June 11, 1945 Monday

Discussion is raging in the Camp as to what the government will do with regard to alleged collaborationists like us. To some, this question has been settled—Pres. Osmeña having already spoken. As reported in the Free Philippines of June 1, Pres. Osmeña declared that he reiterates his policy on collaborators as stated in his speech delivered in Leyte last November. According to this policy, “every case should be examined impartially and decided on its merits.” Persons concerned fall within 3 categories: “Those prompted by a desire to project the people, those actuated by fear of enemy reprisals and those motivated by loyalty to our government and cause.” The matter had been submitted to the Cabinet. The President declared on the 31st of May that the question of collaborators is difficult but not an insoluble problem—provided it is not made a political football. He said that it shall not be allowed to result in a division of the people, as this would be fatal to the success of our efforts toward national rehabilitation, reconstruction and the preservation of national unity.

In his speech in Leyte, the President admits that not all public officials could go to the hills to fight. Some had to remain in their posts to maintain a semblance of government, to protect the population from the oppressor to the extent possible by human ingenuity and to comfort the people in their misery. If the officials did not accept and serve, the Japanese would have governed directly and utilized unscrupulous Filipinos capable of committing treason to their people. The President concluded that the motives which caused the retention of the office and conduct while in office, rather than the sole fact of its occupation, ought to be the criterion in deciding each case.

I agree 100 per cent with Pres. Osmeña. He evidently is thoroughly familiar with the facts. We are now convinced that full justice would be given us. However, from the beginning, I feared that politics and personal considerations might creep in, in which case we cannot be assured of justice in the disposition of our cases. Our country is now in a terrible state; its rehabilitation will be a great problem. We should not do anything that might hinder or affect unfavorably all the rehabilitation efforts. Now, more than ever, we need complete unity. This is the reason why I resent deeply acts and statements of present officials of the government that would compel us to be indifferent or to do something to protect ourselves which might prejudice such efforts. If we really love our country let us forget the past; let us bury our personal ambitions, all personal considerations. Let us be one in carrying out all plans that would enable our country to recover in the shortest time possible.

There is a great deal of rumor and speculation concerning those of us who are senators. A few days ago, rumor spread that we were leaving the Colony soon. Many congratulated us and asked us to visit their families. Some even handed us letters. The rumor became more persistent when Pres. Osmeña, on May 31, 1945 issued a proclamation calling a special session of the Philippine Congress for June 9th. The senators who are here are Yulo, Recto, Paredes, Madrigal, Sebastian and myself—six. One, Sen. Tirona, is detained in Bilibid Prison. There are two vacancies in the Senate on account of the deaths of Senators Martinez and Ozamis. It is said that our presence was necessary to have a quorum. I could not see it that way as there were 15 members of the Senate remaining. But they argued that some of them might not be allowed to sit; like us, they accepted positions in the Japanese regime or committed acts similar to ours. Roxas was one of the framers and signers of the Constitution of the Philippines and later accepted the position of Chairman of the Economic Planning Council. Rodriguez was a member of the Council of State and later on accepted a position in a committee. Arranz was another framer and signer of the Constitution and was a member of the National Assembly. Fernandez was signer of the manifesto to form a government organization at the beginning of the Japanese regime and later became member of the Council of State. Imperial was in the Court of Appeals. Sa Ramain was another framer and signer of the Constitution. They might be classified in the same category to which we belong, and if they are excluded from the special session, there could of course be no quorum.

News came that Congress had convened and that the Senate was organized with the following officers: President, Senator Roxas; President Pro Tempore, Senator Quirino; and Floor Leader, Senator Rodriguez. This has blasted all hopes of our being called in Manila in connection with the Senate.

Undoubtedly, the main reason why we have not been called is that we are still political prisoners. Surely they do not know us nor understand us. We are not capable of doing anything which may divide our people, which may hinder rehabilitation of our country in her preparation for an independent existence. For my part, I shall readily sacrifice my ambitions for the common good and to make our nation great and enduring.

On June 2, we read in the papers that Gen. Manuel Roxas was reverted to inactive status effective May 28, upon his own request. Pres. Osmeña declined to comment. Many interpretation have been given to this news. It especially became mysterious on account of the attitude of Osmeña. It was believed that there had been a serious break between our two great leaders. We were very much concerned. We knew that it meant that the work for the rehabilitation of our country may be seriously affected. Our problems, the situation our country is in now, are such that no one man or group can cope with the situation. But we have faith in their spirit of sacrifice, in their love of country. We were relieved when Roxas was elected President of the Senate; now we know the reason for Roxas’ change of status. It is a great event—Roxas is the natural and logical man for that office. With his experience and ability, our country will be greatly benefited.

