Hugh Gibson’s Food Mission Diary: Herbert Hoover in Manila, 1946

(above) British Pathé newsreel of a portion of former President Herbert Hoover’s mission to assess food requirements for devastated parts of the world, 1946.

While this diary is part of the Herbert Hoover papers, the diary of Hugh Gibson gives a useful glimpse into an interesting mission –Hoover’s task to survey the globe to see food requirements for devastated countries– and American perspectives about those countries and peoples. Among the nations visited was the Philippines. See The Food Mission Diaries of Hugh Gibson (1946 and 1947), particularly 2nd diary: 1st trip (part II), 1946 April 27–June 19, which contains the portion on the Philippines.  The entry starts at the bottom of page 11 and concludes the Philippine portion in the middle of page 20. It provides an American’s impressions of war-devastated Manila (Monday, April 29, 1946):

We drove through the ruined town which is far worse than it looks from the air. Instead of having been destroyed with bombs which scatter the walls, these buildings were for the most part knocked out by artillery and fire, so the walls still stand in utter desolation. Some of the newer structures stood up better to the punishment but there is very little that is fit for habitation. Wherever there is a vacant lot the squatters have swarmed in with scraps of corrugated iron, ply-board or tin and have erected shanty towns of the most appalling variety. With a weak government there is some doubt as to how and when they can get these people out.

It also includes an interesting vignette of a visit to Malacañan Palace in April, 1946 (pages 11-15, Monday, April 29, 1946):

 Malacañan was occupied by the Japs and consequently escaped destruction. It was mined but as so often happened, when the time came the enemy was so busy getting out that he neglected to carry out his fell purpose.

We were escorted up the red-carpeted staircase and through several big drawing rooms in one of what was a tremendous and rather fine chandelier. Holes showed where two other had hung. It seems the Japs made off with them but there is hope they may be hidden somewhere near at hand as it is doubtful whether they could have been packed and shipped in time at their disposal.

Osmeña was waiting at the door to receive us and escorted us across the room to instal us in big arm chairs. Then he sat down, composed his features and was silent in several languages at once. After waiting for him to sound off the Chief [Hoover] made some remark about being happy to tell him that an idea had appeared this morning as to how the Philippine food needs could be met. Osmeña nodded his head without batting an eyelash. He did not ask what the solution was, but nodded and then stopped as if turned off. The Chief made another remark and again got a nod for his reply. [U.S. High Commissioner] McNutt leapt into the fray with two efforts and got two nods for his pains. As things were rollicking along at this rate servants came in with champagne. Osmeña raised his glass and uttered two words: “Your health.” After this outburst of garrulity he relapsed into silence and after a time the Chief allowed he must not take up any more of his time. He evidently agreed as he offered no protest, but accompanied us all the way downstairs to get his picture taken by the waiting photographers.

This entry gives a glimpse of the reaction of Americans to the increasingly hard-of-hearing Osmeña; and incidentally documents the absence of two of the three large Czechoslavak chandeliers in the Reception Hall of the Palace –in the 1950s Minister of Presidential Protocol Manuel Zamora would recount that the chandeliers had been taken down for cleaning right before the war broke out, and were buried for safekeeping for the duration of the war.

On page 18 of the diary, there is also an account of a dinner given in honor of Hoover by the American High Commissioner, Paul V. McNutt, in which President Osmeña and President-elect Manuel Roxas were both present:

At 7:30 dinner at the High Commissioner’s. He has an agreeable house facing the bay, adequate but nothing like the style of Malacañan which [Frank] Murphy stupidly gave over to the Philippines so that he could go and live near the Elks Club. The High Commissioner has been a vagrant ever since and it has not added to his prestige. Murphy built a house of the water front where he and [Francis B.] Sayre lived, which may have been comfortable inside but which looks like of the less distinguished Oklahoma high schools. Why we had to put up something of that sort in a country where there is a distinguished native style is a mystery. Fortunately the cursed thing was thoroughly bombed and it is to be hoped that something decent will be be built or required for our new diplomatic mission.

Most of our party was asked to the dinner, a number of official Americans and several Filipinos, including the President and his wife and the President-elect and his. There was no love lost between then. I sat next to Señora de Osmeña. Directly across her was Señora Rojas [sic], wife of the Pres. elect. Not one word was exchanged between them through the dinner although McNutt did his valiant best. My neighbor is as chatty as her husband is taciturn and kept up a steady flow of conversation –but I haven’t an idea of what she talked about. Perhaps she does this as compensation like Mrs. Coolidge.

