into almost everything. They commandeered automobiles. They compelled house owners to rent their buildings or houses to them or to their Filipino friends at very low rents. They took over almost all Filipino businesses. In Batangas, one Japanese tried to acquire all the “batels” (sail boats) to have a monopoly of the water transportation business. At that time, Batangas ports were being extensively used for shipping to the Southern Islands on the “batels”. The Batangueños were so angry that, to show their oppositions to this form of robbery, it is said that a Japanese was tied to the mast of one of the “batels” and burned alive. Filipinos who refused to sell their business would be threatened; if this fails to scare them, the Japanese would get the business by force. They compelled the sale of the T.V.T. newspapers to them. If the intention was just to control the press they could have done so without compelling the sale to them. The Japanese civilians alleged that they had been appointed agents of the Japanese Army or Navy to take over businesses to bolster the war efforts. Some businesses are really necessary for war purposes, but it would take a wide stretch of the imagination to consider other businesses in connection with the war efforts.

This monopolization of Filipino business caused the Filipinos to doubt the much vaunted purposes of creating the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” They say it is not “co-prosperity” but “prosperity ko.” “Ko” is the Tagalog word for my or mine. It was obvious that even if political independence were granted, the Japanese meant to make slaves of us, economically speaking.

I did my best to curtail this activity of the Japanese. I did it under the guise of inflation prevention. I knew the Japanese businessmen were being lavishly financed by the Japanese banks (for they did not bring any capital from the outside) and I alleged that it was increasing circulation and consequently causing inflation. I was not very successful. Gen. Utsonomiya with whom I had various conferences seemed to be unwilling or unable to help. Only in very few cases was I able to succeed. Some of the businesses I remember having intervened in is the Puyat Furniture Co., and the Philippine Refining Co. which had the monopoly of sugar refinery in the Philippines. The only Filipino businesses that thrived during the Japanese regime were the “buy and sell” business and the real estate business. In the “buy and sell” business, only those who sold war materials to the Japanese Army and Navy got rich. As to the real estate business its boom was caused by the apparently high values of real estate (I say “apparently” because the fact was that the low value of the Japanese military notes, made the prices seem high).

Returning to the matter of the maltreatment of Filipinos at Japanese hands, the cruelty displayed was to say the least horrifying. Many Filipinos were subjected to severe beatings and other forms of corporal punishment. Many were killed. One of those subjected to torture was Dr. Antonio Sison, Director of the Philippine General Hospital, Dean of the College of Medicine and Surgery, and President of the University of the Philippines. Dr. Sison was very strict in the performance of his duties as Director of Philippine General Hospital. He treated everybody equally; gave no special privileges in the hospital no matter how rich and influential the patient may be. Unfortunately, some Filipinos resented this. One of those harboring a grudge against Dr. Sison denounced him to the Japanese military authorities as being the Chief Surgeon of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. The accusation of course turned out to be false. He was arrested, tied to a post blindfolded for more than ten days with practically no food. He was almost dead when released because of the intervention of Pres. Laurel and his brother, Minister Teofilo Sison of the Interior. In this connection, I should state that at the start of the war, Dr. Sison was a great admirer of the Germans and Japanese. He was one of the assiduous students learning Nippongo. His admiration for the Japanese did not last long, soon replaced by a feeling bordering on hate. He dropped the study of Nippongo.

In Batangas, at the beginning the majority of the inhabitants were very friendly towards the Japanese. But the appointment of a Captain Sakai as Chief of the Military Police (Kempetai) soon changed this. Many were arrested, interrogated, slapped and tortured. At one time, Capt. Sakai made a list of prominent people in Batangas and required them all to surrender their revolvers. Many complied; those who did not were punished. I remember my cousin, Luis Atienza of the barrio of Sambat, Taal, in this connection. He received one of those letters. He consulted me as to what he should do. He said that his friends advised him to buy a revolver and surrender it. I answered: “You should not consult me. You ought to know me well enough by this time. Since you say that you have no revolver, do not acquire one. Don’t allow your dignity to be trampled on, accept any punishment that may be meted out to you. It is not dishonorable to receive punishment when you stand up to what is right.” I later regretted that I gave such an advice as I was thereby assuming too much responsibility. Sakai had done much to propagate anti-Japanese feeling in Batangas. This is the reason why guerrillas multiplied in Batangas.