We are encouraged with the news that Senator Tydings, after his personal inspection tour, reported that the Philippines was stricken very badly by the war and needs prompt help. He submitted a four-point program for the rehabilitation of the Philippines as follows: (1) Loans to Philippine government to finance reconstruction; (2) Strict compliance with legislation calling for complete independence as quickly as economic conditions permit; (3) Gifts of funds for Army and Navy engineers to undertake rehabilitation of buildings and other structures as soon as war conditions permit; (4) General treatment of the Philippines to expedite the return to normal conditions. We should be very thankful to the Senator for his program. I hope, however, that as regards independence, the phrase “economic conditions permit”, will not be interpreted like the “stable government” condition in the Jones Law. The third is not clear; it may refer only to military buildings and structures.

Today we received a very disheartening news. It seems a fight between Osmeña and Roxas for the presidency is unavoidable. The election will be in November. Roxas is reported to have said, “I am more than ever determined to fight Osmeña for the Presidency.” The President on the other hand is reported to have said, “It doesn’t matter. I will run for the Presidency in November on national, and not purely personal issues.” So there is a challenge and an acceptance. Friends of both will undoubtedly intervene to settle the feud. I doubt whether they will succeed. Osmeña, on account of his long service in the government and his advanced age, wants to close his public career with a vote of confidence on the part of the people. On the other hand, Roxas feels that, although he is still young, this may be his last chance on account of the state of his health. Furthermore, he thinks that this is the time that he could be of great help to his country as the problems of the country are those he specialized in his studies and observations. Such a division will be fatal to our country. Our country lies prostrate on account of the war. She needs all of us, especially these two outstanding leaders whose love for country is proverbial and whose combined knowledge, experience and ability will enable us to surmount the difficulties that are in store for us. We pray to God that His light may be shed upon us in order to illumine our minds, so that all ambition, all rancor, all personal considerations, in fact, everything we have or may want to have, will be sacrificed at the altar of our mother country.

A word more about independence. Political independence and economic support on the part of America are entirely compatible. One great advantage of becoming an independent nation is that we can proceed with the preparation of our programs, and carrying out these programs with full power and without international considerations other than the reciprocity agreements involved. When I was Chairman of the National Economic Council under President Quezon’s administration, I despaired on account of the difficulties arising out of our dependent status. We could not legislate on anything that may affect American interests, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. passed legislation without consideration to its effect on our economy, especially with regards to our exports to the United States. We could not deal with other countries as we did not possess the authority to do so. My experience has convinced me that it is impossible to prepare and carry out a complete and comprehensive program unless we have an independent nation, with complete freedom in tariff, currency, commercial treaties, etc.

The question has been raised whether it will be possible to prevent the fight between Osmeña and Roxas. From my personal point of view, settlement is most difficult. Now that Pres. Quezon is dead, we have to decide who would succeed him. Of course the choice is between Osmeña and Roxas. Their friends did all they could so the fight could be avoided. No effort was spared; no argument neglected. They especially emphasized the fact that Osmeña was old, and that the arrangement could be that Osmeña can be President this term and Roxas the next. All efforts failed.

Who will win? Nobody can tell. Each count with unconditional supporters. Each can muster good and effective arguments. In my opinion, however, the result will depend upon their views on live issues, especially the date for our independence, the political and economic relationships that may be established with other nations, and the “collaborationist” problem. In so far as I am concerned, personal considerations will never enter, grievances that I have had in the past, will all be forgotten. What matters to me is the independence of our country and the welfare of our people. For these I shall be willing and ready to make any sacrifice.

We had a program within the compound this evening. It was very entertaining.


May 22, 1945 Tuesday

Poetry seems to be contagious for today two poems were submitted, one by Minister Quintin Paredes and the other by Governor Sergio Aquino. Copies of each poem are attached hereto. Everybody was surprised about Don Quintin who was well known as a statesman and jurist, but nobody was aware of his talent to write poetry. Aquino was known as a poet. He evidently abandoned poetry to embrace the cause of our country and to serve our people. He became Fiscal and later Governor of Tarlac. His executive ability earned him a promotion to Governor of a district composed of the provinces of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Zambales and Bataan. His poetry shows that he must have been a good poet.

We read in a local bulletin that Osmeña was coming home—back to the Philippines. Accompanying him were the members of two Committees—one composed of Senators and Representatives who are members of the Committees in the U.S. Congress having jurisdiction over the Philippines, including the Chairman of the Senate Committee, Senator Milliard Tydings; the other, a technical committee composed of military men (Army and Navy), and economists. The purpose for the visit of these Committees is not stated. But we fear that a survey will be made by both Committees which may later be used to justify the postponement of independence or the retention of the Philippines as a U.S. colony. Our only consolation is that before we left Manila at the end of April, we read a statement from Osmeña to the effect that independence is a settled issue; in other words, independence will come on July 4, 1946 or sooner. There was an insinuation that the date would be accelerated. But of course the Committee may report that the destruction of the Philippines is such that rehabilitation will constitute a serious problem, and that in order for America to help or to want to help, independence must be postponed. They may even report that it is the wish of the Filipino people to postpone independence.

