July 16, 1945 Monday

No effort is being spared to prevent a break between Osmeña and Roxas and to preserve unity. It is said that a great majority of the Senators and Representatives signed a petition which they presented to Osmeña and Roxas urging reconciliation and unity. In this campaign, they were backed by other influential people outside the government.

Speaker Zulueta declared that a fight between Osmeña and Roxas is a remote possibility. Both are Nacionalistas and Roxas has not resigned from the party. He said that a Party Convention should be held. Both must submit to the convention and abide by the result of the convention. In theory, this is very good. But I fear that this is not what will happen. If passions run high, no convention will be able to prevent a fight.

What has been the reaction? The people are decidedly behind the movement. Osmeña, to the surprise of everybody, expressed conformity, but at the same time announced his candidacy. I could hardly believe this. It shows thoughtful political strategy. I wonder who are advising him on political affairs. He gave up and did certain things, however, which might have paved the way to reconciliation.

For instance, instead of making an issue of his appointment of the three notorious Cabinet secretaries by raising the argument that the positions are more or less confidential and a matter of confidence, knowing that members of Congress were strongly against it, he withdrew the appointments, an action which had no precedent. There was no mental reservation that he would reappoint them after adjournment, as other executives have done in the past. No kind of effort at all was made toward face-saving. In the past, the appointments are confirmed and after a little while, some apparently good or plausible reasons are invented for the withdrawal from office of the appointee.

And what was the attitude of the appointees? To say the least, it was shameful. They were not man and courageous enough to face the truth. Do they think that there was even a handful of men who believed that they could do much in the Rehabilitation Committee? It is believed that they would spoil the whole effort in America. In the case of Kalaw, what a shame — from Cabinet member to book-collector, a ₱100.00 clerk work! And there was no sign of indignation on the part of these men. It also is not a credit to the appointing official. And all these are at the expense of prostrated Juan de la Cruz. Getting ₱1000 a month for “vacation work”. And these are the patriots who will give their lives for Juan de la Cruz? Poor Philippines!

Oh, I almost forgot the other good action of Osmeña. Showing a spirit of revenge, Confesor announced that while in the U.S. he would expose Roxas who he had been attacking violently. He especially ridiculed the claim that Roxas was the head of the underground resistance in the Philippines. Osmeña was forced to admonish Confesor publicly. He enjoined Confesor to devote his time to the work of the Committee. As to Roxas, a ray of hope arose when it was published that he had ordered the cessation of the campiagn for his candidacy. There was jubilation as it was interpreted to mean that an understanding had been reached. Almost immediately thereafter, however, the papers reported a speech made by Roxas before a guerrilla group attacking the administration of Osmeña. In substance, Roxas said that the administration has not done anything, has absolutely no idea of what should be done to rehabilitate the wrecked finances of the government and to solve the food shortage and other grave problems of the country. It was a bitter denunciation.

Such is the present situation. The fight is not a remote possibility as claimed by Speaker Zulueta, but it is now a reality. Only a miracle can save our country from what all consider a national cataclysm.

I forgot something else also in this connection. It was reported that Roxas told the Senators and Representatives that he would be for unity if the following conditions are accepted: (1) reinstatement of all officials elected in 1940; (2) reinstatement of all employees in the civil service; (3) reistatement of justices and all judicial officers; (4) reinstatement of officers in the Army; (5) more effective rehabilitation measures; and (6) redemption of all Philippine National Bank notes. At first Roxas denied the news; it seems, however, that the report is absolutely true. It is also reported that Osmeña is inclined to accept Roxas’ conditions. This is humiliating since it is an admission of the failure of his administration. But he had sacrificed his personal ambition more than once before, even what others would call dignity, for the sake of his country.

As a matter of fact, unity is not impossible to attain, but the root cause of disunity must be eliminated. To me, it all arises out of this foolish “collaboration issue”. If there were no such issue, there would been no reinstatement problem of employees, judicial officers, elective officials, and Army officers because all these people are being deprived of their respective offices due to this meaningless collaboration issue. As to rehabilitation, there could be no issue about it, and as to bank notes, there should not be much disagreement. Now that the Japanese have been driven away, all were agreed that 99-1/2 percent of the Filipinos were against them. There is practically no Filipino today who does not mourn the death of a near relative or who has not been the victim of Japanese cruelty and brutality. I would say even the most pro-Japanese changed. Everyone we talked to wanted a crack at the Japanese. My own son was insisting in joining the Army because he imagined hearing always the pitiful cries of his dear sister Neny. Some people in government have made it appear there were countless “pro-Japanese Filipinos”. We thought they could be counted with the fingers of our hands. But it turns out, to our surprise, that we were all wrong because they ran to several thousands. It is driving us to desperation. It is root cause of this destructive evil of disunity. A revelation was opened to us.

Even MacArthur was alarmed with what was happening, and he earnestly counseled unity for the sake of the independence of our country and welfare of our people. I know be loves our country and I have no doubt that his only purpose is to help our country. But I fear that for reasons on which many theories have been advanced, he is not aware of the fact that, more than anybody else, he is responsible for this situation. What a disappointment!

The Americans themselves are becoming aware of our anomalous situation. They do not seem to know what to call us. At first, they said that they merely took us under protective custody to protect us from infuriated people. If so, are all measures being taken necessary for the purpose? Was it necessary to leave us exposed to the sun for 2 days in a place (Pier 4 in North Harbor) where there were no persons, except soldiers and Army employees, that could harm us? Was it necessary to herd us like cattle in a dark and hot hold of a ship with a small exit door securely guarded? Was it necessary not to allow us on deck except for only an hour everyday? Do they mean to say that our lives were in danger while sailing in the deep China Sea with only American crewmen? Was it necessary to confine us in a small well-guarded place within a colony in a government reservation? They confined us with those who were real spies of the Japanese and who had been responsible for the death of Filipinos. These are the people whose lives are in danger and are in need of protection. Instead of getting justice and liberty, we landed in jail here in Iwahig wihout knowing what it was all about, there to be treated worse than the worst criminals — the convicted criminals could roam around the Colony, talk to the people, and eat what is good for them; whereas we are detained in a stockade of less than one hectare in size surrounded by barbed wires. Here we are held incommunicado, compelled to eat food that we detest, ordered to be neat but not allowed to send clothes outside to be laundered nor given facilities for laundering inside the stockade; humiliated by marching us like ordinary prisoners to the mess near the plaza with guards carrying sub-machines guns; prohibited to smoke on the way and to talk to each other; deprived of our liberty without the semblance of a trial which we thought is guaranteed to free people by the Constitution and the tradition of America.

We have not injured anybody; one the contrary; we did our best to save and protect the people. Even the guerrillas can have no motive for complaint. All we did was to advise them to lie low while the Americans were not yet here since we were absolutely defenseless. For each Japanese killed, houses were burned, hundreds of Filipinos killed, and we just could do nothing about it.

There seems to be a movement in Manila to postpone the election. Speaker Zulueta seems to be decidedly for postponement, giving his reason that peace and order throughout the Philippines is such that it is not yet possible to hold elections. Of course postponement of an election is really undemocratic, but if elections are not advisable under the circumstances, there should be no hesitation to postpone. Personally, I believe it should be postponed. It will facilitate the efforts for understanding and unity.

It is reported that there are two blocs in the Senate: one pro-Osmeña and the other pro-Roxas. The pro-Osmeña senators are reported to be Rodriguez, Rama, Garcia, Torres, Sa Ramain, Martinez and Bondoc. It is very regrettable to have such blocs in the Senate.

* * * * *

The war in the Philippines has just been declared officially terminated. This, of course, does not mean that there will be no more fighting in the Philippines. Many Japanese soldiers have retreated to the mountains. I suppose the Filipino guerrillas will take care of cleaning them up. I believe over half a million Filipinos have died on account of the war. I am afraid Filipinos will continue dying. Mutual congratulations were passed around. Osmeña made the statement that now we can return to constitutional civil administration. Undoubtedly, this is an answer to the charge launched by Roxas that constitutional guarantees are being disregarded. It was thought that because of the termination of the war in the Philippines, we can now be released. Evidently though, “during the duration” is being interpreted to mean while the war in the whole Orient has not been declared terminated.

Many speculations have been made as to when the war will end. Some say that because of the reconquest of the Philippines it will terminate soon. My opinion is that it will all depend upon the circumstances. In case peace negotiations are started, war will end tomorrow. Japan knows that she is licked. It is all a question of time. If she persists, she knows that all her cities will be wiped out and millions of her people will die. She is only interested in face saving. Even if the words “unconditional surrender” are not used, she would be willing to give up all that she would lose under an “unconditional surrender”.

Continuation of the war will also mean, of course, the sacrifice of lives of Americans and the expenditure of huge amounts of money although these would be very small in comparison to what the Japanese stand to lose. Some Americans, like Sen. Capeheart, are inclined to favor a negotiated peace. They are willing to consider peace overtures which he assures have already been made. But it seems that Pres. Truman and other Allied high officials insist in an unconditional surrender. Nobody of course knows, but Japan may be able to hold out for some time yet. More than a year ago, they knew that the Americans and the British will be able to attack her by air, land and sea. She must have been preparing for it. Furthermore, Japan is very mountainous, the type of terrain appropriate for their way of fighting. The strategy of the United Nations seems to be to break the morale of the Japanese and to destroy the Japanese faith in the divinity of their Emperor. It will not be so easy to destroy a system which has been observed for many centuries. This may take some time and in the meanwhile, the Japanese may continue fighting. I hope Japan’s surrender will be very soon.

Pessimism again reigns in the stockade. Our feeling has never been as low as it is today. Our impression is that we are being forgotten. What must be happening? It looks like the war may drag on for some time and, in the meantime, we have to make the most of our confinement.


July 6, 1945 Friday

Yulo continued to be very bitter against everybody. He has lost confidence in Osmeña and in Roxas in so far as our situation is concerned. As to MacArthur, he says MacArthur will do only what would be for his own convenience. He thinks Osmeña is useless. As to Roxas, he resented the fact that both of them journeyed from Baguio to La Union together, and then to Manila together, and afterwards, Roxas left him. Since then, they have not seen each other.

It is reported that Osmeña at one time planned to prevent the election of Roxas as President of the Senate. He wanted Yulo to return to make him his candidate for the position. This was never carried out.

It was also reported that Roxas had said that Congress had nothing to do and could do nothing in our case, and that it is only the military that could decide our case. This report depressed us. But the news was clarified by the letter of my wife. She said that she, accompanied by Mrs. Recto and Sen. Rodriguez, went to see Pres. Osmeña in his office. The President received them amiably. My wife went there to intervene in my behalf. The President told them that he cannot do anything now as we are still under the military, that he had already requested that we be transferred to the Commonwealth, and that once transferred he would be able to do something. According to her, Roxas paid her a call at our house. He said practically the same thing — that nothing can be done now, but that he has already asked Gen. MacArthur to turn us over to the Commonwealth. He would do his best for us, and if necessary he will go to America.

Today, news came that the military campaign in the Philippines had been declared closed. This may accelerate our transfer to the Commonwealth.

* * * * *

It seems almost definite that the elections will be held next November and that the opposing candidates will be Pres. Osmeña and Roxas. There is quite a difference of opinion as to whether it will benefit us or prejudice us. The general opinion seems to be that it will favor us. Recto upholds this view. They say that both will try to do everything for us with the expectation that we would help whoever could get us released. They are aware that we here hold the balance of power and that whoever we support will come out.

My opinion is different. I believe the effect will be just the reverse. Each would not be a candidate unless he is reasonably sure that he can win. They would be thinking: Why allow a new element to come in which may deprive him of his chance to win? Better eliminate any disturbing element. On the other hand, there are many candidates for senator who will try to use their influence not to allow us to be released for fear that we may present our candidacies and therefore lessen their chances to get elected. Furthermore, each candidate will want to be sure of our support. Those will not get our support will surely work against us.

Both Osmeña and Roxas can do very much for us either way. Osmeña will be the one to decide what to do with us once we are turned over to the Commonwealth. On the other hand, Roxas is an intimate friend of MacArthur and just now our fate is in the hands of MacArthur. If, on the other hand, because of our prudence and because we do not want our attitude known just yet, both may lose interest or may want us to remain where we are until they find out how we stand.