We naturally protested vehemently against such brutal treatment of the Filipinos. I went to see Gen. Utsonomiya many times to request the removal of Capt. Sakai from office. After a long delay, he was finally transferred to Laguna. I heard that in his new post he changed, became very friendly to all the Filipinos especially the “guerrilleros.” He was able to make many “guerrilleros” surrender. He used to go to the mountains alone. In one of those trips he was murdered. The story was that he agreed to meet an important leader of the “guerrilleros” who wanted to negotiate. The followers of the guerrilla leader discovered the plan and, in order to foil the surrender, murdered Sakai.

Another practice so much resented by the Filipinos was “zoning”. A barrio or town is surrounded; all the inhabitants are ordered to proceed to a small place, usually a school house or a church. There they are kept without food and any sanitation facilities. The men are ordered to line up. A Filipino who is hooded walks down the line, pointing out those he believed to be guerrillas or enemies of the Japanese. The accused are forthwith arrested and punished. In many cases, they are never seen again. I have witnessed “zoning” in my youth; the Americans under General Bell, practiced it in Batangas in 1901.

We in government did all we could to save the lives of Filipinos and to free them from imprisonment or detention by the Japanese. Hon. Jose Abad Santos was the Secretary of Justice and former Justice of the Supreme Court who, according to reliable information, was the one to whom President Quezon left all affairs of government when he departed for the United States. When we heard that he was being held by the Japanese in Cebu, we talked to General Wachi, Director General of the Japanese Military Administration, and other generals and asked them most insistently to free Mr. Abad Santos. We explained that he was an Orientalist. We also talked to Col. Kawakami who was the Commander of the Army and in whose hands was placed the fate of Mr. Abad Santos. We were told that our intervention came too late as Mr. Abad Santos had already been executed. Kawakami was extremely cruel to the Filipinos. He was reported to be mentally deranged.

When we heard that Gen. Manuel Roxas was being held by the Japanese in Mindanao, we also took the necessary steps to free him. We were also told that he had already been executed. It appeared that Roxas had really been sentenced to death, but the Colonel in charge refused to carry out the sentence. We later discovered that Gen. Roxas had been brought to Manila. We do not know whether our intervention had any influence at all in Gen. Roxas’ case.

We also intervened in behalf of many other Filipinos. I was always one of those who intervened.

One day my friend, Representative Feliciano Gomez, came to see me to ask me for help for the Mayor of his town as he was being sought by the Japanese. The Mayor, Mr. Alinsod, was accused of being the head of the guerrillas in the town. He assured me that he was not a guerrilla. I talked to General Kawazoe, Chief of Staff of the Army in Central Luzon, who promised to investigate. After a few days, the General came to me, bringing with him papers which proved that the Mayor was really the head of the guerrillas in Sta. Rosa and that he provided guns and food to the guerrillas. I called Mr. Alinsod and asked him to tell me the whole truth. The Mayor confessed. I saw Gen. Kawazoe again, told him the truth, but I strongly urged that the Mayor be given another chance and I would be willing to guarantee his future good conduct. The Mayor was not arrested. He later joined his companions in the mountains and continued his guerrilla activities until the landing of the Americans in Leyte.

Another case was that of Mr. Calingasan, Mayor of Tuy, Batangas. Calingasan had been one of my best leaders when I ran several times for Representative. I remember that in one of our political meetings in Tuy, a fight ensued. Calingasan drew his dagger and challenged the rioters. The disturbance stopped. Calingasan was arrested by the Japanese, charged with being a guerrillero and with having furnished food to American guerrillas. His family came to me to solicit my good offices. I talked to Gen. Kawazoe. The General showed me the papers of the Mayor, among which was an affidavit admitting his guilt. I insisted that the Mayor be released, promising good conduct on his part in the future. The general acceded and Mr. Calingasan was delivered to me in my house. He had various scars on his body as he was tortured during his imprisonment in Nasugbu.