Already it is rumored that there are agents of imperialism in the U.S. Army and Navy, in the C.I.C., who would attempt to influence us so that we ourselves would petition for the postponement or at least express sentiments in favor of such postponement. There are reasons to believe this rumor. It should be remembered that when we were in the headquarters of the Army operating around Baguio, Colonel Arsey, who seemed to be a member of the General Staff, asked us what we thought of independence. When we answered that we did not want it postponed, he seemed surprised and stated that he had talked to hundreds of Filipinos and 95% of them were for postponement. Similar questions I understand are being asked by some members of the C.I.C. This work of the Imperialists for retention is reported to have the backing of influential Filipinos, like Mr. Carlos Romulo.

Personally, I believe that the Filipino people will vote against retention. No amount of money and influence will swing them from their determination. If the vote in a plebiscite is adverse, fraud must have been exercised. But of course I may be wrong. It is feared that the Congress of the U.S. will revoke or modify the Tydings-McDuffie Act without consulting the Filipino people. We all understand of course that once independence is postponed we will never get our independence or at least its attainment would be attended by great difficulties. But I am sure of one thing: that until independence is actually attained, the agitation for it will never stop. Already Taruc and Alejandrino have organized their United Front, one of the purposes of which is to fight any person, group or party, whether Americans or Filipinos, who will want independence denied or postponed. As events are developing, there may be formed two parties in the Philippines with a clear cut issue on independence—one will be against and in favor of American domination, and the other in favor of immediate and absolute independence. The cleavage may cut along social lines: rich men who believe that only America could protect and preserve their wealth, will line up on one side; and those who sincerely believe that it is the destiny of all peoples to constitute themselves into independent nations, and those who believe that the Philippines by right should be free and independent, will line up on the opposite side. Those against independence may win in the first elections. But each defeat will only encourage those for independence to work harder, and in the long run they will win for their cause is just, right and patriotic. The retentionists will meet the same fate as the “Federal” and “Progressive” parties in the Philippines. The cause of Philippine independence will triumph in the end.

Such a fight will of course be prejudicial and injurious to the Philippines and the Filipinos. We have to admit that there was stagnation in the economic development of our country, due not only to the economic policies of America which favored only the Americans, but also to the fact that the Filipino leaders devoted their whole time to the political issue of independence, thus neglecting to prepare a comprehensive economic program for the development of the Philippines.

The American committees, however, may not consider any political issue. As the Philippines has shown loyalty to America and the Filipinos have not only sacrificed their homes and property but even their lives side by side with the U.S. forces, America may wish to help in the rehabilitation of the Philippines. The Committees may want to have first hand knowledge of the economic problems in order that they may be in a better position to assist the Philippines. In that case, we should be very thankful and very grateful.

My conversations within the compound have not been limited to the so-called big shots. I have also talked to the lowliest of us here in the colony. Some of them cannot even read nor write. I came across three men—Catalino Capasi, Almadover and Caramay—who all hail from the town of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where I have many friends. They said that they were arrested, charged with being “Sakdal” or “Kapili”. They swore that they had never joined any of these organizations. One of them, Caramay, says that he was a “cochero” (rig driver), and it is possible that Sakdals and Kapilis had used his vehicle. They said that Sakdals and the Kapilis left with the Japanese. But one common feature during their interrogation was that they were compelled by the Americans to admit their guilt. They were beaten up by their American interrogators, slapped and boxed whenever they denied their guilt. At first, I just could not believe it. But they insisted that they were telling the truth and I am now inclined to believe them. But they also know of many cases where the arrested or suspected persons were threatened with bodily harm, but no actual force was used; where they were promised release or immunity if they would admit their guilt or sign affidavits against other persons. In other words, all means short of the use of force were employed in order to obtain a confession or admission on the part of the arrested person. Governors Aquino and Urquico told us that no such cases were reported to them. As a matter of fact, they were glad that they fell into the hands of the Americans because other suspects who were taken by the guerrillas—a good many of them—were put to death. According to the two Governors, a woman was burnt to death in the public plaza. I am just wondering whether cruelty is an Oriental trait. The Japanese have shown themselves to be unnecessarily cruel. The Chinese are also known for their cruelty. Are we Filipinos the same?

Although receiving gifts from the outside is prohibited unless the gifts go through the office, they continue to come. Gifts of food are not given to the addressee but divided among all of us. Many donors are anonymous. A Mr. V. Macasaet has sent me many things but I do not remember him nor do I know why he gives me anything. Do we really need the protective custody?

We were given a ration of shoes and clothing which are all second hand, having already been used by the American soldiers. With the exception of the shoes and underwear, we do not wear them. It is because they are all marked “X”. Why they are thus marked we do not know. The “X” probably serves to indicate that the articles now belong to the prisoners. We are not required to wear them. So, I have been wearing the clothes donated by charitable persons.

