August 16, 1945, Thursday

This morning, I modified my opinion as to when we will leave. I believe now that it will not be before the end of this month. It will be sometime in September or October. The reason for my change of view now is that I think Laurel, Aquino and Vargas, who are still in Japan, will be brought to the Philippines and I think their cases as well as the Ministers’ will be tried or investigated at the same time. Since the cases of those three or more serious, they may not be considered until after some time and, therefore, our cases will also be delayed.

It is reported by radio that Emperor Hirohito will fly to Manila, in a Japanese plane from Tokyo to Okinawa and in an American plane from Okinawa to Manila. MacArthur has been designated as Commander-in-Chief to receive the surrender of Japan. The representatives of the vanquished always come to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander or to the place indicated by the latter. MacArthur’s headquarters is in Manila; therefore, the Japanese Representative should go there. But why Hirohito precisely. I can’t understand why it cannot be Premier Suzuki. I do not believe the United Nations will deal with the Premier, however; he will probably be one of those to be arrested and accused as a war criminal. But his cabinet can fall and a Pacifist Cabinet could be created under the Premiership of Konoye, Konoye can then sign the peace terms. But it seems it has to be Hirohito. What a humiliation! Before, he was a proud ruler, considered as god himself. His words were law and divine order at the same time. Now he is under the orders of MacArthur.

I suggested to Compadre Serging Osmeña that he write a letter to his father. I so suggested because it seems that they are already in good terms. I explained to him that his father is an experienced and shrewd politician. Serging ought to know that just now his father is at a disadvantage as regards the collaborationists inasmuch as Roxas has openly thrown himself on their side. I told Serging that he write his father that there is discontent here on account of his passive attitude. He should suggest to his father to do something; to make a “golpe” (sensational and radical act) which will boost his stock among the “collaborationists” and such “golpe” should be a general amnesty proclamation freeing everybody accused of collaboration. This may incline the collaborationists to his side or at least put him in a better position to approach them later. I found Serging rather reluctant for reasons which he explained. The reasons involved family relations among the father, mother-in-law and Serging.

* * * * *

Excerpts from a letter of Roy W. Howard, the principal owner of Scripps-Howard newspapers, dated at Manila, July 30, 1945 to Arsenio Luz:

My chief purpose in coming here, aside from a desire to confer with Gen. MacArthur and get a picture of the general situation, was to see if I could be of any help to you. I wish that it were possible for me to report success, but after pursuing every line that is open, and discussing your case with everyone I know who might be in a position to help, I am afraid that as far as your immediate release is concerned, my effort has been a failure.

It is my sincere belief, Arsenio, that in spite of any action that can be taken, including even legal action, the group held in Palawan now will be kept there until the conclusion of the war with Japan. I realize that this is going to be very tough, and I doubt whether were I in your place it would be possible for me to reconcile myself to the belief that remaining there is the best course. But in my efforts I have run into a few facts which, without in any sense justifying the action taken against you, throw a light on the situation which I want to pass along to you.

In my efforts I have talked to Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Thorpe, head of the C.I.C., Pres. Osmeña, Manuel Roxas, Phil Buencamino, Salvador Araneta, Manolo Elizalde, Chick Parsons, Paul McNutt, and others. They have all been very sympathetic and have helped me to the best of their ability. But we have all run into a stone wall in that Gen. MacArthur is embarked on a course which I am convinced he believes to be in the best interest of the Filipinos, and from which I do not believe it is going to be possible to dissuade him. As I see it, the situation boils down to about this:

MacArthur is fighting a war and doing a most magnificent job of it. However, the job is one calling for the most intense concentration, and despite what I am sure is his keen realization of a pot of political and purely domestic needs, he is having a straight line and giving no consideration to any proposition except killing Japs.

I have no doubt that he suspects there are men at Palawan who are entirely innocent, and many who have been guilty of nothing more serious than indiscretion or bad judgment. To attempt to sort those men out, however, would, if justice were to be done, be equivalent to bringing about trials at this time. I can see many reasons why this would be inadvisable, the chief one being that at the rate of which feeling is dying down, it is obvious that there will be much less emotionalism attaching to collaboration trials later on, than would be the case today.