I intervened in various cases of guerrilleros caught by the Japanese. I succeeded in very few cases. One of the patriots I tried to save was Mrs. Antonio Escoda, wife of the newspaperman whose underground activities were well-known and who was captured and put to death by the Japanese. Because of the capture of her husband, she sensed that she would be arrested too. I employed her in my department to show the Japanese that she was cooperating with the administration. All my efforts were in vain because she was arrested and executed.

Another person I tried to help was Gen. Vicente Lim. I was making arrangements to employ Gen. Lim in my department to camouflage his underground activities when he disappeared. I heard later that he tried to escape to Australia and was captured. He was executed.

Many persons representing themselves to be guerrillas came to my house to request for monetary aid. I was very careful in dealing with them because the Japanese Military Police had employed spies to catch Filipino officials who were in contact or cooperating with the guerrillas. However, whenever I was sure they were genuine guerrillas and could be trusted, I gave them valuable information and some monetary aid. I could not give as much money as I would have wanted because I did not have much to spare. Three Filipino guerrillas with whom I had constant contact were Colonels Baya and Jurado, and Lieutenant Jimenez. I personally knew they belonged to the USAFFE. Lt. Jimenez was in constant contact with Bataan and Corregidor and I was able to give him valuable information. I remember I gave some monetary aid to Lt. Lazaro Malabanan who came in behalf of a large guerrilla organization in Batangas, and Ramon Cabrera of the Ateneo de Manila.

One case I would specially like to mention is that of Roberto Vallejo, nicknamed Berto. He was our cook in Manila and we took him with us to Baguio when the government evacuated to that city. From the very beginning, I noticed that he was always out specially at night. During air raids, he would not enter our shelter but instead would stay in an open space. I asked my wife to dismiss him. It was then that he revealed to us that he was a Sergeant in the guerrilla forces. He showed me all his papers. He said he had to observe and report on the effects of the bombings. I immediately relieved him of his duties as our cook so he can concentrate on the performance of his patriotic duties.

Much of the difficulty in our effort to save lives was due to the rather unusual organization of the Japanese Army in the Philippines. Local commanders do not seem to be under any central authority as they paid no attention to orders or requests from Manila. The local commanders would arrest provincial and municipal officials and peaceful law abiding citizens notwithstanding orders, rules and regulations emanating from higher officers in Manila. We were repeatedly frustrated. Many times we were able to obtain the release orders of arrested persons from higher officials in Manila, but local commanders would disregard them.

The punishment inflicted by the Japanese were of the most cruel nature. They also enforced collective responsibility. For the death of a Japanese soldier, masses are massacred and towns burned. This happened in a town in Tayabas.

Another cause of discontent is the forcible eviction of Filipinos from their homes or the forcible taking of private buildings and houses. There were all kinds of abuses in this connection. They would notify the house owner to leave with a certain period and he has to comply. If the buildings and houses were to be used for military purposes, we Filipinos would have understood the necessity of giving up our homes, although we would have objected to the method employed. But in many cases, we just could not see how military necessity enters. The houses are not strategically located and sometimes only one or two officers live in them. In some cases, the houses were left unoccupied and as a result they were looted. Don Vicente Singson Encarnacion was forced to leave his house. The house, which was left vacant for a long period of time, was vandalized. To settle all conflicts, a House Committee was created in accordance with an understanding with the military authorities. However, from the very start, the Japanese officers paid no attention to the committee, and soon thereafter the membership of the committee had to be changed several times as nobody cared to serve in it.

An incident happened with reference to the house on Taft Avenue belonging to the in-laws of my daughter, Natividad. The Cojuangcos were notified by the Japanese officers that the house was to be occupied by the military. Naturally, the owners expressed their desire to have the matter submitted to the House Committee. They had good reasons not to give up their house. I took the matter up with Malacañan and with the House Committee. The Japanese officers returned and told the owner that they must leave within two days and upon failure to do so, they would be thrown out into the streets with all their furniture and belongings. When the Japanese were told that the matter was being investigated by the House Committee, they answered: “Never mind Committee. They are all crooks.” The owners had to leave, transferring to a very small house and moving almost all the furniture. A few days later, they found out that the occupants of the house were Filipino women who were mistresses of the officers. Barely a month passed when the owners found the house abandoned. They returned to the house.