We have been informed that the most serious charge against former Ministers of the Philippine Republic is that we left Manila and this resulted in the killing of so many residents of the city. In other words, they say that if we had not left Manila, the massacre of residents would not have occurred. I am sure that our presence in Manila would not have made any difference. This is what the Japanese did throughout China before the establishment of the Pro-Japanese government. The Japanese were aware that the majority of Filipinos were against them. To protect our people and ourselves, we of course denied this. But as a matter of fact, we knew positively that 95% of the Filipino people were anti-Japanese. We knew that even the government employees serving in the Japanese regime were “guerrilleros”. We knew the feeling of the Filipinos because we were in continuous close contact with them. They hated the Japanese. This feeling was prompted by the abuses committed by the Japanese. They also resented the intervention of the military police and Japanese civilians in strictly private affairs.

What the Filipinos resented most was the air of superiority assumed by the Japanese. Even those holding the lowliest jobs acted no more, no less than kings. All branches of government had Japanese advisers, some of them very ignorant. They would give orders to Filipino officials who by education and experience were far ahead of them.

I remember the case of Dr. Sison, Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dean of the College of Medicine, reputed as one of the best doctors in the Philippines. A young doctor in the Japanese Army with the rank of Lieutenant, a Dr. Ono, tried to boss him around. We had a Japanese friend, Mr. Yamamoto, then Manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank. We were with him almost everyday as he was a member of the Philippine Club and we used to play tennis with him. After the Japanese occupation of Manila, he would not even talk to us.

We interpreted the attitude of the Japanese as a superiority complex. This we can never accept. Just as we have been preaching that we must have no inferiority complex towards the Americans and other whites, we cannot under any circumstances admit inferiority to the Japanese. Such is the general feeling of Filipinos toward the Japanese and they knew this perfectly well. This is the reason why they tried to change the government, why they wanted Gen. Ricarte and Benigno Ramos to hold responsible positions in the government; why they organized the Makapili, which constitutes not only an army to fight with the Japanese, but a party openly and aggressively for the Japanese. They were against the Laurel government because they were convinced that all of us were not sincere. On the other hand, they knew perfectly well that in Manila and everywhere else, there were many “guerrilleros” and that the moment the Americans approached Manila the Filipinos would all rise up in arms. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that they had decided to kill everybody they saw before retreating. We could not have done anything. All that would have happened is that they would have killed us also; they did not discriminate. Even those who were reputed to be pro-Japanese and who had done much for the Japanese were killed.

Supposing that we could have done something, why did we leave Manila. We did not want to leave Manila. Plans to evacuate Manila had been previously considered. Various places were considered for the purpose, like San Mateo and Montalban. After due consideration, however, we decided to drop the matter of the proposed evacuation. But on the 19th of December, the President called us to a special meeting and told us that we were being ordered by the Japanese Military authorities to go to Baguio. We were all surprised. Baguio was one of the evacuation places considered and there was almost a unanimous vote against it for two reasons: (1) There were only two roads leading to the City. If these were cut off, not only would it be impossible to escape but there would also be a food shortage since Baguio is far from being self-sufficient. (2) The water supply of Baguio comes from a pumping water system and if the water lines or the pumping mechanism were destroyed or ran out of fuel, we would have a big problem with our water supply.

At any rate, we had decided not to leave Manila. We asked the President whether we could stay. He answered that he had done all he could to prevent the evacuation since he felt duty was to stay in Manila. He feared that there would be a panic when the people found out that the national government had left. He desired to be in a position to protect the people, to die if necessary. Of course that was also the sentiment of each and every Minister. The President said we must go.

We were given 48 hours to leave Manila. For this reason, I was not able to clear out my desk. My family had no time to prepare for departure. I left many things that I should have taken. At home, we packed hurriedly, also leaving many valuable things behind. We were not able to make arrangements for the occupancy of our house during our absence. We had to ask my daughter Lily and her husband to stay there in the meanwhile. The newly married couple, my daughter Neny and Ramon Cojuangco, could not go to Baguio with us because the younger sister of Ramon was doing to be married in a few days. They promised to follow us as soon as possible. (They failed to do so and I suspect it was because of lack of transportation or because American planes were hovering all over Luzon and it was not safe to travel.)

Our car was not ready for the long trip; it needed to be brought to the repair shop. We were told that we would leave for Baguio at ten o’clock of the night of the 20th. Our car was finished at about 9 o’clock of the night set for our departure, but it did not run smoothly. A Malacañan mechanic, after inspecting it, told us that the car could definitely not reach Baguio. I decided to take the armored car of the Philippine National Bank where I was the one-man Board of Directors. But the armored car was hardly sufficient to accommodate our cook, laundry woman and servants, not to mention our luggage. Not including our household help, we were thirteen: my wife and I, my eight children, mother-in-law, my Japanese military police guard and my chauffeur. We tried to get other cars in Malacañan, but they were all in bad shape and the mechanic certified that they could not reach Baguio. In a way, we were glad as we thought that it would be a good excuse for us not to go.

The Japanese offered to give us a military car, but of course I did not want to use such a car because it was painted in the special khaki color of all military cars. It would have been very dangerous since American planes seem to have already mastery of the air and I was sure that we would encounter American planes. The military car would be a target. I decided to borrow the Buick 7-passenger car of my son-in-law, Ramon Cojuangco (1941 model), although it had not been used for months and we were not sure that it would run. When we tried to leave the Malacañan Palace grounds to go to the house of Speaker Benigno Aquino where the car was kept, the Japanese guards stopped us and questioned us repeatedly. When they found out who I was and where I was going, and that my sole purpose for leaving the premises was to get my son-in-law’s car to use in going to Baguio, we were allowed to leave but under guard. Speaker Aquino’s house was within hailing distance from Malacañan.

The Buick would not start. We pushed it to start the engine, and finally after two hours of pushing, the car began to function. All the while we were pushing the automobile, the soldiers followed behind us. Back in Malacañan, the mechanic certified that it could reach Baguio, so we decided to use it.

We arrived in Malacañan before ten o’clock, the time for departure set by the military, but we were not to leave for Baguio until the next morning. No one was allowed to leave Malacañan. That night we slept on divans and chairs, and some slept in the cars. We were not allowed to get food from the outside; we had to be contented with the little food furnished us by Malacañan. The palace was very heavily guarded by Japanese soldiers and officers.

The motorcade consisted of at least 30 cars belonging to the President, the Chief Justice, and all the Ministers with the exception of Minister Sison of Home Affairs. The Japanese Ambassador and his staff were also with us. Alongside the car of each Minister was a military vehicle with Japanese guards in full uniform. We noticed that they kept their eyes on us.

We boarded our automobiles at about seven o’clock in the morning. We were given instructions. The cars were camouflaged and divided into groups. Each group would leave at half-hour intervals and each car was to keep a certain distance from the next. When American planes appeared, we were told to alight and endeavor to find an air raid shelter, or go to a more protected place like under trees, and not to move. We knew that the trip was going to be a dangerous one. I was worried as I was carrying about ₱15,000,000 of military notes and about ₱1,000,000 of Commonwealth notes in the armored car owned by the Philippine National Bank which was part of our caravan.

We did not actually start until about 9 o’clock and so we were inside the car sweating for a full two hours. The Kempetai or military police assigned to me sat with the chauffeur and was fully armed. We took the regular route to Baguio. There was very little civilian traffic or Filipinos on the road. All along the way, the roads with the exception of places inside the “poblacion” were deserted. Almost all the houses were vacant. The atmosphere was very pitiful and sombre. We also saw no animals. There were stretches of miles and miles with no Filipinos in sight. They probably had fled to the mountains or to the barrios to avoid the Japanese soldiers who had been taking all their food. There were many Japanese soldiers, automobiles, trucks and other military vehicles all along the way. It convinced us that there were still many Japanese soldiers in the Philippines. What we could not understand was that the soldiers were travelling in both directions. We saw cannons, especially anti-aircraft. We saw various airplanes parked alongside the roads, very well camouflaged.

Before leaving Manila, we were told that signals would be given whenever there was an air raid or American planes above. I forgot to say that our convoy included many trucks of Japanese officers and soldiers. Generally, there was one truck in front of a group and another behind. Because of these trucks, we travelled at a very slow pace. A kilometer before reaching San Fernando, Pampanga, we were stopped. We were advised that Camp Clark, the most important Japanese air base, was being attacked. We got off to run for shelter. I selected a ditch. We saw two American planes overhead. We certainly were scared. Evidently the planes did not see our cars as they continued on their way.

We proceeded on our way. San Fernando was intact, but when we reached Angeles we saw that the town was almost completely wiped out. It is said that it was burned by Communist elements. We reached a place from where we could see Camp Clark; a few places were still burning. We learned that many Japanese planes were either shot down or destroyed on the ground. There were also some American planes hit. We learned that Pres. Laurel and his family, who were in the first group, were very near the scene of the air battle and bombing. They also had to alight and hide.

When passing Tarlac we saw many planes coming. At first we thought they were American planes, but they were flying low. Evidently, a big transport carrying some high Japanese officers, was being escorted. The rest of the way we did not stop. We tried to go as fast as possible when approaching or passing airports and other military objectives. We did not encounter any more planes.

Alcohol fuel is really far from being as good as gasoline. All along the road cars belonging to different groups stalled. Many had to be pushed or’ repaired. Some cars had to be abandoned on the roadside, the occupants transferred to the military trucks with the Japanese and Philippine Constabulary soldiers. After a few hours, the motorcade broke up as most of the cars had stopped. The cars still running went ahead. All along the way the trucks loaded with Japanese soldiers never left us. When our car stalled, they also stopped and helped push our car. No car was able to arrive in Baguio before dusk. Some arrived before midnight of the 21st and some in the early morning of the 22nd. Some even arrived on the 23rd. Many cars were left behind. The occupants of cars that broken down in Kennon Road walked all the way to Baguio.

My family and I had the most sensational experience. My car ran smoothly until we entered Pangasinan when it stopped. It had to be pushed by Army trucks quite a long way before it would start again. This had to be repeated many times. At one point, the machine would not function anymore. A Japanese mechanic alighted from a truck and repaired the machine. He must have been a good mechanic as the machine started and we continued on our trip. After about 20 kilometers we stopped again. A truck tried to pull us with the intention of doing so up to Baguio. But my car was very big and heavy and it could not be pulled up the mountain road. The mechanic was able to make it function again. After stopping in Pozorrubio for fuel, at about six o’clock in the evening, we started the sleep climb to Baguio. Before reaching Camp one, the car stopped again. It had to be pushed for kilometers by Min. Recto’s car. In places, the roads were so narrow after a landslide; the fender skirts caught a high ground and the car got stuck. We removed the fender skirts but were convinced, however, that we could not continue the trip that way. Meanwhile, many cars had accumulated behind us and the occupants were becoming impatient. I heard them hooting. I was annoyed; I thought they ought to be more helpful. I told the chauffeur to stop the car, park it on the side of the road, and allow all the cars, including the one pushing us to pass. I was determined that we would sleep right there on the road. It was certainly difficult for my mother-in-law, my wife and my children. I could see that they were suffering, especially as it was already very cold. I was not sorry to stay; I was afraid to continue. My chauffeur had been rejected by the government insurance company for poor eyesight. He was also color blind. I should not have allowed him to drive, especially on narrow and dangerous roads like the Kennon Road. But the chauffeur continued to work on the car. Finally, to our amazement, it started to function.

By this time we were the only car on Kennon Road. We went quite fast. We could not slow down because everytime the car slowed down it would stop. We continued our way in quite a fast clip. We passed all the cars that hours before had left us. We reached Baguio several hours ahead of them. My chauffeur had never been to Baguio. So I had to direct him. We intended to go straight to the house reserved for us in Cabinet Hill. The road to Cabinet Hill was closed. We went ahead to the Pines Hotel. There we learned that the houses on Cabinet Hill were not ready since the present occupants had been given only a few days to vacate the houses — accommodations in Baguio were then very difficult. But the Pines Hotel was ready for us.