If trials were to be held today, they would of necessity be trials before an American military tribunal. I suspect Gen. MacArthur feels that not only will Filipino courts be more competent to judge Filipino psychology, but that Filipinos, knowing the conditions existing in Manila and the pressure that put to bear on people like yourself, will be infinitely more lenient than would be the case with a hard-boiled, wholly impersonal military court. In any event, Arsenio, at the end of the week’s effort, in which I have thrown in everything I have without obtaining any redress in your case, I am forced to say that I think that is the way the thing stands, and while Gen. MacArthur has promised to have prepared for his own personal consideration a review of your case, I do not honestly advise you to count on much of anything happening in consequence.

The real purpose in writing this letter is this: I do not need to tell you, I am sure, that my own faith in your innocence of any action prejudicial to the United States has never waned. That will not be either news or a surprise to you. What is more important, however, to you… something which I am not sure you fully appreciate is that no one from Gen, MacArthur down has expressed to me the slightest belief that any action which you took under the stress of occupation conditions was in any sense an action aimed against the interests of the United States, and no one to whom I have talked has expressed the slightest doubt of your loyalty to the United States and to your American friends. That goes straight, Arsenio, and without any discount.

To give you a complete picture, however, I must add that some of your friends, even though they are understanding and tolerant, feel that you may have on occasion been a bit indiscreet and not used your head as effectively as might have been the case. Everyone realizes, however, that hindsight is sometimes better than foresight, and I haven’t the slightest doubt that aside from the discomfit and inconvenience of being held in custody for the very few months during which this war is going to continue, you will ultimately be restored to complete standing in this community and given a complete bill of health.

If your old sense of humor is still working, and I have no doubt that you still possess it even though it may have been scuffed up a bit, you may smile at a line of reasoning which I have given Carmen, and which I put forward in all seriousness. I realize the ridiculousness of a man on the outside arguing to the man who is detained, on the virtues of being in jail, and yet I think in your case there is some virtue in the situation.

Let me explain: If it were possible to exercise any influence to get you sprung at the present time, and I had an opportunity to do so, I would advise you to turn your back on such an opportunity. My reasoning is this: if you were to come out under such circumstances and without a trial, there would always be hovering over you a suspicion that may be you were at liberty not because of innocence, but because of some pull you were able to exercise. Such a situation would be a handicap to you and your family for the rest of your life. On the basis of what I have been told, and I am not going to attempt to state here which man or men most influenced my judgment (although I assure you they were among your best friends and American well wishers), I believe that the hearing which you will certainly get immediately upon the conclusion of the war and the turning of this whole problem over to the Philippines, will give you a clean bill of health and completely establish your innocence of any action that would prejudice your standing either with Filipinos or Americans. For whatever my judgment is worth, the value of this bill of health and official establishment of your innocence will over the long haul more than compensate for the few additonal weeks or months that you may be denied your liberty.

As I said, this argument, sound though I am convinced it is, may be one easier for me to make on the outside than for you to accept on the inside. I know, however, that you will not doubt my honesty, even though you should doubt my judgment, when I tell you my opinion of the tremendous value which I believe will attach to your exoneration, as distinct from the situation which might result if you were released in consequence of political pressure, even though there was the possibility of exerting political pressure, a possibility which I am sure does not exist.

I would of course have come to Palawan to see you, had it been possible to do so. I even made some efforts in that direction, but became convinced that not only could I have been of no value to you down there, but to have made the trip might have in some degree prejudiced your case.