When Gen. Homma announced that the Japanese came as friends of the Filipinos, and when General Tojo announced that the Philippines would be granted her independence immediately and later in October, 1943, actually granted our independence, there was general rejoicing and genuine expression of gratitude to Japan on the part of the Filipinos. There were many, however, who doubted the sincerity of Japan. They turned out to be right. After independence, the changes affected were only in names and expressions. The Japanese continued to intervene in public affairs especially in the provinces. They continued to arrest and abuse the Filipino; they even arrested public officials without notifying the President or the corresponding high authority. They still controlled businesses. Confiscation still continued.

Before the organization of the Republic, each ministry had Japanese advisers. After the Republic, all were withdrawn, with the exception of the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture. They refused to allow the Minister of Finance to supervise Japanese banks and to control Japanese investments and credit. The offices in the Japanese Administration corresponding to the different ministries remained, however, and continued to give suggestions to the Filipino officials which under the circumstances had to be followed. I must recognize, however, that my adviser, Dr. Haraguti, had been very good to me. He expressed approval or at least sympathy for my plans. But unfortunately, he seemed to be powerless and the military people continued to be the deciding factor. I should add that Japanese officials continued to intervene in private affairs.

To top it all, after the Americans landed, the retreating Japanese massacred everybody in sight, by guns, bayonets and hand grenades. Some of the victims were my own daughter, Natividad, married to Ramon Cojuangco, and my brother-in-law, Jose Lualhati, husband of Conchita.

Many Filipinos joined the American Army to avenge the deaths of their dear ones. It would be unthinkable that Filipinos would not turn pro-American, or that they would do anything to jeopardize America’s war efforts, even those who cooperated with the Japanese. But instead the Americans arrested many of them, including almost all the Filipino high officials during the Japanese regime who served only to help their own people. They arrested numerous persons for flimsy motives and for complaints which generally come from persons who harbor grudges against the accused or who try to make the Americans believe that they are the real “guerrilleros.” The Americans are sowing seeds for anti-American feelings. The Filipinos actively work for Philippine independence because, as they say, if we drive all the Japanese and Americans away, we could manage our affairs without any kind of interference. There will be opposition to any movement that might tie us up with America politically.


3rd January 1945

Eddie Vargas enplaned for Manila this morning, his baggage mostly medicines for his family, parcels for home from the students, a letter or two from each of the rest of us.

The Nippon Times carries an article by General Homma. in a reassuring review of the present Philippine campaign he states: “We need not be unduly apprehensive as even if oil will no longer be forthcoming from the southern regions, we can fly our planes with alcohol produced from pine resin.”


May 7, 1944 (Sunday)

Mass and communion at St. Sofia’s.

Visited the Nagasakis this morning with Quiambao, and took pictures.

Anniversary of the Fall of Corregidor; We Meet General Homma in Personal Interview. Today, anniversary of the fall of Corregidor, General Masaharu Hommma, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces during the Bataan campaign, invited us Constabulary officers (ex-USAFFE officers( for an intimate interview at the Mainichi Shimbun Building at 2:00 p.m.

Present during the interview were two stenographers and a gentleman who was with the Press Section attached to Imperial Army Headquarters and who was with General Homma throughout the Bataan campaign. Maps of the Philippines, especially of Bataan and Corregidor (including copies of military grid maps of the U.S. Army) were spread wide on the table to facilitate our talks. The General made us feel quite at ease, and when we got tangled up in our Nippongo, we talked in English, the General interpreting for us for the sake of the stenographers.

The question asked by the General were substantially as follows:

“Before the outbreak of the war of Great East Asia, what did you think about it? What was the people’s impression of Japan before the war? What was the estimate of the military authorities regarding the strength of the Japanese Army? What were the effects of the first bombings in the Philippines? What was the attitude of the Filipinos towards the war? Was there racial or other discrimination in Bataan? What did you think was the entire strength of the Japanese Army in the whole Philippine campaign? What was the casualty rate on the Filipino side, including deaths in the concentration camps? What do you think was the casualty rate on the Japanese side? What units did you belong to, and what experiences did you have? What artillery guns did you use? How did you take the departure of General MacArthur for Australia? How about the landing in Aglaloma, the fight in the Moron, Abucay, Mt. Samat and Mt. Natib sectors? While in Bataan, what were the rumors concerning the Japanese soldiers? What do you intend to do now, and how do you view the whole thing?”