It was hot as blazes and we dripped through dinner which was served out of doors in a loggia. The thermometer stood at 102 which is high for people who were not so long ago in the snows of Scandinavia. We had some talk among the men after dinner…

In the same entry, there is another interesting vignette: about agrarian conditions:

FitzGerald ran into an interested situation here today. The Government people are crying famine and calling for help in securing rice for the starving. It seems that after the war the people in the valleys of Northern Luzon decided to get rid of their landlords and take over the land for themselves. So they shot some landlords and chased the rest away. Thereupon Mr. Osmeña’s boys moved in, organized a cooperative, and announced it would take the place of the landlords. Of course the landlords had been wrong to take half of the rice as their share, so the co-operative would take only thirty percent. However Osmeña’s party was essential to keeping the co-operative afloat, and there were some expenses of the underground which had to be met, so another ten percent would be knocked off for that. The net result is that Osmeña and his people have forty percent of all the rice crop of the region hidden away in hundreds of little warehouses, ready to play politics or make a fortune, or both. But it does indicate that the people are not going to do so badly with all the fruit and vegetables that grow so easily and all the fish they can have in any quantity.

And he closes with a snapshot of American official opinion on the prospects of Philippine independence:

On May 25 Rojas [sic] takes over as Pres. of the Commonwealth and on July 4th comes complete independence. The prospect is not rosy. The Osmeña government has had a year to put things in order. Congress is voting $600,000,000 for rehabilitation which is a fabulous amount compared to the work that has to be done. Many of the local people are already unhappy and look forward to disintegration as soon as the P.I. [Philippine Islands] are left to their own devices. The remark is frequently heard that within five years the people will be clamoring for the United States to move back in again. And at that they have not yet begun to envisage the possibility that China or Russia might move in. Asia for the Asiatics is a grand slogan but the mess they are going to make of it is terrifying.


The First Quarter Storm through the eyes of Ferdinand E. Marcos

Prior to the scrapping of the 1935 Constitution, presidents would deliver their State of the Nation Address in January, at the Legislative Building in Manila.

On January 26, 1970, President Marcos, who had been inaugurated for an unprecedented full second term less than a month earlier, on December 30, 1969 (see Pete Lacaba’s satirical account, Second Mandate: January 10, 1970), was set to deliver his fifth message to the nation.

The classic account of the start of what has come to be known as the First Quarter Storm is Pete Lacaba’s The January 26 Confrontation: A Highly Personal Account, February 7, 1970 followed by his And the January 30 Insurrection, February 7, 1970. From another point of view, there is Kerima Polotan’s The Long Week, February 7, 1970. Followed by Nap Rama’s Have rock, will demonstrate, March 7, 1970.

And there, is of course, the view of Ferdinand E. Marcos himself.

January 23, 1970 and January 24, 1970 were mainly about keeping an eye out on coup plots and the opposition, as well as reshuffling the top brass of the armed forces and picking a new Secretary of National Defense.

January 25, 1970 was about expressing his ire over the behavior of student leaders.

On January 26, 1970 Marcos wrote,

After the State of the Nation address, which was perhaps my best so far, and we were going down the front stairs, the bottles, placard handles, stones and other missiles started dropping all around us on the driveway to the tune of a “Marcos, Puppet” chant.

Marcos then noted,

Some advisors are quietly recommending sterner measures against the Kabataang Makabayan. We must get the emergency plan polished up.

January 27, 1970 and January 28, 1970 were spent housekeeping –talking to police generals– and warning the U.S. Embassy they had better not get involved. Marcos began to further flesh out the rationale for his forthcoming emergency rule:

If we do not prepare measures of counter-action, they will not only succeed in assassinating me but in taking over the government. So we must perfect our emergency plan.

I have several options. One of them is to abort the subversive plan now by the sudden arrest of the plotters. But this would not be accepted by the people. Nor could we get the Huks, their legal cadres and support. Nor the MIM and other subversive [or front] organizations, nor those underground. We could allow the situation to develop naturally then after massive terrorism, wanton killings and an attempt at my assassination and a coup d’etat, then declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus – and arrest all including the legal cadres. Right now I am inclined towards the latter.

On January 29, 1970 Marcos rather angrily recounted receiving a delegation of faculty from his alma mater, the University of the Philippines; and reports in his diary that a very big student protest is due the next day.