My chauffeur, who had never been to Pines Hotel, did not know the correct entrance. He entered through the exit. Since the driveway was very narrow which made it difficult for a car to back out, I walked to the hotel lobby where I got permission for us to approach the front entrance passing through the wrong way. From the entrance, I hailed my chauffeur to start the automobile and proceed. The road was steep and the car began to roll down, I was right in front of it. I hardly had time to jump out of the way. It was a narrow escape.

We went into the hotel. There was no food prepared for us so we passed the night hungry. We were given two small rooms where we had to sleep four to a bed. We suffered terribly.

I relate all these facts to show that we did not want to leave Manila voluntarily and that we were carried by threat and by force to Baguio.

I would also like to relate here the circumstances connected with the ₱15,000,000 of military notes and ₱1,000,000 of Commonwealth notes that we brought to Baguio.

Sometime on December 19, 1944, the Japanese adviser of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Haraguti, accompanied by three Japanese officers, came to see me at my office. I was surprised at the sudden arrival of my visitors for I had not been informed of their coming. Haraguti, in the name and on behalf of the Japanese Army, demanded that all Philippine and American currency deposited and in the possession of the different Filipino banks be turned over to the Southern Development Bank, a bank owned and controlled by the Japanese government. As Minister of Finance, I had the sole discretion of affecting such a transfer with the final approval of the President. The Japanese did not go to Laurel directly because, in many previous occasions, Laurel told them that where money matters were involved he executes whatever his Minister of Finance recommends.

I protested vehemently. Haraguti cited a precedent — what the American High Commissioner did with reference to bank funds upon the commencement of the Pacific war. He said that the High Commissioner took possession of all the Philippine currency belonging to the different banks. I answered that the present case is different inasmuch as the Philippine Commonwealth was really under the American government, whereas at present the Philippines is an independent Republic formally recognized by the Japanese government. Haraguti insisted and I could see that the Japanese were determined to use force if necessary. I then asked him why they wanted to get the money. He answered that the purpose was to prevent their circulation. I then proposed that the Republic get the money for safekeeping. I added, however, that I would consult Pres. Laurel before making a definite decision. I thought they had accepted my proposition as they left without saying anything further.

I immediately went to see Pres. Laurel. I told Laurel that I was convinced that the Japanese were hell bent on confiscating the money and that we had no other recourse but to do all the means necessary to save the money. Pres. Laurel and I decided to meet with the managers of the banks concerned. Whatever is agreed upon by the managers and myself, would be considered as approved and ordered by the President.

The following day, I called the bank managers concerned and met with them in the office of the President of the Philippine National Bank on the Escolta. As I recall, the only banks then having Philippine or American currency were the Philippine National Bank, the Philippine Bank of Commerce, and the Bank of the Philippine Islands. The PNB was represented by Mr. Vicente Carmona, as bank President, while PBC and BPI were represented by their respective Vice President and General Manager, Miguel Cuaderno and Rafael Moreno. Felix de la Costa, director of the Bureau of Credits and Investment, was also present.

During the meeting I gave them an account of what happened. I told them that the only possible satisfactory solution would be for them to turn over the money to the Philippine government for safekeeping. I added that the money would be returned to them as soon as conditions become normal. They all readily agreed. With respect to the Philippine National Bank, no action was necessary as we were leaving all the money with the bank. I issued corresponding receipts to the banks for the amounts received as follows: Philippine National Bank, ₱490,529.00; Philippine Bank of Commerce, ₱425.200.00; and Bank of the Philippine Islands, ₱969.00. The total amount taken by my office was left and deposited with the Philippine National Bank. After leaving the bank, I went directly to Pres. Laurel to give my report. He approved all that had been done.

About a week prior to the above-mentioned events, Malacañan had advised all the Ministers that the Japanese were ordering all of us to go with them to Baguio. On December 20, 1944, an arrangement was made with the Philippine National Bank to load all the currency in the bank’s armored car which would go with us to Baguio. The person in charge of the armored car was Mr. Amado Lagdameo, the manager of the Baguio branch of PNB. Upon arrival in Baguio, the money was taken directly to and deposited in the Philippine National Bank branch.

In the evening of January 8, 1945, I received a letter from Manager Lagdameo reporting that Maj. I. Moritani accompanied by the Managers of the Bank of Taiwan and the Nampo Kaihatsu Kinko, forced him to hand over to them all the notes deposited in trust with the branch. Also taken were all the cash in the vault. He also wrote that he was not allowed to communicate with me by phone nor see me personally.

I immediately reported the matter to Pres. Laurel. I told him that what the Japanese had done was clearly illegal and improper. I recommended that Laurel make representations to the proper Japanese authorities immediately for the return of the currency seized as it was being held in trust by the Philippine Republic for the banks. Laurel protested strongly to the Japanese Ambassador and the Japanese military authorities demanding the return of the money. Up to the time when I escaped from Baguio on April 12, 1945, the money had not yet been returned. All that we were able to get was a receipt for the money from Col. Utsonomiya. All the original documents are in my possession.


July 3, 1945 Tuesday

The papers report that Confesor and Cabili have been appointed as members of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission in Washington. Both will have to go to Washington. Cabile has resigned as Secretary of National Defense. His appointment and that of Confesor as Secretary of the Interior were submitted to the Commission on Appointments of Congress. The papers said that in view of their new offices, the Commission on Appointments will no longer have to act.

I suspect that the appointments of Confesor and Cabili have been disapproved, or at least Pres. Osmeña had been told or was convinced that their appointments would be disapproved by the Commission. The attitude of the Commission was expected. Both had been attacking the “collaborationists” and it seems that public opinion in Manila is favorable to the “collaborationists”. Both talk a lot, but have accomplished very little, especially as regards the economy. Both have been using language improper for high government officials. Both have been very much criticized, and it is even reported that they have to go around with body guards as their lives are in danger. The attitude of the Commission is fully justified. Their appointment to the Rehabilitation Commission is a face-saving stunt.

On June 28th, Pres. Truman said that he hoped the meeting next month with Churchill and Stalin would result in a formula for a final treaty that “will insure peace for generations to come.”

We hope they will succeed. Such is the prayer of all the people in the world. War is so terrible that it must be avoided by all means. We do not know what the formula will be. Surely all the causes of war must be eliminated. To me colonization is one of the causes. It should be abolished as a thing of the past. All countries must be granted independence.

Jose Abad Santos was Secretary of Justice in Pres. Quezon’s Cabinet when the war broke out. Before his appointment to that office he had held many other important offices such as Justice of the Supreme Court. He was a great jurist. He accompanied Pres. Quezon in Corregidor, visited front lines in Bataan and traveled with Quezon to the South. When the presidential party left for Australia in 1942, Abad Santos remained with powers to represent the President in areas not under Japanese control. He was subsequently captured by the Japanese and reliable reports are to the effect that he had been killed by the Japanese. On June 27th, Pres. Osmeña said of him: “The late Secretary Abad Santos will go down in history as one of the most outstanding heroes of this war. Abad Santos is a real hero, a true patriot and should be held up before the youth as a model.”

According to the Free Philippines of June 29th, the President “emphasized Abad Santos chose to die rather than collaborate.”

The death of Abad Santos is still shrouded in mystery. Lt. Abad Santos, Jr. supposed to be a witness to his father’s death and, consequently, may be able to tell the whole story, was taken by the Japanese to Tokyo.

Abad Santos’ other son, Osmundo, entrusted to us in Baguio a sealed envelop containing confidential papers concerning Justice Abad Santos. They may reveal all the facts which we would like to know.

The tribute paid by Pres. Osmeña to Secretary Abad Santos is well deserved. He is truly a great man. I have already stated above what we did to try to save Secretary Abad Santos. We knew that he was an Orientalist and we thought this fact could save him so we told it to the Japanese authorities. But Abad Santos unluckily fell into the hands of a crazed and cruel man — Col. Kawakami. Col. Kawakami executed him before we could do anything for him.

The fact that Osmeña emphasized his statement that Abad Santos chose to die rather than collaborate with the Japanese is very significant. It is an attack on Roxas. Undoubtedly, it was a “hit back” on account of the bitter criticism launched by Roxas against Osmeña’s administration. It is a biting criticism of Roxas. Now the fight is on. No way to avoid it. Both Osmeña and Roxas will be candidates for President.

The statement of Osmeña, of course, also applies to us. We hope that it will not change or prejudice his attitude towards supposed collaborationists. After all, on account of our imprisonment in Iwahig we had nothing to do and could have nothing to do with the criticism of Roxas against him.

The question arose as to whether the fight between Osmeña and Roxas will favor or prejudice us. There is a difference of opinion. Recto believes it will favor us, as both would want to get our support. If not for this fight, we would be forgotten and left to rot here. In my opinion, it will prejudice us. Both may be too busy with the preparation of their respective platforms and with the campaign that we may be forgotten. At the present time, it is not known who among us are for Osmeña or Roxas. If the majority of us are in favor of Osmeña, Roxas may block our release through his friend. Gen. MacArthur, who before was not very friendly to Osmeña. If we are inclined towards Roxas, Osmeña may want us detained until after elections or after the war, and it is probably within his power as President to do so.

We had a meeting where we pledged to bind ourselves together as one. We will found a newspaper to be financed by Mr. Madrigal which shall be our organ for the propaganda of our platform, policies and aims. What these platform, policies and aims are, we have not determined. But we are agreed on two matters. First, we shall seek our exoneration and vindication from the charge of “collaborationists” with the implications of disloyalty and treason to our country and anti-Americanism. Second, we shall assist actively and wholeheartedly in the rehabilitation work of our country. As regards independence, there may be one or two dissenting voices, and the rest will be aggressively in favor. Needless to say, we will go after those who have been responsible for our imprisonment or who have been unjustly attacking us.

All these plans may lead to the formation of a party which will put up candidates for all positions, including those of president and vice president. With the men now with us who have repeatedly enjoyed the trust and confidence of our people, and who still retain this hold on their constituents, together with the thousands of persons also arrested, humiliated and imprisoned like us, the new party will be a formidable one. If we continue to be united and we all work vigorously, we may even win in the elections and thus be in power.

Pres. Osmeña has two sons imprisoned in Bilibid and later in Muntinglupa. They are being charged with being collaborationists for having engaged in the “buy and sell business” with the Japanese Army and Navy as the biggest purchasers in so far as war materials are concerned. Really, Serging Osmeña was one of the big “buy and sell” men and he made a lot of money. It is reported that he was able to pay the big indebtedness of his father. He established a company called “ESSO” and my son, Tony, was Treasurer and trusted official of the Company. Apparently, the young Osmeñas were expecting help from their father. It seems that such help was not extended. The father was indifferent. Furthermore, he made a statement to the press praising a son who worked against the Japanese and stating that he could not intervene in the cases of Serging and Nicasio. This peaked the anger of Serging. He immediately wrote a letter to his father stating among other things: “We have lost our mother, now we lose our father.” Serging complained that they had never been attended to by the father; he left them nothing. It was a very bitter and at the same time pathetic denunciation of his own father.

I do not know whether I would have done what Serging, Jr. did even if placed under the same circumstances. I do not believe I could do it. A father is a father; the children owe their existence to him. No matter how bad he may be, he must never be denounced by the children. This is especially so in the case of Pres. Osmeña. He is the President of the Republic. It is very embarrassing for him to have sons imprisoned for collaboration. Rather, Serging and Nick should have begged their father’s forgiveness for having placed him in such a situation. Furthermore, there are thousands imprisoned for the same reasons; Osmeña as President could not favor his own sons and not do the same for the others, unless he wants to be accused of favoritism and injustice.

Later reports are to the effect that Serging had retracted and he was awfully sorry for what he did. I am happy to hear this.

It is reported that President Osmeña had sent word to Serging and Nick that he will order the release of persons personally known to him with he himself as guarantor. This may be what induced Serging to change. If true, it will benefit not only his sons but many of us here who are not only known to Osmeña but are also his personal friends. This is especially so in my case. This has revived the hope of many.

Romulo is reported to have said that Roxas is no longer liked by MacArthur. If this is so, the interest that Roxas is taking in us may be prejudicial. But I seriously doubt the truth of the report of Romulo. If it is true, Roxas would not have been returned to active service as General and he probably would have been imprisoned just like us.