To these series of questions our answers were substantially as follows:

“Before the outbreak of the Great East Asia War, there were so many rumors about it, and the situation was very tense; but we never expected it to start as early as December 8, 1941; the Filipinos thought it was a war to safeguard Philippine territorial integrity and so the Filipinos, especially the youth, were anxious to fight, many volunteering to join the ranks, even while the fight in Bataan was already on, going there by bancas; before the war, the Filipinos looked at Japan with extreme suspicion, regarding her as menace to the Pacific and a threat to P.I. independence; the military authorities underestimated Japan’s fighting strength although some quarters seriously thought about Japan’s preparedness for a major Pacific war; the first bombings were quite effective, military objectives being hit accurately, and there was a general belief that perhaps the Japanese planes were manned by German pilots; there was discrimination in food rationing in favor of the Americans, but this was due to the different standards of allowances between the Americas and the Filipinos, and there was no way of complaining to our superior officers for they, too, (as Filipinos) were receiving the same poor rations; the Americans were careful about their treatment of the Filipinos because they were afraid to provoke the anger of the Filipinos who were very conscious that they were bearing practically the whole brunt of the fight in Bataan; an estimate of the Japanese forces was about 500,000 and casualties about 100,000 (the General said the Japanese forces numbered only about 100,000 and the casualties 5,000); we calculated the deaths on the Filipino side at about 50,000; we related our various experiences in our different sectors from the start of the Bataan campaign till the general offensive of April 3, 1942, which finally ended in the fall of Bataan; told him we used 75 mm. and 155 mm. guns, and he was surprised to hear that an average of about 1,000 shells were fired a day (he said the Japanese could not fire back so often due to lack of a good supply of ammunition); when General MacArthur left for Australia, he issued a memo to all officers to the effect that he was leaving on command of the U.S. President to assume a more important post for the successful prosecution of the war, which encouraged the men in Bataan; rumors about the Japanese soldiers were that they were barbarous and merciless and would spare no one if captured; there was also a communique issued in Bataan announcing the death and funeral of General Homma (the General heard this one, too, he said); now that we see the sincerity in the actions of Japan and the high ideals for which she is fighting, we cannot help but feel grateful for the opportunity granted to us to work for our country in particular and for Great East Asia in general.” (Heh!)

After the interview at the Mainichi Building, we proceeded to the Greater East Asia Hall where the General treated us to a banquet. Here, too, we continued our exchange of views. When asked as to what lessons could be learned from the Bataan war, the old veteran General said that jungle positions are the best defense, and an offensive in jungle sectors is the hardest military operation to undertake.

I told the General the following: “When we were in Bataan, we never thought of losing the war and much less of being captured prisoners; when we were in the concentration camp, we never expected to be released; when we were released, we never thought we would become Constabulary officers; as Constabulary officers we never thought of going to Japan as government scholars of the Imperial Government; and, finally, while in Japan we never even dreamed of meeting in an intimate interview the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, our grand enemy in Bataan.”

Personally, I consider my meeting General Homma in this afternoon’s interview a fitting climax of my personal odyssey which started in the crimson fields of Bataan. I only hope I find time to write my “memoirs” which I intend to entitle From Bataan to Tokyo.


August 15, 1942

General Homma has left for Japan. His departure was rumored a week ago, and it was one of those rumors which turned out to be true. It was not published by the local press until he had landed safely in his own country. It was Radio Tokyo that broadcasted the news.

Those who have known him describe him as afable, frank and intelligent, but a Japanese through and through. He was replaced by General Tanaka, about whom we know nothing aside from the fact that he has a moustache which protrudes like two brushes.

There was also an announcement that General Hayashi was replaced by General Watti as Chief of the Military Administration. The Honorable Murata, Chief Adviser of the military administration, also flew to Japan, but we could not tell whether he was replaced by another.

Would all these changes mean a new political atmosphere? We have to find that out, not from the press, but from subsequent events.


July 24, 1942

A report came from the Army Headquarters that a number of persons hostile to the Imperial Forces had been arrested. They were accused of connivance and cooperation with some groups which are working against those arrested were some highly-placed government officials who had pledged loyalty to the administration only for appearances but were actually coddling subversive elements. All these people were to be eliminated to the last man.