The next day would prove to be even more explosive than the day of Marcos’ State of the Nation Address: the attack on Malacañan Palace by student protesters. Marcos writes about it in his January 30, 1970 diary entry:

…the Metrocom under Col. Ordoñez and Aguilar after reinforcement by one company of the PC under Gen. Raval arrived have pushed up to Mendiola near San Beda where the MPD were held in reserve. I hear shooting and I am told that the MPD have been firing in the air.

The rioters have been able to breach Gate 4 and I had difficulty to stop the guards from shooting the rioters down. Specially as when Gate 3 was threatened also. I received a call from Maj. Ramos for permission to fire and my answer was “Permission granted to fire your water hoses.”

For an overview of the events of that day, see Pete Lacaba’s And the January 30 Insurrection, February 7, 1970. This was another in what would turn out to be historic reportage on historic times; as counterpoint (from a point of view far from enamored of the students) see Kerima Polotan’s account mentioned above.

The next day, January 31, 1972, Marcos further fleshed out his version of the student attack on the Palace, and begins enumerating more people to keep an eye on –politicians, media people; he also mentions the need to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus –eventually.

For an overview of the First Quarter Storm, see also Manuel L. Quezon III’s The Defiant Era, January 30, 2010.


January 20, 2001

12:20 a.m.- Rene de Villa arrives in Mabini Hall, accompanied by now Finance Secretary Alberto “Bert” Romulo and now Justice Secretary Hernando “Nani” Perez. The first round of negotiations begins.

Rene gives me a draft resignation letter for the President, with the demand that the letter be signed and the President leave the office by 6 a.m.

“Otherwise,” he tells me, “we cannot control the hotheads in our group. Lulusubin nila ang Malacañang (They will attack Malacañang).” I answer that Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo exercise her leadership over these groups. I tell the negotiators, “I am sincere in getting the problem out of the way to normalize the situation as soon as possible.” We want no violence, just a peaceful transition, and I will exert all efforts to prevent any violence from taking place. The President has accepted that he will leave the Palace, I explain, but insists on the five-day transition period.

Rene wants to know why the President needs five days. “Why can’t he leave by 6 a.m.?” he asks. I answer: “I can only surmise that it is because (Armed Forces Chief of Staff) General (Angelo) Reyes has promised the President a five-day transition period. He would turn over the Presidency on the 24th. I was not privy to their conversation, but I can guess that the five days would be just enough time for the President to advise his family, friends and supporters of his decision to go.” The President did, after all, have a good number of supporters. I explain to the panel that he cannot be pushed to leave the Palace earlier, since he has General Reyes’ assurance.

I tell them that the President is quite certain of the five-day transition and will not easily change his mind into accepting a 6 a.m. deadline. Rene immediately  raises a concern: “What if the President organizes a counter-attack in the five days?” “Let us be realistic,” I counter. “The President does not have the capability to counter-attack. He does not have the AFP or the Philippine National Police on his side. He is not only in a corner –he is also down.”

Bert Romulo chimes in, speaking at the top of his voice. “My mandate is for you to leave by 6 a.m. Otherwise, if that is not accomplished, I cannot come back here anymore,” he tells me. For the sake of reaching an agreement, I ask all not to take a hardline stance. I explain that it takes time to convince the President, who needs time to accept things. I explain that “the President just wants to vindicate his name. The envelope (containing information on bank accounts allegedly owned by Estrada) is, after all, the spark that ignited his conflagration.” Rene answers that “vindication is not always on the day itself.” “But we have the occasion to vindicate ourselves now,” I reply. “Let us take this opportunity.” I explain that after the envelope is opened at the impeachment trial, the President can leave already –even before the five-day period is over.

I stress the three points most important to the President. One he will hand in his resignation, but to take affect five days later. The five-day transition period is crucial. If Reyes never made that assurance, he should call the President to explain that he did not assure him of the transition period. Two, there must be a guarantee of safety of the President and his family. And three, there must be an agreement to open the second envelope.  I tell them that I am “sincere in getting the problem out of the way to normalize the situation as soon as possible.”

Rene says that we should meet again at 3 a.m. I answer that we should meet at 7 a.m. since we all need some rest. But Rene tells me, “7 a.m. may be too late, since lulusubin ang Malacañang (Malacañang will be attacked) by 6 a.m.” We agree to hold a second round of negotiations by 6 a.m. The first round of negotiations ends at 2:20 a.m.

2:30 a.m- I return to the Presidential palace and enter t he small conference room where the President is waiting. With him are Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and his chief of staff Gigi Reyes, Lito Banayo, Ronnie Puno, Dondon Bagatsing and Boying Remulla. I explain what happened in the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name. If the envelope is opened by Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. The President says: “Pagod na pagod na ako- masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any of this it’s too painful. I am tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)”

I had been advising the President nonstop since the day before. The President pauses and tells me, “Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakinggan ko. At hanggan sa huli, ikaw pa rin (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve listened to. And now, at the end, you still are).”