Now for one more point, and then I’ll wind up this interminably long letter. In April, before his death on August 1st, I visited President Quezon at Miami, Florida. At that time he was on his death bed and I think fully realized that his number was up. He talked with extreme difficulty and only in a whisper, because the tuberculosis had reached his throat. I won’t attempt to quote all of his conversation, but merely that which has a bearing on your situation, and on his unshakeable faith in you and confidence in your loyalty and integrity. There had at that time come back to the United States varied stories of collaborative action being taken by Filipinos. Cases discussed with a number of these people, some of whom I knew and others whose names had slipped me, but whom he insisted I had met and who knew me. Finally, he turned to me and said:

Roy, I do not know about all of these people. I am worried about Jorge Vargas. The reports on what Jorge is doing are not good, though I find it very difficult to believe that any one so long associated with me would turn out to be disloyal to me, to the Filipino people, and to the United States. I must admit that I am having to reserve judgment. About some of your friends, however, I would advise you to have faith, just as I have. There are some of them to whom disloyalty would be impossible and I include in this list Alunan, Joe Yulo, Arsenio Luz, Phil Buencamino…’

In addition he named those several others — people whom probably I would recognize if I saw them, but whose names at the time did not mean much to me.

Quezon told me at that time the instructions that he had left with his friends, and added that he was now in touch with those men by clandestine short wave radio. He also told me that within a week he had received a call from one of his men, a Filipino doctor, who had returned to the States from Manila within the preceding forthnight.

At home I have a diary memorandum which I wrote that night, in which I have Quezon’s exact words. The foregoing quotation, however, is to all intents and purposes correct and accurate.

…I am no seventh son of a seventh son, but I venture the prophecy that this war will be over before the end of the year and that your complete restoration to your family and to the position which you have so well earned in this community, will have been effected before the New Year is many days old.

Mr. Howard is one of the two or three great newspapermen in the United States now living. The news above is the most authoritative we have received inasmuch as it is the result of his personal conferences with MacArthur in whose hands our destiny lies. Therein it is clear that we will not be released while the war lasts. He believes that even if we can go now we should not accept it as there will always be the suspicion that we got out as a result of influence. Whereas if we are acquitted after due trial, we will be given a clean bill of health, and, therefore, be restored to our old position in the community. Such was my opinion from the beginning. We do not positively know what we are charged of. But under the circumstances, we presume that it must be treason to our country and disloyalty to the United States. As to the latter, I have never been disloyal to the United States but if they insist, I would not mind it because after all deep in my heart I do not recognize loyalty to any country other than my own. But the charge of treason to my country is very serious. From all indications at the present time, only prejudiced Filipinos believe that we have been traitors and they constitute a very small portion of our population. But how about future generations who do not know the facts personally? If our declaration of innocence now is not recorded, they may get the idea that we have done something against our country. So it is preferable that we be submitted to a trial in order that our formal vindication may be decreed if we are found not guilty.

December 25, 1935

Talk with Rafael Corpus, former director of Agriculture and new President of the Philippine National Bank. He told how Wood had tried to liquidate the bank; how eventually all the money supposed by Wood to be lost in sugar mills had been made good –even Philippine Vegetable Oil paid back 50%. Said he discovered more and more how the economic basis for the country was laid during my administration.

Sugar– said it was O.K. for seven years.

Hemp– said Sumatra’s attempt to rival the Philippines had failed.

Rice– said next year would be worse than this; that the floods in Pangasinan etc., had ruined the crop; that sugar had absorbed much of the rice land.

Iron– said Economic Council must establish a steel industry here –Japan was now taking 300,000 tons of iron ore yearly from Paracale in the Philippines– that our coal in Mindanao was just right for iron, but was too hard for ships. We had all the materials at hand, and even if it would compete with the United States we must insist on it. It was also a matter of national defense. We need a mineral survey, particularly of the vast and untouched iron fields of Surigao, reserved for the government.

Government of Quezon– said it had taken well so far.

Roy Howard article– said the fear of Japan was very real and the commercial classes would like an anchor –either the United States or England. Said fear of Japan did not penetrate to the common people in the provinces.

Sakdal & Communism– a very real problem –said some Filipinos had gone to the International in Russia and had come back with money. General Valdes told him one of these leaders had 50,000 pesos. Valdes confirmed this to Corpus.

Japanese– said they were very bold; that they were watching the development of the Davao matter; that they had been allowed by connivance or by supineness of Filipino officials to get these lands illegally and should not be blamed. Corpus says it was the Filipinos’ own fault.