We try to make our lives less monotonous if possible. We want to forget our situation so that we would not be worrying too much and we would not continue expressing our indignation. Chief Justice Yulo does not seem to be able to do this. Instead of gaining like the rest of us, he is the only one who has lost weight. How do we pass the time then? We wake up early and immediately prepare for the outdoor group calisthenics. This lasts from ten to twenty minutes, and is obligatory. The exercises are quite scientifically prepared, involving all parts of the body. It is amusing to see overweight people, like Mr. Madrigal, perform the difficult movements in our exercises. After exercises, we proceed to the mess hall for breakfast. After breakfast, those of us detailed for the day’s work, clean the compound. When not on duty, I spend my time reading and writing. At noon, after lunch, we take a little nap. Afterwards, we either play a little poker or I continue reading and writing. Suppertime is early—as early as five o’clock. After supper we engage in personal conversations.

The most interesting part of the day is after 8 o’clock in the evening. A musical program is staged every night. We certainly have elements for the program. One of them, a Mr. Sotto, son of Don Vicente Sotto, is a very good singer. There are many other good singers. Then there is dancing choreographed by Dr. Hilario C. Moncado. The program is very amusing and we enjoy ourselves very much. Some of the American guards—the good ones, especially one by the name of Johnny—also take part in the program. A half past nine, the program ends and we then go to bed. I never forget to pray before going to bed. I pray to God to give health and comfort to my family. I pray for the salvation of our people.

We never miss hearing Mass on Sundays.


May 15, 1945 Thursday

I asked Madrigal whether he had seen and talked to Osmeña and why Osmeña went to the United States. He said Osmeña had to go to Washington on account of the attitude of Senator Tydings, The Chairman of Insular Affairs. The U.S. Senator had said that we had to decide whether or not we wanted independence; and that if we chose independence, they would no longer meddle nor help. We would have to run our ship alone. If we wanted them to assist in the rehabilitation, we would have to ask the U.S. to withdraw their promise of independence or at least ask for the postponement of independence.

Coming from Tydings, it is quite a surprise. Independence was a settled question. We were to have it on July 4, 1946. Tydings was one of the authors of the bill (Tydings-McDuffie) providing for that independence. Why raise it up again? Why not just say, “Since you are going to have your independence, the United States can no longer help you in the rehabilitation.” We suppose that Tydings represents the opinion of his committee and the sentiment of the American people.

The statement of Tydings will cause a distinct surprise and disappointment to the friends of America in the Philippines. Before the coming of the Americans, almost every Filipino was waiting for the Americans, for many reasons. One of them is that some believed that it is of great material advantage to be connected with America. They believed that commercial preference like free trade would be continued. Some have connections with officials and employees of American firms and they wanted the Americans to come to be able to return to their former jobs. Unfortunately, there are many others whose motives were not very holy. They believed they will receive back salaries or back pay, pensions and indemnities for properties destroyed on account of the war. They believed that the United States would help us even after granting us independence. They consider it as some sort of compensation or recognition of the firm stand of the Filipinos in favor of America and the sacrifice of tens of thousands of Filipino lives for the triumph of American arms. To those people, the stand of America as expressed by Tydings will constitute a great disappointment.

Again the question of independence comes up. This question has divided us in the past and has been the cause of the stagnation of the development of Philippine economics. Instead of devoting their whole time and energy to the economic development of the country our public men devote their time to the discussion of political questions. Again, we will be losing time—time we need so very badly to prepare and carry out the program of rehabilitation and reconstruction. We should have a complete program for the economic development of our country.

We will again be divided and perhaps the campaign and speeches will be even more lively and bitter. I, for one, am in favor of independence right now. If America wants to assist in our work of rehabilitation, she can do so even with independence. Is not the sacrifice made by the Filipinos, the loss of tens of thousands of the flower of our youth, enough to merit assistance? But the Americans want the postponement of independence before they would help us. We are not stupid enough not to know that postponement means permanent retention of the Philippines by America.

In my opinion, the postponement of independence will merely delay the foundation of our nation. Whether we like it or not independence is coming. If we turn back and ignore the patriotism and sacrifice made by our forefathers to attain that which of right belongs to us—independence—and we now become anti-independence or propose the postponement of independence, you can be sure that other people will take up the cudgels. We may defeat them now because of our influence and means. But in the long run they will be the victors because their cause is just. It is the only goal that any self-respecting people can strive and fight for. The sacrifices for the sake of attaining independence were great and such sacrifices should not be in vain. Independence will come whether we like it or not. If so, let us begin early. Let us lay the foundation now for a united and strong nation. Why delay? Let us tackle fearlessly the problems now confronting us, and if America does not wish to assist us, then let us do it with our own energy and resources. We are not wanting in these, but there have been no concerted and well-defined programs for the full and vigorous use of such energy and resources.

Three news reports were received of interest to us.

The first is the formal surrender of Germany. It was received with joy, not only because we want the Allies to win, but also we believe that with Germany eliminated and the war in Europe ended, the war in the Pacific cannot last much longer. As a matter of fact, a good portion of the Army, Navy and their equipment is being transferred to the Pacific.