In turns out that the Dr. Sison reported here earlier who was snubbed by Romulo is not Agerico but Antonio. Dr. Antonio Sison is the family doctor of the Romulos and has never collected any fee from them. He saved the life of Romulo twice. When the incident happened it is reliably reported that Dr. Sison was indignant. This is the same Romulo that had been attacking the supposed “collaborationists.”


July 2, 1945 Monday

The Sunday Times of June 24, 1945 reports that new parties are being organized. Three parties will probably fight for power and control of the government in the November elections. Despite efforts to bring about a reconciliation of warring leaders of the party in power, the split up of the Nacionalista party into two factions is inevitable as a result of developments in the Philippine Congress.

A third political group is reliably reported as being formed, led by intellectuals pledged to support a program of government more liberal and more socially conscious than embraced in the platform of the ruling party. Roxas will be leader of the Nacionalista left wing and Osmeña of the administration party. There will be a fight in the convention for nominations, but the losing group will put up a ticket of its own. Independent big wigs are being invited to join the third party. Inactive political groups like the Sumulong popular front and the Abad Santos socialist party are also being courted. The new group may not be able to put up a complete ticket, but they will have candidates for the positions except President and Vice President.

Bad news. The United States civilian relief activities in the Philippines will be discontinued on Sept. 1, 1945. The Philippine government will therefore assume the activities and the full responsibility. This is a mistake and our government should have left no stone unturned to have the American aid continued. The Philippine government will not be in a condition to undertake the financing of such tremendous work.

The Associated Press dispatch of June 20, 1945, released in San Francisco, reports that, “At a press conference, the civilian Philippine delegation headed by Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, who was one of the leaders of the campaign to include an outright guarantee of independence in the charters, has accepted the self government formula.” This attitude was probably induced by the opinion of Premier Fraser of New Zealand and others, that there is no difference between self-government, self-determination and independence.

I cannot understand why such a change, proposed by the United Nations trusteeship committee, was ever accepted by Romulo and our delegation. If there is no difference as contended by Fraser, why change the text proposed by Romulo, which is very clear. The fact, however, is that there is a whale of a difference between independence and self-government. The former admits of no interpretation other than that the country concerned will be granted independence; whereas the self-government theory, besides the fact that it presupposes delay, may not ultimately lead to independence. The very explanation of Fraser bears this out. According to the news, he “pointed to the increasing importance of inter-dependence in world affairs.” Inter­dependence means that one or both countries have some more or less permanent” relations. If the new provision means that there shall be progressive development of self-government until independence is granted, who shall determine whether the self-government has advanced to such degree that independence may be granted? If it is the trustee who will decide whether or not a country is ready for self-government, which trustee will undoubtedly be the present corresponding colonizing country, then we may as well forget all about it. If it is the so-called Big Five, composed of England, United States, Soviet Russia, France and China, we also better forget all about it. England and France are colonizing countries and they naturally will want to defend their power and authority over the country under trusteeship now forming part of their colonies. Soviet Russia is ambitious She has expanded and will continue to expand. She has been doing this by means of some sort of plebiscite which everybody knows is just a mere formula since the results are obtained by threats, or by organizing puppet governments under the orders of Soviet Russia. This is precisely what she is trying to do now in connection with Poland. I hope the other countries of the Big Four will not be hoodwinked. China will be interested to guarantee absolute independence, as this is precisely her national policy to protect herself from the continuance of incursions in her territory. But she is too weak for the present and cannot wield any influence.

The United States should be interested in guaranteeing independence. In connection with the Philippines, she chose a course which entitled her to be justly considered as the cradle of liberty. But there are certain factors to be considered here. The United States for the present is the most highly developed in so far as economics are concerned. Her people are hardworking but at the same time they believe in amusing themselves as much as possible. Between business activities and their propensity for enjoyment, they have no time for anything else. This is the reason why at times their Congress does things that may not be to the liking of the American people. This also enables lobbyists to wield much influence in Washington. There are well organized lobbying offices in Washington which are heavily financed. They employ expert lobbyists and men who are well connected with high government executives and influential members of Congress. Practically all big interests in America are represented in Washington. The sugar interest, especially Cuban, was so powerful that to porect the Philippine sugar, the Philippine Sugar Association had to employ an influential ex-Senator (ex-Senator Hawes) with personal and intimate relations with members of Congress, as its Representative in Washington. I shall never forget our experience when I was a member of an Economic Mission to the United States in 1938-1939. To be able to get a little amendment to the provision of the Tydings-McDuffie Law involving our abaca product, we had to approach and convince one Mr. McDaniel, the representative of the Cordage Association of America. The chairman of the committee in the Senate would not even consider it unless we could have an understanding with Mr. McDaniel.

Furthermore, the United States is a representative democracy. They organize the government through parties that fight in the elections for control. Each party has a platform at times just the opposite of the platform of the other party. When a party wins, it naturally endeavors to carry out its policies and points of view as expressed in its platform. This is the reason why there is no continuity in American policies. This precisely is what happened in connection with our Jones Law passed under a Democratic regime. It promised independence when a stable government would have been established in the Philippines. Later, the Republican Party was elevated to power. It reversed the Democratic policy and paid no attention to the stable government provision. To justify its policy, it even denied that there was ever a valid promise of independence in the law. The Republican Party sent the Wood-Forbes Missions here to investigate. These missions reported so many anomalies here to show that there was no stable government.

For these reasons, we cannot be sure that the present attitude of the American government toward trusteeship will be a permanent one.

The trusteeship provision must have been proposed or at least inspired by the English. With it they meant to perpetuate their hold on their present colonies, like India. In so far as they are concerned, it will merely be a change of name — instead of colonization, it will be trusteeship. But in susbstance and in actuality, nothing will change.

The provision is also not clear as to whether the independence to be granted will be both political and economic. The modern tendency now is to grant political independence, but continue the economic control. To me, this system is just as bad if not worse than political dependence. Economic dependence is just as effective as political dependence to control a country. The country concerned will not be able to plan, develop and follow its economic policies. This is precisely what happened to the Philippines when the free trade was established — as a consequence, our whole economy became tightly intertwined with that of America. When the date for independence was fixed, we tried to extricate ourselves from American economic control. But what happened? Everytime we planned something which might affect American interests, we were stopped. We could not approve legislation which might effectuate the substitution of American business by Filipino business. We could not have diplomatic intercourse with other nations to ascertain what advantageous economic treaties we could enter into. We always had to consider American interests. This meant also that we could not negotiate reciprocity treaties with other nations, as has been done with America. How can we plan for self-sufficiency and economic independence under these circumstances? This is precisely the reason why I resigned as Chairman of the National Economic Council during the administration of Pres. Quezon. Everytime I proposed something which might affect American interests, I was stopped. When I proposed that we approach certain nations to see whether we could get some reciprocity agreements under which we could exchange products or export our excess products to those nations, I was warned not to endanger our economic relationship with America. All these support my thesis that independence must be both political and economic.


June 30, 1945 Saturday

The Post of June 23, reports that a congressional investigation of the acts of the Secretary of the Interior, Tomas Confesor, as Governor of Panay and Romblon during the occupation, is proposed in a resolution introduced by Representative Ceferino de los Santos of Iloilo. A joint committee of Congress is to look into the “state of terrorism, criminality and maladministration” and to investigate the issuance, use and disposition of emergency currencies. He made as basis for the resolution the recent speeches in Congress, reports on alleged arrests and executions and property confiscation in the islands during the occupation, as well as reports on the fight between Confesor and Col. Macario Peralta, head of the Panay guerrillas. Peralta is reported to possess affidavits which he intends to use against Confesor.

In an interview with the Associated Press reported in the Post of June 23. Kalaw said: “We need free trade with the United States over a period of 20 years or not at all.” I do not understand it. Supposing we are offered a 10-year or a 15-year period, are we going to refuse? To refuse will constitute an unpardonable blunder, a knife thrust at the very heart of our mother country.

It must be mentioned that after the surrender, many Bataan and Corregidor Filipino veterans were in a miserable state. Those who were previously in government claimed their former positions. Some who were not, applied for government employment. They were compelled to do this so that their dear ones may live. We Ministers and former Commissioners tried to help them as much as we could. All those with suitable qualifications were employed. Even those without civil service qualifications were accommodated. Instructions were passed around to give preference to these veterans. We were able to help many this way.

Editorial, Manila Post, June 23. Vindication. “When we first announced our stand on the collaboration issue we strongly advocated a liberal, dispassionate and realistic view conformable to the Pronouncement of President Osmeña in his ‘Government of Laws’ speech, in which he defined a policy poles apart from the view of the guerrillas and certain Cabinet members who uncompromisingly held the strict view that all those who served in the Vargas and Laurel governments and in Japanese-controlled entities are collaborators. We were then labelled in some unthinking quarters as collaborationist with the malicious intent of discrediting us.

“But knowing that the popular sentiment was on our side and that our stand rested four-square on principles, we steadfastly and courageously adhered to it and reiterated it time and again…

“For our part, we held ourselves fortunate to find that the principles for which we have long been fighting alone, and because of which we have been spitefully branded a collaborationist periodical, finds a champion in Senate Pres. Roxas, whose patriotism no one can now question.”

Following is a continuation of Roxas’ speech reported earlier: “On February 20 (1942), President Quezon was leaving Corregidor upon the request of the President of the United States and of Gen. MacArthur. President Quezon did not want to leave… I think it is my duty to say that Pres. Quezon not only left Corregidor with reluctance because he said he wanted to suffer and die with his people if need be, but he was very reluctant to leave Manila for Corregidor because he said, ‘I believe it is my duty to remain with my people in time of great need and trial.’ But he was prevailed upon. The United States government believed that it would be very unwise to risk Pres. Quezon’s life because he was the symbol, not only the leader, but the symbol of Filipino resistance and Filipino patriotism and Filipino idealism. He was not only the leader of his country, he was the father of Philippine liberty, and he was the man that built up in this country all the love and affection and loyalty that we have borne out in the battlefields… With tears in his eyes he left because he thought that it was his duty to his country, but he left with a broken heart and left only because he believed that his presence in the United States would accelerate the sending of reinforcement here…

“He left Corregidor and asked me to go with him. (He declined because he was afraid that the soldiers that were fighting in Bataan would suffer a dislocation and their morale would be weakened or shakened if they learned that he had left the country leaving them to fight alone.) He left leaving me all the responsibilities of government.”

Pres. Quezon issued an executive order providing that if anything should happen to him and to Vice President Osmeña during the duration of the war, that Manuel Roxas would be officially recognized as the legitimate successor to the presidency of the Commonwealth. One month later, Quezon wanted Roxas to come with him to Australia. “After the war, the safety and the future of our country can only be saved in his (Roxas) hands.” Roxas declined giving his reasons. Quezon answered, “Under those circumstances, I believe you should stay.”

Roxas’ speech continued, “I remained here because I wanted to continue fighting. I wanted to organize the resistance movement in the Philippines and, with the help of God, I think I did my share, poor as it is.”

According to reports from sources close to Pres. Osmeña, he did not know that Representative Lopez of Cebu was going to attack Senate Pres. Roxas; otherwise, he would have asked Lopez to refrain from delivering his speech, as he did when he found out that another solon from Cebu intended to attack certain members of Congress for activities during the Japanese regime. This was to preserve unity and avoid any discussion among the people. The controversy in our midst as to whether the Senate should have determined by lot the terms of office of the Senators, seems to have been started by the following amendment which seems to have already been approved by Congress:

Sec. 9 of Act 666, as amended, will read: “Sec. 9. The Senate shall within ten days after approval of this act, determine by lot which shall serve for a term of six years, which of the group shall serve for a term of four years, and which of the group shall serve for a term of 2 years; Provided that the Senators whose term of office shall cease as a result of the lot, shall hold over until their successors shall have been elected. Provided, further, that Senators whose term of office would have expired under the old rule shall continue in office without compensation until their successors are elected.”

The changes thereby introduced is that instead of holding the determination by lot within ten days from the beginning of the session which should have been held last January, 1942, it will be held within ten days after the approval of the amendment. Another change is that the Senators whose term of office had expired could continue in office until their successors are elected but without compensation. The purpose undoubtedly is to insure a quorum in the Senate.