Boying Remulla pulls out a letter he has prepared for the President to sign. It reads:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, I am hereby transmitting to this Office this written declaration that I am unable to discharge the powers and duties of my Office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be Acting President of the President of the Philippines.

Boying explains that with this position, the President will still enjoy the benefits of Presidential immunity and can resume his Presidency when he decides to do so. Ronnie Puno supports Boying. But I oppose the signing of the letter. It would only prolong the crisis, I say, since it would not solve the political problems that are taking place.

A discussion ensues, with Lito Banayo supporting my stand. I explain that this letter is not practical under the circumstances since it would be construed as a shallow attempt to hang on. This would be particularly bad since negotiations have centered on the President’s turnover of the administration to Gloria, and this letter would be clearly construed as a sign of bad faith on our part.

Senator Enrile is silent throughout the discussion.

I step out, upset at what Boying is trying to do. I feel that this is an ill-advised and bad move, and I hope that the President will not listen to Boying. Lito Banayo follows me, “Hindi maganda yung sulat na iyon (This isn’t a good letter),” I point out to him.

Macel stays on in the room. Later, she tells me, that she noticed that Boying approached the President and Senator Enrile several times when I was away, trying to convince them about the letter. She adds, however, that she thinks that the President will not listen to Boying.

4 a.m.- Senator Enrile says goodbye to the President, and hugs him tightly.

I am constantly on the phone with General Reyes, Titoy Pardo and Rene de Villa. Rene de Villa proposes two additional points for negotiations –that during the five-day transition period:

  • The AFP and PNP would function under the Vice President as national military and Police authorities.
  • The transition process would begin immediately, and persons would begin immediately, and persons designated by the Vice President to government positions would be immediately briefed by their counterpart.

I write down the five points of negotiation.

4:30 a.m.- After having explained them to the President, it is now time for the First Lady and for the President’s children who are present –Jinggoy, JV Ejercito, Jackie and Techie– to hear about the points of negotiation.

We start preparing the draft for discussion at the 6 a.m. meeting. Five points are hammered out based on repeated phone calls between myself, De Villa, General Reyes, Titoy Pardo, who have been relaying to me feedback from the Cory Aquino and the Ramos group.

7:30 a.m- Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms Macapagal’s spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel. Rene pulls out a document titled “Negotiating Points.” It reads:

1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, thjat will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Various President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, shall function under the President as national military and police authority effective immediately.

4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its chief of staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.

We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective Principals, agree and undertake as follows:

1. A transition will occur, and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the Presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed safety and security of their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.

This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (‘AFP’) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authories- Vice President (Macapagal)

3. Both parties shall endeavour to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.

4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the “Transition Period”), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.

During the transition period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (‘PNP’) shall function under Vice President (Macapagal) as national and police authorities.

Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form of tenor provided for in ‘Annex A’ heretofore attached to this agreement.

Rene Corona stresses that the envelope can only be operated by the Senate President, and not the Senate sitting as an impeachment court, “since there is no going back to the trial.”

The emissaries also insist that the resignation should be signed today, Jan. 20.

Corona says that a separate resignation letter is a deal breaker, the absolute minimum, or the whole deal collapses. Macel mentions that the turnover should be sufficient since by the acts of the President, one can see that there is an intention to relinquish his position. Rene Corona answers: “You are a bar topnotcher. You should know that a resignation has to be an unequivocal act and should be in a letter.”

The second round of negotiations ends at around 9:30 a.m.

But without our knowledge, the President has apparently signed the Remulla letter, which is transmitted to speaker (Arnulfo) Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m today, Jan. 20. A copy is transmitted to Pimentel and received Monday, Jan. 22. We are not informed of this until Sunday afternoon, when I received a faxed, signed and transmitted copy of the letter.

This is the letter of resignation of Joseph Estrada, a letter that Palace negotiators were supposed to give to the United Opposition but never did:

I hereby tender my resignation as President of the Republic of the Philippines effective January 24 2001 in the name of national unity and in order to effect a peaceful transition of power amidst divisive political unrest.

In my sincere desire to improve the lives of our people, I have been privileged to have served our countrymen from the highest office in government. I had discharged my duties to the best of my abilities and with full faith in our people. And it had been my badge of honor to be a President of the masa, the common man –for indeed, I am one of them.