There were rumors that Quezon City Mayor Tomás Morató and his chief and assistant chief of police, as well as former Manila Mayor Eulogio Rodríguez and his son, the governor of Rizal, are among those arrested.

The report contained the terse clause: “It should be remembered by everyone that all feelings of sympathy towards the enemy, even if not manifested externally, are clearly an act of hostility to the Imperial Army.”

Rome does not judge the inner thoughts, but Homma does.


June 3, 1942

Military parade held in Manila yesterday. Lt. Gen. Homma reviewed his victorious Japanese forces. The newspapers say there were many onlookers. It was not so. There were very few and the majority were forced to attend the parade. The people did not applaud the troops. There was none of the usual fanfare and cheers from the crowd. Men, women and even children looked grimly, sadly. I kept thinking of the last line of Zulueta’s prize-winning essay during the Commonwealth regime: “And gods will walk on brown legs.” Were these the gods—these men that tramped in their ugly shoes and drab uniforms? There was something about the way they marched, a sort of automatic shoving of the feet forward, their bodies swaying to the left and right, just forging on and on, wearily, doggedly, fanatically…

I felt cold, like awaking from a nightmare.

 

 


June 3, 1942

The occupation army held a military parade at the Luneta to celebrate the end of military operations in the Philippines. Some 80 tanks, canons of all calibers, anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks, and motorized infantry men paraded through Burgos Avenue. The din was deafening.

Fifty planes flew overhead in perfect formation, three of which performed aerial acrobatics. There were other displays of military might in other avenues which we did not witness. There was no brass band, unlike in other military parades of the past years, where the brass bands constituted a major attraction.

The districts around the Luneta were made off-limits to traffic, and since early morning, no one could leave Intramuros or Ermita. People were requested to close the windows of higher floors and watch the parade from the sidewalks or from ground floors.

At the Luneta, only invited guests were allowed to enter and view the parade, namely, General Homma and his retinue, the high officials of the army and the government, and some representatives of Allied or neutral governments.

As the gates of the Walled City were closed, people could not go to their respective places of work, nor to the market. We therefore could not buy our supplies for the day. And as we did not want to go on a fast, Fr. Sadaba and myself decided to play mendicants, appealing to the charity of our guests. We jumped over the barrier that separated us, and went to their kitchen, which was ours in the place. With signs—we have been improving our use of the language of the mutes—we made them understand that we had nothing to eat. The cook, a typical representative of his profession—good-natured, corpulent, with wall-sized shoulders and a pair of elephantine biceps—opened their, or better still, our refrigerator and gave us a basketful of eggs, meat, tomatoes and eggplants.

A kitchen aide approached us and, forming a cross with his fingers, asked, “Kristu?”

“Yes, we Kristu,” meaning we were Christians.

He pointed to himself and said, “Kristu.”

“Oh, you Kristu,” we said, and we laughed and nodded our heads in mutual understanding.

“Nagasaki,” he continued.

“You from Nagasaki?” Nagasaki is the center of Catholicism in Japan. He started counting with his fingers, asking how many Christians we were.

We answered, also with our fingers, that we were twelve Christians in that place. The good Japanese appeared well-pleased.

We glanced at their food storeroom and saw that there were basketfuls of fruits and vegetables, sacks of rice and big quantities of meat and fish. We could not help gazing with envy at the big cauldrons overflowing with steaming rice and big chunks of meat, as if in preparation for a big feast.

If only we could understand one another, we and the tenants could be of mutual assistance to each other. They could help us materially and we could help them spiritually. We could see that they were eager to converse with us. But in spite of their gesticulations and their practice in the art of mimicry, we still find ourselves at a loss.

We just found out that these soldiers are pilots or air cadets, some of whom had taken part in the bombing of Intramuros. Every morning most of them are fetched by magnificent buses, and we imagine that they are taken to an airfield.

They must have been assigned their living quarters in this residential place so that enemy planes may not get to them. Perhaps they do not feel secure within the vicinity of an airfield. We are only hoping that the flying fortresses would not spot them and drop some bombs on our place!