Hope for our early release was again revived. It is said that the selection by lot will have to be done in our presence and that it seems that we are needed in the Senate to insure a quorum.

Secretary of the Interior Tomas Confesor on June 24 hurled back at Senate Pres. Manuel Roxas the charge of Fascism with which the latter has accused those who “want (the country) to be governed by the Chief Executive alone.”

Evidently referring to the attack of Roxas against the administration, Confesor declared: “I understand that someone made the state­ment that our present economic ills are administrative rather than a legislative responsibility… That statement shifting the responsibility of solons to these problems to the executive branch of the government alone is a Fascistic theory — an abdication of legislative power or authority; and anyone who advocates the abdication of legislative authority, is advocating a dictatorial form of government.”

Roxas is right. The economic problems are primarily for the executive to handle. The Legislative only intervenes whenever legislation is necessary. Even then, after the approval of the legislation the rest will have to be performed by the Executive. The theory of Confesor is impractical. The Legislative body moves slowly being composed of many persons and its acts will have to be sanctioned by the majority. The Executive, on the other hand, can move most expeditiously. Economic problems have many ramifications and if everytime each ramification will have to be submitted to the legislative body and will have to await the approval of this body, the measures or remedy required will come too late — at a time when damage or “prejudice had already been caused or the condition no longer admits of any remedy.

In the same speech of Roxas, he said, “While it is true the only ways to determine political questions in a democracy is by allowing the people to decide those questions, I invite the Senator from Bohol to file a bill in the Senate setting a date for the next election and I promise him I will see it through at the earliest date possible.”

According to Confesor, the United States Army is spending from 70 to 80 million pesos a month in the Philippines today. It means that within a year they may spend up to one billion.

My comment: If the information is correct, there will be inflation for I am sure that much circulation cannot at present be absorbed by the production which covers industry, agriculture and commerce. I am surprised that the necessary hedges against inflation are not being set up.


June 29, 1945 Friday

Yesterday some more “collaborationists” arrived from Manila. Among them were Justice Jorge Bocobo, Dean of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines; Mr. Arsenio Luz, Chairman of the Board of Information and Spokesman of Malacañan with the rank of Minister; Mr. Francisco Lavides, a Representative and lately Military Governor for the district comprising Laguna, Tayabas, Batangas and Mindoro; and Dr. Julio Luz.

They brought much news and many newspapers. Some of the news are sensational.

Wer were surprised to see Justice Bocobol he had never been a pro-Japanese, although he admires some of their virtues. He has always been sympathetic towards the Americans. He attributes his detention to the fact he was one of the signers of the first Manifesto and was a member of the first Council of State.

The news about a resolution in the Senate referred to earlier has been cleared up. Sen. Ramon Torres presented a resolution providing for the immediate investigation of Senators Recto, Yulo, Paredes, Tirona, Madrigal, Sebastian and myself who are now under detention. He demanded the investigation to vindicate the good name of the Senate and in order to avoid difficulties that hamper the regular functioning of the Senate. He said that he is convinced that our detention is just the result of a misunderstanding, rather than to a real and just cause. He said that his purpose was to determine he qualification of the detained Senators to be members of the Senate. (Philippine Press, June 26, 1945). The Senators are being prevented from complying with their official duties for causes of which the Senate has no official cognizance. Torres asked: “Who of us who are free and fully enjoy our rights as Senators can say that we have a better right, rathen than better luck, than some of those presently detained?” The resolution gives authority to the Senate President to appoint a special committee of five senators. The Senate President is to make the necessary arrangements with the corresponding authorities so that the committee may be given the necessary facilities for the poper discharge of its functions.

Editorial of Philippines Press, June 26, 1945. Present administration “has fumbled, in the opinion of even those who wish it well, the collaboration issue.”

Post, June 24. The nature of the late President Quezon’s “last instructions” to ranking Filipino officials and members of his war cabinet –the crux of the collaborationist problem– was further clarified by Senate President Roxas. At a meeting held in Marikina, before Quezon went to Corregidor, Roxas recalled, the late President instructed those who were to remain behind to “remain at their posts and do their utmost to protect the people” while the nation waited for the arrival of the American forces that would redeem the Philippines’ freedom. Among present: Gen. Roxas, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, Secretary of National Defense Teofilo Sison, Secretary of Agriculture Rafael Alunan, Secretary of Finance Serafin Marabut, Exec. Sec. Jorge B. Vargas, Philippine Army Chief of Staff Basilio Valdes, and Dr. Jose P. Laurel, then Justice of the Supreme Court.

Laurel, who had been originally scheduled to accompany Quezon to America but who was requested by the late President at the last moment to stay, reportedly asked Quezon, “To what extent should be cooperate with the Japanese?”

To which Quezon was said to have replied, “You may cooperate short of taking the oath of allegiance to Japan.”

Laurel then asked, “Suppose we are forced to?”

For a while Quezon was silent. Before he could answer, Laurel said, “I shall flee and hide in the mountains.”

Quezon: “No, not all of you should do that. Avoid it as much as you can.”

News items on June 24, 1945: Senator Carlos P. Garcia yesterday (June 23, 1945) challenged his colleagues that they resign from the Senate and submit to a national election as early as feasible so that the voters will have a chance to render their verdict on “collaboration” and other issues that now threaten to split the Nacionalista ranks. Garcia took the floor to hit back at Senate Pres. Roxas who on Wednesday attacked him and Rep. Pedro Lopez of Cebu as well as the administration. All elective officials particularly those who held posts under the Japanese, should return their positions to the people because it is the latter who can decide who are the Filipino officials who did such acts as signing the Pact of Alliance, declaring war against the United States, and sending Constabulary with Japanese soldiers to mopping out operations in some provinces. They would wish to know whether Filipino leaders were really impotent to prevent these and other crimes, and if so wh they continued at their posts. He said those serving during Japanese occupation lost the confidence and trust of the people who have remained loyal to the Commonwealth and the United States. Pres. Osmeña is included in the request for resignation.

Senator Garcia accepted Roxas’ challenge that he introduce a bill calling for an early election, but the date will have to be determined after complete order is restored. He said he is willing to have elections held as early as circumstances will permit.

The above apparently is a rejoinder on the part of Senator Garcia. It was an answer to the speech of Roxas of June 21, 1945.

My comment: I do not see that an election is necessary to find out the things Garcia said the people would like to know. We have been elected for a certain term under the Constitution and the people’s will should be respected. But under the circumstances, I cannot possibly refuse to resign. It may be interpreted as meaning that I want to hide something. I especially want the people to know that I have never been disloyal to my country. However, it occurs to me that the truth can very well be ascertained by following the constitutional processes. In the case of the senators, they cannot be not allowed to sit while an investigation is being held by a committee of the Senate and until their cases are decided by that body. Such measure as is proposed by Sen. Torres should be adopted immediately. We are entitled to perform the functions entrusted to us by the people if we are not guilty.

Post, June 25, 1945. Roxas accepted the challenge made by Sen. Carlos Garcia, that the questions on which he (Roxas) and the administration differed be decided at an election.


June 27, 1945 Wednesday

A Colonel, Assistant Chief of the U.S. Military Police, came and inspected us today. He stopped in front of me and asked me two questions. “Are you comfortable here?”, he asked. I somewhat hesitated before answering, “Yes, under the circumstances.” What I really meant was that in view of the fact that we were prisoners, and because of the lack of facilities, the comfort that we have is all that could possibly be given. But we are not satisfied. Evidently, the Colonel understood me as he repeated “under the circumstances.” His next question was, “How is the food?” I answered, “It is sufficient in quantity, but it is not the kind of food we want. We prefer not to eat canned foods. What we want are fresh fish, meat and vegetables. We also would like to have rice. This is the kind of meal we eat as Filipinos.” He then turned to our Colonel Superintendent and asked him how they could be obtained. He even talked about fishing. Turning to me again, he said that rice is pretty hard to obtain; there is a scarcity of rice even in Manila and it costs very much. When he passed by Paredes and he was told that Paredes was our spokesman, he asked Paredes to see him. Jokingly he added, “not by motor car.” Paredes went to see him at 2 o’clock and returned after two hours. He immediately gathered us together to make a report.

Paredes said the Colonel talked to him about giving us better food, allowing us to bring food in, allowing us to have our laundry done outside the camp, etc. The Colonel said that he came precisely to investigate our living conditions and he will see what can be done. When asked about our petition to MacArthur, he said that it passed through him and he passed it on to the General Staff. Whether it reached MacArthur or not, he did not know.

Paredes then talked about our case. He explained that we had not been sentenced nor have we been informed of the charges against us. We believe that we have not done anything to deserve imprisonment. He mentioned some specific cases, like Bayan who is merely a technical man; that of Yulo, who supported two guerillas and gave information to the U.S. Army about what he saw in Manchoukuo which had been used by the U.S. Army to its advantage. Paredes asked that we be released; if that was not possible, that we be brought back to Manila and given limited freedom; and if this was still not acceptable, that our conditions here be improved. Here we are worse off than the criminals with long term sentences as they are allowed to go around the Colony, while we have to remain inside the stockade.

The Colonel said that he fully sympathized with us, but it was not within his power to grant our request. But he believes something will be done soon since Congress seems to be very interested in us. He reported that one day the House was discussing the matter of the collaborationists issue and the discussion became so heated that the public was excluded and the doors closed. The Colonel said that the C.I.C. was supposed to have investigated us, and after sentencing we were turned over to the Military Police. Paredes reiterated that none of us had been duly investigated and, consequently, we could not have been sentenced. The Colonel then said that probably the reason was that we were merely under protective custody to save us from persons who might want to kill us. Paredes said that he would be willing to bet that anyone of the officer class here could travel from one end of the Philippines to the other without being molested. Paredes said that they probably are not aware that in placing us under protective custody we are really being punished. When we are left “incommunicado”, we are punished; when we are separated from the family, we are punished; and when we are made to eat food that we are not used to eating, we are punished.

The Colonel said that the Military Police did not know anything about the merits of our cases; that MacArthur ordered that after action by the C.I.C, we be turned over to the Military Police; that they were given 48 hours by MacArthur within which to take us to Iwahig. This is probably the reason why we were shipped in a freighter where we were herded in a dark and hot hold like cattle. He added that the order is to hold us for the duration of the war.

Discussion ensued as to when the war with Japan, this being the war referred to by the Colonel, would last. The visiting Colonel asserted that it would take about eighteen months, whereas our Colonel here in the camp insists that the war would last only three months. Paredes said that with the way the American Army is fighting and with the bombing of Japan by super-fortresses, the war with Japan could not possibly last much longer.

Paredes and Gen. Francisco who also had a conference with the Colonel, got the impression that everything had been done in accordance with orders from Gen. MacArthur. In connection with our request for transfer to Manila, Paredes suggested that we could be confined in our respective homes, or in another place like the house or “hacienda” of Don Vicente Madrigal in Muntinglupa, or the house of Mr. Bayan in Quezon City. The Colonel took note of the suggestions of Paredes. Chief Yulo, after the report, again expressed his indignation and strongly criticized MacArthur.

A few days ago, all the members of the officer class were transferred to a part of one of the buildings. We are now separated from the enlisted class by a wall made of nipa. But we are in the same compound; we are now very crowded. However, there is no doubt that things have improved. The new administration seems to do everything for us. The Superintendent is Lt. Col. Gilfilan, while the assistant is Lt. Stanley F. Hogenberg, Jr. They are both very kind and considerate and take personal interest in us. The Lieutenant saw to it that we were provided with clothes and shoes. He gave us boxing gloves and other athletic equipment, and dominoes and other paraphernalia for our amusement. He provided instructions for the illiterate prisoners in the camp. Once he asked a young boy whether he went to church. He distributed Catholic books and sacred medals.

The enlisted class was required to work either in cleaning the premises or in preparing the new camp to which we will be transferred. This camp will not be finished until after three months. Sometimes men complain of the treatment accorded to them by the Captain in charge of the construction, compelling them to work even during a rain storm.