Though I leave the position as President of our beloved country, I only hope that our people shall always see me as the President of the masa. And I hope that history shall judge me kindly.

It was 9:30 in the morning, Jan. 20, 2001.

I was inside the Presidential Residence, tired and weary from a night of negotiations for Joseph Ejercito Estrada. The residence looked cool and tranquil, as it had been for many months that I had been its visitor. Very few people were moving around the first floor of the residence.

My senior Deputy Executive Secretary, Ramon ‘Dondon’ Bagatsing, was seated at one of the round tables. The head of the Presidential Management Staff, Ma. Celia ‘Macel’ Fernandez, was busy at the computer.

Only 13 days ago, I took my oath as executive secretary on Jan 6, 2001 to work with the 13th President of the Philippines. And the 13th day lasted two days. When I made the difficult decision to accept the position of executive secretary, only two things were clear in my mind and heart. One, I would serve our country with all my energy, ensuring that government would always be there for our countrymen. But more importantly, I knew that this was a job that I would          perform to the best of my capacities –till the end.

Certainly, it was this disposition that carried me through those final days, those final hours, and gave me the opportunity to witness history unfolding.

9:30 a.m.- After meeting with the emissaries of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, I return to the Presidential Residence with Dondong Bagatsing and Macel Fernandez of the Presidential Management Staff. Immediately, in a series of phone calls, Gen. Angelo Reyes and I agree on the wording of two sticky issues: the provisions on the President’s resignation and a  request to open the controversial second envelope in the impeachment trial. I also clear the final wording with Senate President Aquilino ‘Nene’ Pimentel.

9:45 a.m- (Former) Secretaries Jun Rivera (transportation), Mario Tiaoqui (energy), VG Vigilar (public works), Tony Cerilles (environment), Benny Laguesma (labor) , Quasi Romualdez (health) and Ronnie Puno (interior) arrive at the residence. The President’s friend Melo Santiago is also there.

11:00 a.m- Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.

The agreement starts

1. The president shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

Annexed is a copy of the President’s resignation letter. The rest of the President’s letter reads as follows:

2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January, 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority- Vice President

4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (‘PNP’) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authorities.

5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.

The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex ‘B’ heretofore attached to this agreement.

Former political adviser Lito Banayo had prepared the statement in Annex B:

I take this singular opportunity to commend His Excellency, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, for his rare display of statesmanship in effecting a peaceful transition of power amidst divisive political conflict that has beset our beloved country.

Throughout this crisis, President Estrada has shown steadfast adherence to the Constitution and its processes, with the highest consideration for the national interest.

As he leaves the highest office in the land within the gift of our sovereign people, the Filipino nation and I salute him and wish that the true patriot who brought peace to our country in this transition find peace for himself.

11:00 a.m.- Radio commentators report that Chief Supt. Romeo Maganto has allowed the anti-Erap demonstrators to proceed to Mendiola. This prompts the Presidential Security Group to arm civilians in the Palace. Sensing that this will lead to bloodshed, I immediately call Gen. Reyes to order a stop to Maganto’s supposed order.

11:05 a.m.- Loi, the First Lady, and her daughter Jackie Lopez visit the Palace chapel. After praying for fifteen minutes, they exit the Palace. It turns out to be the last act of the Estrada family at the Palace. The PSG guards immediately lock the doors of Malacañang after they leave.

11:30 a.m.- I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.

Bakit hindi naman kayo makahintay? Paano na ang agreement? (Why couldn’t you wait?) Reyes answered: “Wala na, sir (It’s over, sir).” I ask him, “Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?” And General Reyes answers, “Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, we’re deleting that part).”

Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross. But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes. I direct Demaree Raval to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected. I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The President is too stunned for words.

12 noon- Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

12:20 p.m.–The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.

The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered. By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President.

1 p.m. – The President’s personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family’s personal possessions as they can.

During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacañang. The statement reads:

At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people. MABUHAY!

As we are seated at the lunch table, the President received a call from General Reyes, who assures him that he can still stay at the Palace for another five days. But later, when the President asks me, “Ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis (Do I have to leave now)?” I immediately tell him: “Yes, Mr. President, for your safety and your family’s.”

1:30 p.m.- The sentry gate is locked.

1:50 p.m- General Diaz of the PSG calls on all detailed PSG personnel to gather in front of the residence for the send-off of the President. The President says goodbye to the people who have stayed with him until the end at the presidential residence, then turns around and leaves the staircase. I leave around this time, exhausted from the previous days’ events.