The second news is the occupation of Baguio by the American Army without much of a fight. We were worried because of friends and high government officials who are still there. We learned, however, with great satisfaction, the Ministers Emilio Tirona and Arsenio Luz, and Vice Minister Pio Pedrosa were safe and have already been brought to Manila to the concentration camp. It seems that the Japanese did not massacre or kill anybody before retreating as they did in Manila. This is was because of the fact that the Defense Commander of Baguio was General Babe, a very old retired general who had been sent to the Philippines to be the adviser of the Philippine Constabulary. He was a very kind gentleman with a feeling of true friendship for the Filipinos. When he was placed in charge of the defense of Baguio, we expected that no serious defense of Baguio would be made.

We began to ask each other whether it would have been better for us to have remained in Baguio like Ministers Tirona and Luz. The unanimous opinion seems to be that notwithstanding our hardships and sufferings experienced during our trip from Baguio to Tubao and the loss of almost all our personal belongings, we still do not regret our having come as we were able to avoid the dangers caused by almost continuous bombing and shelling, the menace coming from retreating Japanese and from men who were not real “guerrillas” but whose only purpose was to loot or rob other people.

The third news is to the effect that Balete Pass had already been taken by the Americans and that they are now in Sta. Fe. It took a long time for the Americans to capture Balete, which is a strategic ground for the defense forces. Now that this difficult natural barrier had been taken, it is now expected that the Americans will go faster in the campaign for the occupation of the Cagayan Valley.


September 30, 1943

did not see Quezon this day; he had a Cabinet meeting for half an hour at 11:30 a.m. and then “slept” the rest of the day.

Talked with Dr. Rotor and Bernstein. The latter says Quezon is emotionally very much upset with the editorials in Washington Post and Washington Star;  and very angry with Lippman. Rotor says Quezon is always pessimistic towards the end of a political fight; he walks right up to an issue, fights every step with all his might and then becomes pessimistic over probable results. Bernstein added that since that conversation at Saranac at which we were present when Quezon told Osmeña that if the resolution were passed by November 15th he (Q.) would resign because he is ill, Bernstein had heard nothing more on the subject. He says that at the time Quezon was sincere, but he (B.) never believed that Quezon would quit.

Talk with Resident Commissioner Elizalde who was more cordial than usual; he had helped Tydings to draw up the resolution as finally introduced. Thinks the idea inspiring and beautiful.

Discussed with him the Mountbatten appointment; he said it was not done in order to interfere with MacArthur, but so as to have British forces reconquer their lost Asiatic colonies; thus they can hold them. Otherwise if done by Americans or under American Command the United States might insist on independence for these colonies. At least the United States would be embarrassed by the matter! Elizalde said also that General Marshall, Chief of Staff, did have a “run-in” with Churchill at Quebec –Marshall is no “yes man.” Elizalde insists that old General Pershing is in an army combination with Marshall, Admiral King and General MacArthur.


September 29, 1943

Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon back from Saranac in his apartment in the Shoreham; still on his back and confined to his bedroom; full of fight over the joint resolution introduced in the Senate by Mr. Tydings for immediate independence of the Philippines. No fever and yet not much strength–but the spirit burning fiercely. Tries not to speak and writes his remarks on a pad, but occasionally breaks in with a muffled voice.

The story of the joint resolution since I left Quezon in Saranac nearly three weeks ago, is the substitution for our form for independence (as soon as the Japanese are driven our of the P.I.) of a straight-out declaration for immediate independence, as suggested later by Frank Murphy. When Murphy got back to Washington he telephoned the White House that he did not want the Philippines “treated like India.”

Quezon has sent the two forms of resolution down to Tydings who had gone to see Roosevelt (for the first time in years) and, while he seems not to have actually shown the resolution he had selected (and enlarged) for immediate independence, he came out and announced that Mr. Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were in favour of it, and introduced it in the Senate on September 24th with a brief statement stressing the importance of preventing the Japanese grant of “independence” from influencing any Filipinos to fight alongside the Japanese army when our forces re-entered the Philippines.

Then the opposition got to work in the press. Mr.Walter Lippman attacked the new resolution introduced by Senator Tydings in two newspaper articles on September 28th and 30th, and Quezon replied to the first in very vigorous terms on September 29th, being ably supported by the veteran journalist, Mr. William Philip Simms. Editorials in the Washington Star and Washington Post opposed the Tydings’ resolution.

Quezon as is usual in one of his political fights, is alternately in high spirits and in the trough of depression.

I saw him at 6 p.m., September 29th, and he opened up by writing his views to me, in answer to my remarks. He said he had been willing to accept independence when the Japanese were expelled, but now it was too late to yield on immediate independence–the Filipinos could not be made to understand. He added “rather than yield, I’ll go Jap.” Stimson and the Interior Department (Ickes) were opposed to it, according to Quezon; Roosevelt was writing his message to Congress on the subject, and was to send it first to Quezon on Monday, October 4th. Quezon had sent General Valdes before the Senate Committee to read his (Q’s) views in support of the resolution “word by word” and could not now retract.