Don Vicente Madrigal receives newspapers which we read. Among the news is that Confesor was bitterly attacked in the floor of the House. Representative Borja of Iloilo said that if Confesor had not left for the mountains, he would have been killed for the many abuses he had committed, especially the taking of private property. Rep Rafols also hurled charges against Confesor. Both called him names. The language used must have been terrible as they were ordered stricken off the record. Confesor should resign or ask for an investigation. He should clear himself or leave the service. If the charges are true, his usefulness to the government is over since the people will lose their respect. A government with such officials will be crippled.

The other news is that there seems to be a strong movement to settle the dispute of Roxas and Osmeña for candidacy for President. It was reported that Osmeña may choose not to run if such sacrifice is necessary to effect unity. It is said that Osmeña had done it in the past and he will be willing to do it again. Roxas was expected to do the same. There was an editorial in which the withdrawal of either of them was advocated for the sake of unity. As a precedent, it cited the withdrawal of Rizal in favor of Del Pilar in Madrid; the elimination of Bonifacio and of General Luna; the conciliation of Quezon and Osmeña after the “Collectivitas-Unipersonalistas” fight and the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill fight. There was a suggestion for Osmeña to run for President and Roxas for Vice President. The fight seems to be inevitable, but efforts to settle matters should be continued to insure unity for the good of the country.

It is reported that Senators Sa Ramain and Rama had also been detained apparently for being collaborationists, but later released for the purpose of attaining a quorum during the Senate session. I do not know what Rama did; as regards sa Ramain, he had committed acts, such as signing the Constitution, for which others have been arrested and are now suffering imprisonment. Why the discrimination?

There are Senators-elect appointed during the Commonwealth Government who, under the Constitution, forfeited their right to a seat in the Senate for accepting other positions in the government. These are Domingo Imperial, who accepted the position of Justice, Court of Appeals; Roxas, who accepted the position of Colonel and afterwards became General in the Army; Sebastian, who accepted the position of Judge of the Court of First Instance; and Tirona, who accepted the position of Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations. If the four above are eliminated there can be no quorum in the present session of Congress. Already there are reports that the legality of the present Congress or the present session of Congress is being doubted. A lawyer has submitted a memorandum raising that question and Rep. Montejo of Leyte wants the question submitted for legal opinion. If the law is to be strictly adhered to, this question must be determined.

Rumor circulated that the Congress has passed a resolution requesting that we be turned over to the Commonwealth Government before July 15, 1945. An employee in the office of the Colonel happened to glance at a newspaper and he transmitted the news to a colonist, one Mr. Lopez, who came running to our quarters to tell us the news. We hope this will be confirmed. It means that our friends in Manila have not forsaken us. The general belief is that Congress must have some sort of understanding with Pres. Osmeña and Gen. MacArthur, and that after we have been turned over to the Commonwealth, we will be released. Discussion arose as to why the 15th of July was mentioned. One said that the purpose is to prevent us from sitting in the Senate since Congress adjourns on or about the, 15th of July. Another said that they want us to be out before the 15th to enable us precisely to attend the session. Chief Yulo doubts whether Gen. MacArthur would do anything. Furthermore, he opines we cannot be released during the duration of the war in view of the U.S. President’s order, and if MacArthur releases us or turns us over to the Commonwealth, it will have to be declared that a mistake in considering us collaborationist had been committed. MacArthur will not reverse himself or admit he was mistaken. Paredes thinks that the C.I.C. may declare us not guilty, in which case we can be released as we will not come under the presidential order.


June 26, 1945, Tuesday

It may be asked: If the conduct of the Japanese is as reported above why did we serve in the Japanese regime and later in the Philippine Republic?

I had good reasons for not accepting any position in the Japanese regime. Aside from my past relations with America and the Americans, and the position I had held with the Philippine government which would make my acceptance of any position under the Japanese regime improper, I had plans which I could carry out only as a private citizen. I was Director of Marsman & Co. and President and Vice President of various Marsman enterprises, like the Coco Grove Mining Co., Marsman Trading, Insular Drug, Cardinal Insurance, Marsman Lumber, etc. Immediately before the war, Marsman & Co. further expanded its enterprises, by buying American Hardware and the Food and other departments of Pacific Commercial Co. There were also many new industries and businesses planned. Such was the condition of Marsman & Co. when the war broke out.

The offices of the Marsman enterprises were in the Marsman Building at the Port Area. It was right next to military objectives. From the second day of the war, Manila Bay was bombed including the Port Area. A favorite target was Pier 7, considered the longest in the world, located probably less than 100 meters from our building. Bombing continued almost everyday until the day before the entry into Manila of the Japanese Army on January 2, 1942.

I used to go to the office regularly although I did not have to. Employees were dismissed after 11:00 a.m. as it was noted that air raids commenced after that hour; nevertheless, I and other executives would remain in our offices and continue working as if nothing was happening. The bombs fell around the building. It might have been a military target as Admiral Hart, the Head of the American Asiatic Fleet, and the Navy General Staff had their headquarters in the Marsman Building. We had somebody in the building watch for Japanese planes and sound the alarm. We would all run down to the air raid shelters whenever he gives the signal; and when the planes were overhead, we would all lie down, cover our ears and open our mouths. I used to sit next to Admiral Hart in the air raid shelter located in the first story under the stairs. The building was also surrounded by layers of sandbags. Luckily, the building was never hit. There was only one bomb that fell behind the building about five yards away. All the windows of the building were shattered. I found several shrapnels inside my office which was on the 4th floor from which I got a good view of the pier.

In my house, we built no shelter at all. We used to hide on the first floor on both sides of the stairs which was located at the very center of the house. We lined the walls with sandbags and placed boards and many other things on the second floor directly above us. No bombs fell near us but we could hear the detonation very well so that at times, they sounded like they fell just next door to us. We save planes dive down and drop bombs on Nichols Field.

I never go out during an air raid. But I was caught in the streets twice when this occured. The first time I was luckily in front of the Bay View Hotel, a nine story reinforced concrete building. It seemed to be a safe place. The bombs fell in the bay near the hotel. The second time, I was in real danger. A special meeting of the Chamber of Mines was called and generally, either Vice President Ohnick or myself attended. We had agreec that Mr. Ohnick would attend that morning. The meeting was a special one called to discuss a very important matter concerning the mining industry. At the last hour, Mr. Ohnick decided not to attend and I had to rush to the meeting at the Pacific Building. This was the 27th of December, 1941. The meeting was hurriedly held and adjourned. I had sent my chauffeur to the bank to get some money and when after the meeting my automobile was not back, I had to borrow the automobile of the attorney of the company, Mr. Amando Velilla. I forgot to give directions to Mr. Velilla’s chauffeur not to pass through Intramuros (the Walled City) to go to Escolta but to go on to Padre Burgos St. outside Port Area. He drove through Intramuros, across the Malecon Drive and the air raid sirens sounded. Following instructions, we had to leave the car and seek shelter in the Myer’s Building. I entered a small compartment which had been converted into a very poorly built shelter. There were other people there, but they did not know me. Bombs fell all around. I heard the sound of an airplane which seemed to be flying very low. The moment I heard the sound I hit the floor, closed my eyes, covered my ears, and opened my mouth. Forthwith, I heard something heavy drop; then the building shook as the bomb exploded. The building was hit and shrapnel flew all around. When I dove, those around me laughed; they thought it was funny. I came through unscathed while many of the people around me were hurt. It was indeed a very narrow escape, but my satisfaction was that it happened while performing a duty for the company which had extricated me from financial difficulties. The Myer’s Building caught fire and burned down. The experience made me very cautious.

The City of Manila had already been declared an open city; nevertheless, the Japanese planes continued dropping bombs. To protect people residing in the nearby municipalities, like Pasay, San Juan, Caloocan, these were also included in the open city.

It was on December 28, 1941 when Japanese planes bombed the Treasury Building and the Philippines Herald offices located in a building on the other side of the former moat and wall around Intramuros, about opposite the Legislative Building. We were then having caucuses of both the members of the Senate and House to agree on the organization. When the siren sounded we ran to the shelter in the cellar. We were in the shelter until after three o’clock without anything to eat. It was very hot and crowded inside. The Herald had just written a strong editorial against the Japanese. It was also the time that the Church of Sto. Domingo and the Letran College were destroyed.

In connection with the advance of the Japanese and the occupation of Manila, it was in the morning of the 8th of December that the war began. I remember the date very well as that is the feast day of my hometown, Taal, Batangas, and we were about to leave that morning for Taal when we heard the news in the radio about the attack on Pearl Harbor. A few minutes afterwards we heard the bombing of Baguio. At 12:30 p.m. the bombing of Clark Field was reported and at 3 o’clock that same afternoon Nichols Field was attacked. Nichols Field was only a few kilometers from my house at Malate so that the war was brought next door to us. As I said, although there was bombing almost everyday I continued going to work especially since I noticed that the other executives were always present at the office. Very few of the Filipino personnel came. We continued holding meetings of the Boards of Directors of the Marsman companies as usual, but many times they had to be suspended to go to the shelter on account of air raids. I remember that one of my last acts was to sign dividend checks declared by the Coco Grove, of which I was the President. Before the coming of the Japanese we took steps to have our gold bullion taken to Corregidor where the USAFFE was going to make its last stand. We also endeavored to send all the moneys of the Marsman companies to the United States. I remember that our last meeting was at the University Club and we left some of our papers there. While there, I telephoned to arrange the sending of money to the United States.

Before going to the office, I would generally inquire from General Francisco about the situation of the advancing Japanese Army.He told me confidentially that the situation was very bad; that the Japanese were advancing very fast. I also informed my American friends and I advised them to withdraw as much of their deposits as they could. They refused on account of the official communique from the General Headquarters to the effect that “Enemies repulsed; no change in front.” About the 27th of December, I told them the Japanese had already passed San Pablo, Laguna, almost 100 kilometers away. It was then too late for the Americans to withdraw their money and they became very angry.

Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was absolute blackout throughout Manila. We passed terrible nights. Oftentimes, we heard revolver or gun shots. We understand that it was to enforce the blackout. The guards also shot at persons moving suspiciously or signaling, or at the places where the signaling was coming from. We actually saw many such signals, evidencing the presence of spies and fifth columnists.

The nights were dark and gloomy. I remember that we passed Christmas without the usual celebration. Some in our neighborhood tried to sing the Christmas carols, but they seemed in our ears like songs sang in necrological services. The thieves were also active. I remember that while we were downstairs on account of the air raids, a thief entered the second floor of our house. We heard the bathroom window creaking and we immediately ran upstairs and turned on the light in the room next to the bathroom. We found the door of the bathroom closed and we suspected the thief was still inside. In the meanwhile, the air raid wardens with an American Army officer were yelling from the street ordering us to put the light out, otherwise they would shoot. I quickly ran down to explain to the officer that there was a thief inside the bathroom. The officer went upstairs. Standing behind the closed bathroom door, he yelled to the thief to come out. He then broke in the door with his revolver. He found nobody: evidently, the thief had jumped out the window. There were practically no people going around at night. The cinematograph were open, but we never went.

In the day time, there were many people in the streets. During air raids, the air raid wardens were kept very busy. These are paid employees and they were very strict in the performance of their duties. The warden in front of our house, a man by the name of Emilio, was especially efficient. We noticed that the white people were reluctant to obey him. I remember an incident which I witnessed. The warden ordered a white couple to stop because there was an air raid; but they continued on their way. The warden ran after them to stop them. An American officer happened to be around and he drew his revolver and threatened to shoot the warden if he insisted. The warden, fearing for his life, let the couple go. When the officer drew his revolver, I immediately ran to my house to get my revolver. My intention was to shoot the officer if he shot at the warden since the latter was merely performing his official duty.

People were very careful about letting in anybody into their houses, even those caught in the streets during an air raid. Doors were always kept closed and locked. The reason for this was that there had been cases where bad elements took advantage of air raids to rob the houses.

On or about December 28, 1941, Pres. Quezon, Vice Pres. Osmeña with Secretary Santos, Col. Roxas and Gen. Valdes fled to Corregidor. For several days before and after their departure, there was a heavy movement of American and Filipino troops fleeing Manila as it had been declared an open city. They went north to Bataan where they were to make their last stand. It was about this time when I received an order from the U.S. Navy to turn over the Marsman yacht anchored in front of the Yacht Club to the Navy, and another order from the Army to blow up all our dynamite cache in Camarines Norte, and all our oil. We had just received a consignment of over 4000 cases of dynamite and in preparation for the war our two oil tanks, one of which was the biggest in the Philippines, were filled up.