2:30 p.m.- The President leaves Malacañang and boards a barge for San Juan.

 


January 19, 2001

By 8 a.m of Jan. 19, along with Press Secretary Dong Puno, I met at the New World Hotel Senators Juan Ponce Enrile and Gringo Honasan, and the President’s defense lawyer, Estelito Mendoza, to sound them out on the proposal to open the second envelope. “If this is the President’s decision,” said the senators, “we cannot do anything.”

Sensing the situation was becoming critical, I called Macel Fernandez from the hotel to draft an Executive Order creating an ad hoc committee to monitor and manage the fast-swelling crowds in order to safeguard human rights and prevent violence.

At 10:22 a.m., I arrived at the Presidential Residence. Secretary Robert Aventajado, Lito Banayo and Dong Puno were already having breakfast. Only Mercado was wearing black. He was seated beside Macel. DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim was also there.

The President’s legal team, Estelito Mendoza, Andres Narvasa, Raul Daza and Cleofe Verzola, arrived soon after I did. Together with the President, Lito Banayo, Dong, Orly, Fred Lim and I went inside the small conference room of the residence to discuss two important points –the opening of the second envelope and the ad hoc committee to handle the demonstrations. A consensus was arrived at that the President would issue a public statement calling for the opening of the second envelope. The president also quickly agreed to constitute the ad hoc committee, with the executive secretary sitting as chair and the secretary of interior and local government as vice chair. Members would include the secretaries of Justice, national defence, finance, the press secretary, the director general of the PNP and the chief of staff of the Armed Force of the Philippines.

I had the committee members called earlier for our first meeting. All of them were present, except the AFP chief of staff, Gen. Angelo Reyes, and Secretary Pardo. The Nica, Isafp, PNP Intelligence Group and NBI head also came as support staff to the ad hoc committee.

Discussions on the state of security followed. “The military is 100% secure,” reassured Orly. I did not know that moments earlier, he had told Macel that government had to act fast, because in the last few days the Military would move. I also did not know that Orly’s vehicle that day contained at least 20 high-powered firearms.

At 1 p.m., Orly left the palace. He said he was just going to the office.

1:20 p.m.- The President calls me into his small office at the Presidential Residence (PR) and says in a somber tone, “Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this serious, Angelo has defected).” General Calimlim is beside him. On the couch sits Ping Lacson, talking on his cell phone.

The President could not understand why Reyes would defect, after he had consistently improved the soldier’s pay and welfare benefits. And he could not understand why Reyes, whose appointment had been extended by the President until 2002 just a few days earlier, would abandon him at the time he was most needed.

2:00 p.m- The President prepares to tape the previously prepared statement regarding the second envelope.

While the President is dressing up for his taping, Sen. Raul Roco calls me on the cellular phone. “Partner,” he says, “it’s time to take a decision. Perhaps you should convince the President to resign.” While I am talking to Roco, Secretary Alredo Lim is hovering around me and asking, “Who are you talking to?” “Raul Roco,” I answer. Lim immediately says, “Aalis na muna ako. Immobilize ko lang si Maganto.” (I have to leave, I will immobilize Maganto),” said Lim. “Hintayin mo muna si Presidente, nagbibihis lang,” I told Fred. He answered, “Hindi na, mauna na ako.”(Angara tells him to wait for the President who was dressing up. But Lim said he had to go.)

Chief Supt. Romeo Maganto, head of a task force at the interior department, reportedly allowed the protestors in Mendiola to get closer to the Palace gates.

2:30 p.m.- Secretary Lim leaves the Palace. The President, in a last minute effort to diffuse the situation and hold back the demonstrators, decided to hold a snap elections, and that he would not himself run in that elections.

I asked Senator Roco what he thought of the snap elections. Roco answered that snap elections might be very difficult considering there is no vacancy for the vice presidency.

2:45 p.m.- I invited Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Noli Fuentebella to come to Malacañang to ask for their opinion on the snap elections. They arrived at the PR and met with the President and myself. “There would be technical difficulties on the snap elections,” Nene said, “since the position of Vice President is not vacant.” Noli did not volunteer any comments. Nonetheless they asked the President to send them a written request.

3:00 p.m.- General Reyes announces his decision. I see on television that General Reyes is accompanied by Orly Mercado, wearing black. Orly had been one of the most trusted and favoured Cabinet members of Estrada and was president of Estrada’s Partido ng Masang Pilipino.