I told him this move should have been made last February (1943) when we first took it up–but Quezon said that Osmeña was then opposed. (Quezon was also then uncertain of Roosevelt’s position on the question.)

The President then reached under his pillow and showed me two telegrams from MacArthur of September 25th, and 27th, 1943. The first congratulated Quezon upon Tydings’ resolution, and said he knew of no people who would better adorn independence than the Filipinos. That early in August he (MacArthur) had become deeply concerned over the possible effects of the Japanese declaration of “independence” for the Philippines and had cabled the Chief of Staff that it was necessary for the United States to grant independence before the Japanese did so, and had asked the Chief of Staff to show his cable to the Secretary of War and to the President. MacArthur added that probably Quezon had not been apprised of his cable!

MacArthur’s second cable was to ask Quezon, in the event of the passage of Tydings’ resolution, to give MacArthur command without salary of the Philippine Army to use with the American Army to reconquer the Philippines, a task to which he had dedicated the rest of his life.

At this point Andres Soriano came in and joined us; he is trying to get released from his post as Secretary of Finance, but Quezon told him (in Spanish) that he must wait until next May.

Later I dined with Soriano; he told me he had been trying ever since last Spring to get out of the Cabinet; he wanted to join the Philippine Army in Mindanao and be a general officer there. Also wishes to launch his preparations for the rehabilitation of the Philippines. Wants to make it an industrial and shipping nation to take over part of the business in the Islands of the class of enterprise which had made Japan so strong in the past. Quezon kept telling him to wait.


September 6-9, 1943

Saranac Lake, N.Y.

This is the first entry in this diary for more than three months. Early in June, Quezon was attacked by bronchitis and soon developed a serious attack of tuberculosis. Dr. Trepp was frankly alarmed–he told me that Quezon was a worn-out man, and expressed himself as uncertain whether he could pull Quezon through this time. I suggested Saranac Lake, of which Trepp had never heard, but he understood at once when I mentioned the name of the famous Dr. Trudeau. So, after a couple of weeks in Washington and an equal period at Doctors’ Hospital in New York, Quezon was taken to Saranac.

Before leaving Washington, Quezon was not allowed to speak above a whisper, and the Cabinet met in his bedroom, where the President designated Osmeña to act for him, and in case the latter was incapacitated (as he then was!), Elizalde was to act as and for the President. This selection, inevitable as it was, created vast confusion among high officials–Quezon’s secretary, Dr. Rotor, and Bernstein, head of the Office of Special Services, were frankly uncertain whether they could (or would) get on with Elizalde!

Meanwhile, Osmeña, who, as already noted, has been suddenly operated on for appendicitis, came through safely, and then developed an infection and a high temperature. The first two occasions when I visited him in his bed in Doctors’ Hospital in Washington, he could not speak–only moved his eyelids. I then thought he might die in my presence. My third visit, a fortnight later found him sitting up in a wheel chair and conversing agreeably; I told him he would soon be dancing again, and to clinch the matter he stood up and did a couple of fox-trot steps. He has been more or less acting as President ever since, somewhat to the surprise of Elizalde, who had expected Osmeña to be out of business for a year.

Quezon’s 65th birthday was at Saranac on August 19, 1943; shortly after that I heard that he was going to send for me; a telegram on September 4, from Rotor asked me to go up to Saranac for a week.

On arrival, I found all the customary “court circle” at MacMartin camp–Mrs. Quezon, the three children and all their usual suite. Osmeña and Bernstein were there, and Valdes and young Madrigal soon arrived. They were all gayer and in better spirits than I have seen them since their arrival in the United States in May, 1942. Quezon was said to have gained five pounds, and was contemplating an early return to Washington to escape the cold weather at Saranac. Trepp seemed resigned to the move, although he was enjoying himself in surroundings which reminded him of his native Switzerland. Quezon had the steam heat on in the house all summer, and part of his “outdoor” porch enclosed!

I found Quezon still on his back in bed, he was obliged to talk in an unaccustomed low voice, and easily became tired. Osmeña, Bernstein and I were at once employed on several alternative forms for a joint resolution of Congress declaring that the Philippines were and of right ought to be free and independent, that independence was to be granted as soon as the invader was driven out of the Islands and was to be secured, and the United States was to make good the ravages of war.

Quezon had received at Saranac a visit from Secretary of War Stimson on the latter’s journey to the Quebec conference. Stinson had been deeply disturbed by the Japanese political maneuvers in the Philippines (as, indeed I have been myself). They feared that the Japanese grant of independence might rally a certain number of Filipinos to aid the Japanese army to resist the coming American attack on them in the Philippines. Stimson told Quezon that if this occurred, he (S.) would feel like committing suicide. Millard Tydings, the Senator from Maryland, Chairman of the Committee on Tertitories etc., had been staying nearby with his father-in-law, ex-Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, and the two of them had come over to visit Quezon. Tydings then told Quezon that he would “father” “any damn thing” to which the President would agree in order to meet this situation.