On that same day, my son Tony who had finished training in the Cavalry Camp at Parañaque, and who was a Sergeant-Major in the Philippine Army Reserve received an order to join his regiment. He had been waiting for it; all his other classmates had received theirs. He prepared to comply with the order. I noticed that he was very, very anxious to do so. He envied his classmates, especially Apostol who only the day before left without him when his order did not come. Apostol never came back. Tony’s instructions were to report to the military headquarters in Pampanga. But when he arrived at the train station, the last train for the North had left and so had the last police bus that took reservists to their destination. Upon Tony’s insistence, I went to Malacañan to inquire and there I met Maj. Gen. Guillermo Francisco. I inquired from him as to how Tony could report for duty. He answered that the orders given to Tony and others which were issued on about December 9, 1941 had already been cancelled.

Before the Japanese entered Manila, I as a Senator-elect and as such a high government official, discussed with Speaker Yulo, Mr. Vargas and other officials what we should do. Should we hide from or present ourselves to the Japanese military authorities? After due discussion, and following instructions allegedly given by Pres. Quezon, we decided to stay. However, I expected that we would immediately be called by the Japanese and as I did not want to be one of the first to be called, and as I wished to know first what the Japanese would do to the Filipino officials, I decided to go into hiding. I went to New Manila and hid in the house of Doña Narcisa de Leon on Broadway Avenue. I changed my name and everybody was instructed to call me by that name and not divulge my identity. I went there in the afternoon of the 29th of December. I was very well treated Mrs. de Leon who is our “comadre” and in fact by the whole family. They certainly took good care of me. Rizal Day, December 30, passed and for the first time since that day was made an official holiday, there was no celebration. The Japanese were expected to arrive and enter Manila on December 31, but they did not come.

For the first time, I was not with my family when the New Year was ushered in. Like Christmas, there was no celebration of any kind. The usual fanfare and family reunions were conspicuously absent. There was a lot of speculation as to when the Japanese would enter Manila and what they were going to do.

By the second of January, 1942, when the Japanese had not shown up, we learned that the Japanese contingent coming from the North was somewhat delayed and that coming from the South was waiting. I called up Mr. Ohnick and told him I was hiding and asked his advice as to whether I should stay in hiding. He answered that I better just stay home. So in the afternoon, I went home. I left my revolver in Broadway as I was afraid that if I were to encounter the Japanese I would be searched, and if found with a revolver, I would be shot. It was a memorable short ride home. At any time, I was expecting to meet the Japanese and I wondered what I would do. I passed through España St., Quezon Avenue, Quezon Bridge, Arroceros St., Plaza Lawton, Taft Avenue and San Andres St. I met no Japanese, but I saw spectacles which gave me a glimpse of the moral fiber of the Filipinos. It foreshadowed what was to come later -the shameful conduct of many of our countrymen of robbery consisting in illegal confiscation of goods, soulless profiteering on goods, including foodstuff, and rampant bribery of the police and other agents of the law who were charged with the prevention of illegal traffic of commodities and sale at prices in excess of those fixed by law. I saw big crowds all along the streets and at first I did not know what it was all about. On España St. I met people carrying all kinds of commodities, clothing, canned goods, etc. On Rizal Avenue, I saw persons forcing open the Chinese stores and carrying out everything, including furniture. It was rampant looting. People rushed into the stores like mad dogs. I reached the other side of Quezon Bridge and there I saw a big crowd snatching everything they could get from the old Ice Plant. I could see them carrying frozen meat and fish.

On Lawton Square, on Taft Avenue, San Andres St., I saw the same thing. Some people used automobiles, “calesas” and “carretelas” to haul their loot. Many of them sold their wares right there on the street for very low prices; one could buy everything: clothing, foodstuff, furniture. I learned later that the goods came from the Port Area. Some bodegas were opened to the public. Other bodegas, however, were forced open. This was not to be regretted after all as the goods would have fallen into the hands of the Japanese. My chauffeur insisted in going to the Port Area with our automobiles. I refused to allow him to go. I prohibited all the members of my family and all those who worked for me to take any part in the looting or even to buy the looted goods. I consider it dishonest to acquire them. In fact, there was looting all over Manila. Right in front of my house they forced a Chinese store open and stole everything inside. The policemen who witnessed this looting were powerless. Some of the policemen were even seen to take part in the looting. It was a shame.

I forgot to mention that during the bombing, every time there was an air raid alarm, American soldiers were stationed in various parts of Manila to watch for parachutists. Five American soldiers were stationed just outside my house. Whenever they came, we offered them coffee.

It was in the afternoon of the 2nd of January between 5 and 6 o’clock p.m. when the Japanese entered the city. They marched down various streets, two of which were Taft Avenue and Mabini St. From Taft Avenue we could hear yells of “Banzai.” Those passing Mabini rode in trucks. We could see them very well from our house. For a victorious army, it was surprising that there was no show of pride.

The next day, the people went out expecting excellent treatment as many of them sincerely believed that the Japanese would treat us as equals and brothers. That same day we were awakened to the reality that the Japanese were not as we expected. That very first day, there were incidents due to the fact that the Filipinos were being compelled to salute the Japanese sentries. Everybody was searched for arms, which was to be expected. But the Japanese civilians were very abusive. Sometimes, although the Japanese soldier had already searched the man and found nothing, the Japanese civilian who acted as interpreter would get his watch or other things. All automobiles were confiscated without ceremony. Even civilians confiscated automobiles. I was just about to leave my house in my automobiles when my friend, Mr. Schultz, stopped me to tell me the Japanese were confiscating automobiles and his automobile had just been taken. So I went walking along the boulevard to go to the Marsman building at the Port Area. However, at the Luneta, I was stopped by a Japanese sentry. Evidently, entry into the Port Area had been prohibited.

On January 4th, an automobile with Japanese Navy officers stopped at our house. My family was scared. The civilian interpreter told me to get dressed and go with them. I was taken to the Marsman Building. I was made to wait at the anteroom of what used to be Mr. Jan Marsman’s office on the fourth floor. After about half an hour, I was ushered in. I saw a uniformed man who turned out to be the General and Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in the Philippines. The General asked me many questions. He asked where Mr. Marsman was and whether the company was really owned by Britishers and Americans. He also told me he knew that Admiral Hart, the head of the American Navy in the Philippines had quarters in the building. He then asked where the telephone or secret communication to Corregidor was located in the building. Then the Japanese asked me for the keys to all the Marsman buildings and warehouses. I told them that I was Vice President of the Marsman Building Corporation and as such I was quite familiar with the plans of the building, and that I was not aware of any telephone communication with Corregidor. We went back to the Marsman Building where they took me all around the building to search for the communications equipment, but we did not find any. They thanked me and I prepared to leave. But before doing so I asked that I be allowed to go into my office to get a few things. They asked me for specifications and I especially mentioned the English Dictionary. My intention was that if I were allowed to get the dictionary I would then ask for other things. I had many valuable things in my office, such as important documents, parts of my diary, my collection of rare stamps, my photographs with Pres. Quezon and Mrs. Marsman, and other personal belongings. A Navy Captain escorted me to my office. But at the door, he stopped me and went inside. When he came out, he told me they would look for my things and deliver them to me at my house. On the way out of the building, I was looking all around, especially at the safes in which the companies had at least P60,000.

The next day the Japanese came for me again. We went to the Marsman bodegas near the North bank of the Pasig River. I do not know why they brought me there as I was not allowed to go inside the bodegas. I saw various trucks parked in front of the bodegas. The caretaker told me that trucks had been coming frequently and that the Japanese loaded them to the limit with things taken from the bodegas.

The next morning after the entry of the Japanese, I went to the Admiral Apartments on Dewey Boulevard. Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Ohnick were expecting to be arrested by the Japanese at any time and that same morning at about noon, somebody had telephoned me that Mr. and Mrs. Ohnick were leaving with Japanese officers. When I arrived at the Admiral Apartments, they were gone. I just missed them by a few minutes. I saw their automobile being taken by the Japanese. I tried to stop the soldiers but they did not pay any attention to me. I lingered around the hotel. I met and talked with ex-Representative Pedro Sabido and Dr. Salvador Araneta. I found that Mr. Sabido decidedly in favor of a close relationship with Japan and membership to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This is the reason why in the sub-committee on Economic Planning of the Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence, I made him Chairman of the Committee on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Araneta, on the other hand, was decidedly against any relationship with the Japanese. It should be remembered that he was one of the most active for permanent political relationship with the United States.

The only high officials of the Marsman enterprises who regularly attended the Board meetings after the Japanese came were Mr. Welhaven, Mr. Ottiger, Mr. Velilla and myself. Von Ahren called a few times. Mr. Ohnick attended once at the San Luis office he was out of the the concentration camp for a few hours. The Japanese came once to inquire what we were doing. We announced that we were discussing our affairs. They asked whether we were licensed. We explained that we were not operating. There was an understanding in the company that we were to take care of the interests of the Marsman enterprises during this period. We held many meetings in my house on Calle San Andres where we discussed various affairs of the companies to do all we could to protect them. We decided to prepare an inventory of all the stock we had for such claims as we may later wish to make. Very little could be done as regards these two matters as it was most difficult to deal with the Japanese and they would not allow us to have access to the premises of the Marsman buildings and bodegas. I was to continue with any work that could be done for the companies as Messrs. Welhaven and Ottiger are whites and the Japanese are prejudiced against whites. Furthermore, Mr. Welhaven was a semi-belligerent as he was from Norway, the refugee government which had declared war against Germany and Japan.

I did my best to get Mr. and Mrs. Ohnick released from the concentration camp in Sto. Tomas University. I used to send a few things to them and to other Marsman men at the camp. I generally went with Mr. Velilla and Mr. Ottiger. I shall never forget those visits. Those Japanese guards were very hard to deal with. I carried a pass from Colonel Watanabe. We had to go through all kinds of difficulties to get in. My papers were scrutinized. We were usually made to wait at the gate for a long time. There we saw many Filipinos slapped and treated like dogs. We feared that our turn would come. Many times we could talk only in the presence of the Japanese. I often went to see the Superintendent since it was easier to talk to him to ask him to be allowed to talk to internees without any guard present. When leaving I generally would loiter around the grounds to talk to different people. I knew I was exposing myself to danger in doing so. One of the internees, Mr. Kelly, a high official of Marsman Company who was one of my best friends in the organization, was suffering from something which required him to go to Dr. Gonzales on Legarda St. Every time he went, he called me up. I always took him back to Sto. Tomas in my automobile where we would have a good chat along the way.

I continued my efforts to get Mr. and Mrs. Ohnick out of the concentration camp. Mrs. Ohnick was released because she was sick most of the time. Mr. Ohnick was able to get permission once in a while to be out of the camp for a few hours.  I went to talk to the Superintendent about Mr. Ohnick. I told him that I would like to have Mr. Ohnick released in view of the fact that his wife was sick. I explained to him my relationship with Mr. & Mrs. Ohnick. I said that Mr. Ohnick was the Vice President of Marsman & Company, and that I was a member of the Board of Directors. Mr. Ohnick, when interviewed by the Superintendent, mentioned that his father was a pure blooded Japanese. I knew this, and I also knew that his father’s name was Oniki, but I never mentioned it. The Superintendent decided to release Mr. Ohnick to me. Of course I had to guarantee his good conduct. Mr. & Mrs. Ohnick moved to a house near the Rizal Memorial Stadium where I visited them quite frequently. Mrs. Ohnick was in very poor health.

Mr. & Mrs. Francisco were also released as Mrs. Francisco was very sick. They occupied a house in New Manila where I visited them. I noticed that their house was being watched by the Japanese police. I pitied them very much as they complained that they could not get some essential things like laundry soap. Mr. Francisco attended a few of the meetings of Marsman & Co.