Considering that the President’s options at the time are limited to snap elections and still fighting it out, I pull aside Nene Pimentel and ask him if he could advise the president not to exclude other options. “A dignified exit or resignation might be the best way for him,” I said. The President listens intently to Pimentel, who volunteers to put the idea to Cory Aquino and get a feedback.

3:45 p.m.- I see on television that General Calimlim has joined General Reyes in withdrawing support for the President. He had been in the PR just hours before. It was now more crucial than ever that the PNP remain loyal to the presidency. Ping Lacson immediately said he would check with the PNP directors who were waiting in his office.

4:00 p.m.- Ping Lacson leaves the Presidential Palace.

5:30 p.m.- The President tapes a statement at the main conference room of the Palace calling for snap elections and stating categorically that he would not run. Friends and supporters rallied around him for support.

Ping Lacson called me to say that the PNP has decided to withdraw support for the President. He asked to talk to the President but I said the President was taping a message in the main conference hall. I promised Ping that I would call him back as soon as the President was free. I then crossed over from the residence to the Palace and waited for the President to finish taping to relay to him Ping’s message.

I have Ping called and the President and he talk over the phone.

6:00 p.m.- Ping Lacson announced on television that the PNP was withdrawing its support to the President. Ping said it was the most difficult decision of his life.

8:00 p.m.- I leave briefly to meet with several senators at my apartment to update them on developments. I arrive at the same time as Tessie Aquino-Oreta. Sen. Jonny Ponce Enrile arrives soon after.

9:00 p.m.- Before other senators arrive and as I start briefing Tessie and Johnny on the developments, I receive a call from Nene Pimentel asking me to join him in the Palace to meet the President. I immediately rush back to Malacañang. The senators met without me, with Senators John Osmeña, Tito Sotto and Gringo Honasan arriving after I had left.

9:30 p.m.- I arrived in the Presidential Residence to meet Nene and the President. Nene is already with the President inside the latter’s small office. They are JV Ejercito.

The President, Nene, JV and I meet in the President’s office. Nene repeats to the President the need to make a grateful and dignified exit, saying that he would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family. The President said he will never leave the country. The President also reiterates his desire that the second letter be opened. A letter is immediately drafted, where the President asks the Senate sitting as an impeachment court to open the second envelope.

Later, an aide says Cardinal Vidal has arrived and the three of us join the Cardinal in the main sala.

10:00 p.m.- After the meeting, the President tells me, “Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have to a week in the Palace.”

11 p.m.- Rene de Villa, one of the opposition’s emissaries and now Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s executive secretary, calls to ask that we meet in negotiation.

I receive a call from former President Fidel V. Ramos.

“Ed,” Ramos says, “magtulungan tayo para magkaroon ng (Let’s cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power. It is important that there will be no violence.” I answer: “Of course, Mr. President, it is also in our interest that no violence will break out.”

We set the first round of negotiations in the Office of the Executive Secretary at  Malacañang’s Mabini Hall. Political advisor Lito Banayo, Assistant Secretary Boying Remulla of the Presidential Management Group, my aide Dondon Bagatsing and  PMS head Macel Fernandez are with me.

 

 


January 18, 2001

At nine in the morning of Thursday, Jan. 18, I received the officers and board members of the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce in my office at Mabini Hall, headed by their president emeritus Jimmy Tang. We discussed how the federation could assist in employment creation especially in the countryside.

Immediately after Gen. Edgardo Batenga and Gen. Victor Mayo, deputy national security adviser, gave me a briefing on the MILF negotiations. A week ago, the President gave me the go ahead to resume negotiations with both the National Democratic Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The NDF had given a positive response and I had the initial batch of political prisoners processed for release.

I was voted by Senate President Aquilino ‘Nene’ Pimentel to go to the Senate and attend a lunch testimonial for two policemen who had died trying to defuse the Dec. 30 bomb in Makati.

Early that morning, I had received requests for interviews from the New York Times, Time Magazine and Newsweek. The foreign press must smell something, I thought.

At around 7 p.m of Jan. 18, Finance Secretary Jose ‘Titoy’ Pardo asked me to join him in asking his five undersecretaries to hold back their resignations for a few days. I explained to him that although we understood their feelings, it would not be an opportune time to resign. Believing Titoy and I had persuaded them to defer their resignation, I left and went to Malacañang.

At around 8 p.m., the president was talking to his defense lawyers.He was consulting them on the opening of the second envelope. The President had seen the reaction of the people to the suppression of the second envelope. Feeling he had nothing to hide, President Estrada asked his lawyers to request that the second envelope be opened, despite the fact that he had already won the legal battle over that technical issue.