So, together with Osmeña and Bernstein, I worked for the first day on the various forms offered for the proposed joint resolution. We could see Quezon for only an hour in the morning and the same length of time in the afternoon. That night Osmeña and Bernstein returned south.

Talk with Colonel Manuel Nieto, Quezon’s loyal friend and chief a.d.c. He told me that they had recently seen a colonel (American) who had escaped from the Philippines in July last. He reported that the Filipinos still have 10,000 troops in Mindanao; that there the Japanese held only Davao, Zamboanga, Misamis and the country up as far as Lake Lanao. The Filipinos can operate elsewhere in Mindanao as they wish. Tomas Confesor has a sort of government in existence in parts of Panay and adjoining islands; Samar and Leyte are for the most part unoccupied by the Japanese. Parts of Cebu are still in the hands of Filipino commandos; Luzon is pretty thoroughly occupied by the enemy.

In conversation at lunch I condoled with Mrs. Marcos Roces over the death of her brother-in-law, my good friend Don Alejandro Roces. It seems that the news had been kept from her–I don’t know why! In talking over this with Quezon later he remarked “Roces was better dead than left alive to explain later his attitude in his newspapers (La Vanguardia, Taliba, etc.) which had been pro-Japanese from the moment the enemy occupied Manila.” Quezon added that he would not himself hang any of the pro-Japanese Filipinos upon his return, though he added that “some of them may be killed before we can take control.” The general impression is that the Filipino people can distinguish accurately between those who are really pro-Japanese and those who are merely co-operating formally to preserve what they can of their country. Quezon quoted again the cable he sent to Roosevelt before leaving for Corregidor, that “if a government cannot afford protection to its citizens it cannot claim their allegiance.” It seems that thereupon Roosevelt cabled MacArthur to release the Filipino Army if Quezon demanded it, but also cabled Quezon his famous message “promising to redeem and protect the Philippines and give them their independence.” Quezon added that he had changed the word “redeemed” when he issued to the Filipino people the proclamation publishing Roosevelt’s message, on the basis of which the Filipinos fought the battle of Bataan. Roosevelt did not know that MacArthur had showed Quezon the message allowing him to disband the Philippine Army if Quezon insisted. Quezon praised Roosevelt’s attitude very highly.

He told me that Stimson’s recent visit to London was to insist that a more vigorous war be waged at once. Hence the pronouncements to that effect at the subsequent Quebec Conference.

About the so-called “independence” offered by the Japanese to the Filipinos, Quezon said: “As soon as I heard that the voting was to be done only by members of the Kalibapi, all my anxieties were ended. If it had been a vote of the Filipino people I would never have gone against it–I would have resigned.” (As a matter of opinion, the Filipinos are said to have “adopted” the new constitution by the vote of 181 hand-picked members of the Kalibapi!) This attitude of Quezon toward his retention of the presidency is uncertain in my mind. When Osmeña and Bernstein left after handing him the various forms proposed for a joint resolution of Congress, Quezon in bidding good-bye to Osmeña said “If this resolution passes Congress before November 15th, I shall resign because I am ill.” Mrs. Quezon also told me that when they go back to Manila, it would not be to reside in Malacañan Palace, but in their own house! On the other hand, Trepp says that he knows Quezon is going to retain the presidency, since he has overheard the negotiations on that subject!

After Osmeña and Bernstein had left, I worked for two more days with Quezon on the joint resolution and the various alternative forms were whittled down to one, declaring the Philippines independent, etc., as soon as invader was ejected and reciting Roosevelt’s famous message of promises to “redeem, secure, etc., and to repair.”

Just as I was leaving to return home, well satisfied with the draft of the joint resolution and Quezon’s proposed letter to President Roosevelt, a telephone conversation between Mrs. Quezon and ex-Governor General Frank Murphy in Michigan introduced another uncertainty into Quezon’s mind! Murphy was then quoted as having said that “he did not want the Philippines to be treated like India, and the resolution must grant immediate independence and he was going to Washington to get it!”

Canceran, the President’s private secretary, who had been busy all day for three days typing and retyping forms of the resolution as Quezon thought of new improvements, sadly said to me: “That is the trouble with the President, he always changes his mind at the last moment, upon new advice.”

Well, we shall see, what we shall see.

Roosevelt and Stimson are already committed to the earlier proposition–i.e., independence as soon as the Japanese invader is thrown out. (The other form might look as if the United States were evading their obligations).

It seems that Quezon has had Dr. Cherin, an assistant of Bernstein, working on the re-writing of Quezon’s book this summer, though Quezon told me nothing of that. The real hitch in publication is that Quezon cannot yet tell the full story of the all-important interchange of cablegrams between himself and Roosevelt before the battle of Bataan.