Mr. Ohnick was present in various meetings in my house and in a meeting at the Marsman store and shop at San Luis St., almost directly in front of the Agricultural Building. At one time. some Japanese came and asked whether we had license to operate the store. We answered that we had not opened the store and that we were merely having an informal meeting. This store was later seized by the Japanese. In these meetings attended by Mr. Ohnick the main question discussed was whether or not we should continue the business. The consensus of opinion among us was that we should suspend operations of the company. However, upon my suggestion, we filed a petition to operate. My reason was that if we did not apply for a license to operate, they might take this as an admission that it was an enemy company. We were contending that it was not enemy property inasmuch as the majority stockholders were Mr. and Mrs. Marsman who were naturalized Filipinos. I forgot to state that Mr. Francisco, another high official of Marsman, was also present in some of those meetings. The Japanese never took action on our petition, and in the meanwhile they continued taking everything in the store until nothing was left.

It was agreed that I was to take charge of protecting the properties and interests of Marsman enterprises and that I was to act on matters that may come involving the enterprises. I was also to study future plans for the activities of the company during the Japanese regime if we ever decide to reopen.

Upon the request of my friends in the concentration camp, I suspended sending food or even visiting them. I noticed that I was being watched very closely. I remember one incident. We had a party in the house of Mr. and Mrs. Ohnick. All of them, with the exception of myself and Velilla, were Americans, Englishmen, Norwegians and Swiss. It was to celebrate the birthday of Mr. Ohnick and I went there with that understanding. The next day there was a full report about the party by the Military Police. The report stated that it was to celebrate the birthday of Mr. Marsman. It turned out that it was the birthday of Mr. Marsman and that the party was intended for him also, but I did not know this.

Because of my close relations with the Americans, the Japanese became suspicious of me. They complained to Malacañan. Knowing that drastic action would be taken against me, I desisted from visiting and sending food to the camp. My friends well understood my situation.

The Japanese Army entered Manila on the 2nd of January, 1942. Before their entry, the government made all the necessary preparations. Vargas, the Secretary to the President, which position made him a ranking member of the Cabinet, was at the same time appointed by Pres. Quezon as Mayor of Manila. He was the one charged with the painful duty of surrendering Manila. This was called Greater Manila as the municipalities around Manila –Pasay, Parañaque, San Pedro Makati, San Juan, and Caloocan– were incorporated into Greater Manila. Quezon City was also made a part of it. The purpose in creating a Greater Manila was so the whole area comprising those cities and municipalities could be included in the declaration of open city. Vargas and Laurel, got in touch with Katsumi Nihro, then Japanese Consul General in Manila. In the meanwhile, all the policemen were disarmed to prevent any incident which might result in combat with the Japanese. They were merely provided with walking sticks. Big streamers were placed along Taft Avenue and P. Burgos St. by the City Hall, warning the Filipinos to keep the peace. Vargas surrendered the city without any incident. He was told by the Japanese to continue as Mayor. He as well as Laurel were approached by the Japanese about forming a Central Government. Kihara, former Japanese Vice-Consul in Manila, took part in the negotiations. General Hayashi, an old friend of Laurel, called him also about forming a government. Aquino and Recto were approached by their friend, Kanegae. Later, Mori talked with Paredes on the subject.

Laurel was the Secretary of Justice and Acting Chief Justice; Aquino was a member of the Cabinet before the last reorganization of the Cabinet by Pres. Quezon and was slated to be the Speaker of the next House of Representatives; Paredes, Floor Leader and Speaker-elect; Recto, Senator-elect. Aquino, Paredes and Recto talked to Yulo who was then Speaker of the House and slated to be the President of the Senate. Yulo decided to consult Chief Justice Avanceña, the grand old man of the Philippines, whose views are always sound and whose patriotism had already been tested. He then called the other members of the Cabinet before the last reorganization to a meeting –Teofilo Sison, Rafael Alunan, Jose Fabella, Serafin Marabut, Jorge Bocobo. Fabella could not attend as he was sick. Later, they called all the Senators in Manila. These were Ramon Fernandez, Vicente Madrigal, Melecio Arranz, Eulogio Rodriguez, Elpidio Quirino, Arnaiz and myself.

The House of Representatives in a caucus designated the following to attend the meetings: Jose Zulueta, Eugenio Perez, Jose Veloso, Tomas Oppus, Prospero Sanidad, Alfonso Mendoza. Finally, prominent people were called and those included Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, President of the first Philippine Republic; Ramon Avanceña, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; Miguel Unson, a businessman and civic leader; Alejandro Roces, another statesman, owner and publisher of the influential newspapers. Juan Sumulong, the president of the Democrata Party was included in the list. When he was approached by Secretary Bocobo, he answered that he would consult his men. He died before he could do this. There are others whose names I could not remember just now.

Many meetings were held in the covered glorietta by the swimming pool on the left side of the palatial house of Speaker Yulo. It was an ideal place for secret meetings. Almost all expressed their opinion very freely. Each had the courage to make his conviction known. The discussion was very thorough. Everybody was aware of the gravity of the situation and the momentous decision we necessarily had to make. Some were in favor of the establishment of some form of government; others were not. We were, however, agreed on one point. Under no circumstances would we accept any arrangement unless our independence was guaranteed. We made it very clear that we would not give up the freedom for which our forefathers had lavishly shed their blood.

Evidently, the Japanese negotiators transmitted this to Tokyo as Premier Tojo, on the 21st of January, in a speech before the Diet, promised independence for the Philippines if conditions of peace so warrant and if the Filipinos understood and cooperated with the aims and purposes of Japan, such s the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

After due deliberation, we decided not to form a government, but to have an organization which would merely cooperate with the Japanese civil administration in the Philippines. The Japanese, therefore, established their own civil administration in the Philippines which had all the departments and all the attributes of a government. On the other hand, the Filipinos organized a Commission with the Chairman as its chief executive.

As it turned out, the work of the Commission was of an auxiliary nature only. It could only decide routine or unimportant matters; all important matters, such as legislation and decision on policies had to be submitted to the Japanese Administration for approval.

Why did we accept such an arrangement? The following were our main reasons:

(1) To be assured of our independence whatever the result of the war might be.

(2) To be in a position to help the people. We knew the record of cruelty and brutality of the Japanese in China as many films had been shown in Manila depicting the atrocities of the Japanese. In our own country, slapping, unjustified arrests, illegal confiscation of private properties, and many other forms of abuses, had already become a common everyday happening. What could we do? We, who had repeatedly received the confidence of our people, could not forsake them precisely at a time when they had great need of us. Our personal interest should be of no account; no sacrifice is too great if dedicated to the cause of the people. We accepted, not necessarily because we were sure we could do much for our people, but in order to place ourselves in a position to help. Whether we succeeded or not only history will judge. Passion now runs high that even the most obvious might be overlooked.

(3) But our principal reason was that if we did not accept, the administration would fall into the hands of men like Artemio Ricarte, or an irresponsible person like Benigno Ramos. We are not sure that Ricarte is not a patriot. His record as a revolutionary figure points to his greatness and patriotism. But he was already over 75 years old. Somebody would have to govern for him, and history tells us that a government directed by another man behind the scene is dangerous as it generates the most iniquitous acts or acts of oppression by the government. His conduct in connecting himself with the Makapili has proven that our fear was well founded. Furthermore, Ricarte lived in Japan and was pro-Japanese and there was no one in our meeting that welcomed Japanese influence in the Philippines. Why did we think Ricarte might be head of the government? Because he came with the Japanese Expeditionary Forces and from the very beginning he was proclaiming that he was in favor of a dictatorship.

If not Ricarte, we were sure that the head of the government would have been Benigno Ramos, the head of the Makapili. He is so well known that it seems unecessary to describe him. Suffice it to say that he was an ambitious man and a degenerate. The only thing he thinks of is how to exploit other people. The many cases of “estafa” were the best proof of this assertion. He is a man without moral principles. He would not hesitate to kill to attain his purpose. The number of people killed by the Sakdals and the Makapilis is proof of this. In a government under Ramos, the people would be driven to start a revolution for they would not tolerate such indiscriminate killings,  Many of Ramos’ men –Sakdals– were killed by their own countrymen; in fact they had to concentrate themselves in places under the protective wings of the Japanese. The Filipino would have been the victim as Ramos would have been aided by the Japanese Army.

A government under Ricarte or Ramos would be used by the Japanese to commit cruelties and murders of the Filipinos.

(4) The last reason, which is no less important than the previous ones, is that we felt we were merely complying with the instructions of Pres. Quezon. These instructions are stated somewhere above. Whether we have complied faithfully or exceeded our authority, only history will decide. It should be remembered that the instructions contain no detail and all we could say for the present is that all our acts were done in good faith. If at times we apparently had exceeded our authority, it was exclusively for the purpose of avoiding a cataclysm, a great misfortune. In those instructions, Pres. Quezon foresaw the danger in leaving a government open to men like Ricarte or Ramos.

But I should reiterate that the Commission organized was not a real government. All its acts were merely delegated or had to be approved by the Japanese civil administration. We had hundreds of cases where we tried to do something or to do it in a different way, but the Japanese just did things or had them done in accordance with their whims and desires. The Office of the Director-General in the Japanese Administration was really the head of the government. It was occupied by Gen. Hayashi, and leter by Gen. Wachi.

When it was certain that a Commission was to be organized, somehow it got into my head that I may be appointed to the Commission. I wanted to avoid it by all means. As Vargas was the one dealing with the Japanese, I sked him not to have my name considered at all. Upon my insistence, he promised. He even showed me the proposed list wherein Yulo was suggested for Commissioner of Finance. When the list came out my name appeared. I became, to use a vulgar expression, groggy. My wife cried as she knew what that meant. She feared we would be in constant danger; she really hated public service as during my 29 years of service I got nothing but disappointments. I immediately went to Vargas to see whether I could decline. Vargas answered emphatically that I could not, unless I wanted to endanger my life. I consulted Mr. Ohnick. He understood the situation. He advised me to accept it, but to resign after three months. I consulted Vargas again and he said that he was aware of my situation, that he would help me get out after three months. I therefore asked for a three-month leave from Marsman & Co., which was granted. Such is the story of my acceptance.

After three months, I asked Mr. Vargas to allow me to resign. He said that it was not yet time. I asked and obtained another month’s leave of absence from Marsman & Co. At the end of the month, Mr. Vargas asked me to stay. He told me that it was for my own safety as he was sure the Japanese would consider my resignation a hostile act.

Mr. & Mrs. Ohnick were taken to Sto. Tomas again when the Japanese, for reasons I do not know, recalled all former internees, including the old and sick, to the Sto. Tomas concentration camp.


June 21, 1945 Thursday

Food has been insufficient during the last days. We do not know what is happening. They say that it is the result of the policy of the new administration; others say that it is because our government is now the one providing the expenses for our food. I pity the enlisted class who have to work seven hours a day except Sunday.

I have always thought that the President of the Senate and the Speaker should be furnished copies of our letters to Osmeña and MacArthur. We have good reason to believe that Roxas, President of the Senate, and Zulueta, Speaker of the House, are working for us and they should know the facts. Furthermore, as high officials of the government who must be consulted about government policies, they should know our side. The question arose as to who shall send the copies. Yulo, whose attitude is very definitely and strongly against the injustice being committed against us and against those who are responsible therefor, did not want to do it. He said he did not care to use influence, since our cause was just. He expressed disappointment with the high officials who we thought were our friends. I argued that sending them copies does not necessarily mean that we solicit their influence; it was an act giving due recognition to officials of the rank of President of the Senate and Speaker. Alunan finally decided to send the copies.

Again rumor is spreading like wild fire that we will soon be released. I traced the news to Dr. Moncado. He said that it was the Captain in charge of the construction of the new camp who told him that we had been turned over to the Commonwealth government. The Captain also said that construction of the new camp would stop. Another person, Mr. Galvez, confirmed what Dr. Moncado had said because when he protested to the Lieutenant that our food was insufficient, he was told us that it was due to the fact that the expenses for our food is now being defrayed by the Commonwealth Government. Personally, I believe the rumor arose on account of a publication in a newspaper that Palawan would be turned over by the U.S. military authorities to our government effective August first. The hope for our early release is entertained on account of the belief that once the Commonwealth Government assumes jurisdiction over us, we would immediately be released. I am not so optimistic. I hope I am wrong, but the Manila officials do not seem to be very interested in us and, on the other hand, other considerations seem to be entering in our case.