October 20, 1972

scan0040

12:20 PM

Oct. 20, 1972

Malacañan Palace

Manila

Imelda started playing badminton today at 5:30 PM while we were playing golf. With her at the tennis court which we walled with lawaint and canvas to serve as windbreak were Lulu Tinio, Meldy Cojuangco and Helen Cu Unjieng. She played for almost three hours.

Met the reporters of the newspaper Times-Journal Vic Tañedo and Roy Acosta with the Express Tibo Mijares.

Gov. G. Licaros on the Japanese loans and the punishment of dollar blackmarketers as well as registration of currency.

Alex Melchor on PES work on project planning and laws.

Sec. Roño on the LOI for the new Dept. of Local Governments and Community Development.

Then Com. Vera on the reorganization of the BIR.

Am working on the Report to the Nation for the 1st month of Martial Law and the Proclamation of the Emancipation of the Tenants by declaring their ownership of the land they till tomorrow at the Maharlika at 10:00 AM.


October 19, 1972

scan0038 scan0039

1

12:30 PM

Oct. 19, 1972

Thursday

Malacañan Palace

Manila

We have been sleeping in Suite I since two nights ago because the allergist, Dr. Kua Lim discovered molds and bacteria in our bedroom and gymnasium below and they are now being cleaned completely.

I have been able to placate the hill tribes, the Palawan Tausogs, the Manobos, the Higanons, the T’boli, the Mansakos etc as well as the Moslems.

We met with the Alontos (Domocao, the delegate, Madki and Gov. Tarhata Alonto Lucman) and the Cotobao Datus, the Sinsuats, the Ampatuans, Kudanding etc.

And started operations PARE under Gen. Aluvete and Chairman Aboitiz of the MDA.

Interview by Richardson of the Australian paper The Age.

And met the delegations led by Gov. Espinosa of Masbate, Gov.   and Congressman Cerilles of Zamboanga del Sur and Cong. Gustilo of Negros Occidental.

2

Malacañan Palace

Manila

Talked to Kokoy on the US situation. Washington apparently for my martial law but not that of Pres. Park Chung Hee of Korea. He does not seem to have any reason for it as he is now negotiating the union of North and South Korea.

Am now working on the labor intensive investments like garments, embroideries and cottage industries.

And the impact infrastructure like the roads and destroyed dikes, irrigation electric & power projects etc.

Finalizing land reform (ownership phase) on the basis of transfer of ownership over land in excess of six hectares.


October 8,1972

scan0016

3:30 AM Oct. 9th

Oct. 8, 1972

Sunday

Malacañan Palace

Manila

We are still in Euphoria because of the Spivak Meet the Press Show by satellite in Washington and thru KBS in my study in Malacañan.

Are you peacefully going to transfer authority in 1973?

How long will martial law be?

What have you done to narrow the gap of the rich and poor?

Are you one of the wealthiest men in the Philippines and Asia?

 

My only regret was “It was too short” –only 30 minutes –actually about 25 minutes.


September 18, 1972, Monday

Scan0122 Scan0123

 

(1)

12:50 PM

Sept. 18, 1972

Monday

Malacañan Palace

Manila

 

The Concon and the sala of Judge Lustre of Quezon City trying the subversives were bombed by unidentified person this afternoon at 3:40 PM. It caused extensive damage and injured about thirty people.

Two of the subversives were almost able to escape.

This is apparently the answer of the subversives to the raids on their headquarters in Manila, Quezon and Pasay last Sunday morning at 4:30 where about 48 were arrested including Cabardo, a former PMA cadet who is tagged as the Visayan NPA head.

Ex Sec. Peding Montelibano, after bringing the problems of the PNB and the sugar industry, pledged that he and his family (one governor and one congressman) were behind me and Imelda even if I proclaimed martial law.

One thing about this man, he has a good nose for survival.

(2)

Sept. 18th (Con’t)

Malacañan Palace

Manila

We finalized the plans for the proclamation of martial law at 6:00 pm to 10:00 pm with the SND, the Chief of Staff, major service commanders, J-2, Gen. Paz, 1st PC Zone Commander, Gen. Diaz and Metrocom commander, Co. Montoya, with Gen. Ver in attendance.

They all agreed the earlier we do it the better because the media is waging a propaganda campaign that distorts and twists the facts and they may succeed in weakening our support among the people if it is allowed to continue.

So after the bombing of the Concon, we agreed on the 21st without any postponement.

We finalized the target personalities, the assignments, and the procedures.

Our communications network will center in Malacañan as before.