June 4, 1942

12:30 p.m. at Senate Chamber to hear Quezon’s address. Excellent and effective. He seemed a little nervous at the beginning, and no wonder: that is the most critical audience in the world. They were all very friendly to him. Quezon told me that never in his wildest dreams had he expected to address the United States Senate, though he had always counted on being the President of his own country. Senator Barkley of Kentucky, the floor leader, sat on his right and led the applause, while Senator Tydings sat on his left. As the Senate was technically in recess to receive him, applause was not “out of order” and some of the Senators kept it up even longer than the crowded galleries. They had interrupted their voting on a declaration of war against Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary to receive him. The ex-Mrs. Douglas MacArthur went up in the motor with the Quezons.

Quezon was in high spirits after it was all so well over, and had A. D. Williams and myself, with Quezon’s two daughters to lunch at the Shoreham. His daughters were chaffing him because he had made one slip–referring to the V.P. as “Vice President Marshall.” It was, of course, Henry Wallace.

At lunch, there was a lively conversation between Quezon and A. D. Williams, who in recent years had been closest to the President of any American in the Philippines, being his adviser in the construction of public works in which Quezon’s keen creative energies were always fully employed. Williams, who had at last, after so many years of service in the tropics incurred the disease known as “sprue” had finally, in July 1941, been obliged to resign his most confidential post with the President in Manila and retire for good to his farm near Culpepper, Virginia. One of his last bits of construction work in the Philippines had been the creation of an air-raid shelter at Quezon’s country home at Mariquina, near Manila. The Quezon girls, who were present at this luncheon commented enthusiastically over this and said that, during the invasion they had spent most of their time in that shelter; it had a toilet and two entrances, and had been cut out of the tufa rock which is excellent material for insulating shocks.

Quezon and Williams told of some differences of opinion between the President and General MacArthur during these months of anxiety and strain before the war broke, but it would be quite superfluous to recount such matters now after the close friendship and heroic co-operation of those important personages during the dramatic war scenes which followed.

They also chatted about General Eisenhower the present Chief of the War Plans Board in Washington. MacArthur had brought with him on his mission to the Philippines two Majors in the United States Army, Ord and Eisenhower. When poor Ord was killed in an airplane accident at Baguio, Eisenhower became MacArthur’s “number two.” Eisenhower was very popular with both races in Manila–Americans and Filipinos, and seemed to enjoy the many occasions on which Quezon entertained him at Malacañan and on the yacht Casiana. Finally, Mrs. Eisenhower began to claim the Major’s time for her social engagements and Quezon had chaffed him about this in the presence of his wife at the farewell luncheon he gave them at Malacañan Palace some months before the war broke, when they were returning to the United States.

At this same luncheon, Quezon and A. D. Williams made quite different computations as to the number of American war planes in the Philippines at the time of the invasion. When Williams then ill, finally left the islands to retire home, he had been a member of the board appointed by Quezon to advise on new air fields. He calculated that the United States then had some three hundred plane in or en route to the Philippines, actually on hand or about to arrive. Quezon said there had been, at the time of the Japanese assault thirty-eight four engine bombers and about one hundred and thirty war planes of various types. Many of these were destroyed on the ground at Nichols Field, Clark Field and Cavite on the eighth of December, 1941. I asked whether this destruction caused any panic among the Filipinos and he replied that they knew nothing about it. Williams told again of his having, as representative of the Philippine Government gone around in June or July 1941 with the American officer-in-charge to inspect ground for new air landing space near Manila and how he personally had begged the Commanding General not to extend existing fields, but to build a dozen new landing grounds among the bamboo fields to either side of the South Road. No attention had been paid to his advice. He also remonstrated with the navy for spending five or six million dollars in dredging and in filling in an extension of the existing air field at Cavite which, as he said, “stuck out like a sore thumb” in Manila Bay, and was visible from the air for a great distance.

Quezon then said how indignant he had been with Admiral Hart for withdrawing his fleet from the Philippines at nearly the last moment. “If he was going to lose his fleet, why not to so in defense of the Philippines instead of Java?” He admitted, however, that Hart’s fleet was destroyed after he, himself, had been relieved of command at the insistence of the Dutch, who took over the American ships before the disastrous naval battle of the Java Sea. But Quezon still insisted that his submarines, based on Cavite for refuelling, should have been used to sink the Japanese transports and thus interrupt the invasion of the Philippines. There were twenty-eight submarines in this command of which some twenty-two were of the new type.

Quezon then turned to some remarks on the pressing reasons which had induced him to attempt towards the end of February 1942 the escape by submarine from the beleaguered fortress of Corregidor. This will not be repeated here, because it has been described in his book The Good Fight, published by D. Appleton-Century in New York in 1944, after the President’s death.

This account of that day’s conversation at the luncheon table at the Shoreham would be incomplete without recording the writer’s recollection of another subject discussed by Quezon, which has, however, a very remote bearing if any on the invasion of the Philippines.