Christmas dinner (lunch) with the Headquarters Commander of the 31st Infantry, the only regiment of American soldiers left in the Philippines. Excellent home food and a far better entertainment than last Christmas at Luxor in Egypt. Captain & Mrs. Lussier and Captain & Mrs. Howell.

Dinner with Mr. & Mrs. Samuel Gaches. Talk with old Colonel J.N. Wolfson who told me that McKinley’s secret instructions to Taft when he sent him out here to the Philippines as the first Civil Governor were to prepare the Filipinos as rapidly as possible for self-government –hence the “little brown brother” (and Taft’s fight for power against the United States army). Colonel Wolfson also told me of being retained recently (he is over 80 years of age) by 81 inhabitants from Tarlac who had been ousted from their lands by a local cacique under claim of a prior Spanish title, even tho some of them had Torrens titles. The judge of first instance in Tarlac had decided in favor of the cacique —Wolfson got this reversed in the Philippine Supreme Court.

December 21, 1935

Contribution to the Tribune by Pedro Abad Santos commenting on Roy Howard’s article. A very shrewd analysis of the present situation. So far as Quezon is concerned, I do not really know his views of the future –I discard that part of Santos’ article which deals with the working classes, for while now suffering from economic depression, they are certainly on a much higher standard of living than any others in tropical Asia.

Conversation at his office with J. Ross. He supplied the key to the puzzle –everything clicks now and falls into place:

(a) Quezon’s reticence with me

(b) The Roy Howard interview

(c) The good impression wished to be created by the purchase of Manila RR. bonds from the English Company

(d) The unwillingness of Blunt to accept Quezon’s house in Pasay at a very reduced rental

(e) The embarrassment of Blunt over the interview the London Times man (Stevents) had with Quezon etc., etc.

(f) The anxious enquiries Quezon made of me as to the utter dependence of England upon holding her Empire together etc., etc.

This is haute politique indeed. J. Ross told me that Quezon is in favour of independence if that is safe (so is J. Ross!) that at the moment he is badly scared over Japan; that England appears to be an “anchor to windward” (words mine); that three years ago Quezon told him that the United States was going to “kick us out” and Quezon was then in favour of going to London to talk with the Foreign Office; J. Ross told him that the Foreign Office would not talk with him. That Colonel Frank Hodsoll told J. Ross that he (Hodsoll) had been asked by Quezon to talk to the British Ambassador in Washington and had done so.

J. Ross and I agreed on the reasons for the attacks on me here –that I was believed to be in favor of quick independence and that they believed my own Government here had damaged business (Wood-Forbes Report); J. Ross thought it would die down soon. Elizalde’s opposition to me was due to his jealous wish to have a controlling influence over Quezon.

The most surprising symptom I have found here this time is the utter lack of self-confidence among the Filipinos!

J. Ross asked me if I did not think Quezon could lead his people into a Protectorate –I said he could lead some of them, but that denial of independence was a cartload of dynamite.

Doria left at noon en route for the Mt. Data Christmas party of Heine Schradieck of the Standard Oil. Amazingly enough, I remember how I had interned Schradieck together with the other Germans in the Philippines when we entered the World War in 1917.

Saw Secretary of Agriculture Rodriguez, former Governor of the Province of Rizal, concerning the dispute between Binangonan and Cadorno municipalities.

Saw the President at Malacañan at 6 p.m.; he was about to start for the National Assembly which was ready to adjourn. He was in the barber chair now established in the Palace and he received my account of my interview with Blunt with alert interest. His mind was taken up, however, with a pending dispute between the Jesuit Friars and their tenants on some unspecified hacienda. He said he wanted me to help him on it, but what he really desired was a sympathetic audience before which to express his own views. Secretary Yulo was waiting in the next room and joined in the conversation. Quezon said he had sent today for Araneta, the lawyer for the Jesuit Corporation, to prepare the ground before he should see the Administrator of the Corporation tomorrow; that agrarian troubles on this hacienda might result in bloodshed; that he (Quezon) was in favour of justice rather than the law; that these families of tenants had cleared the land and had lived on it for generations –that they practically owned it and had more moral right there than the Friar owners who had not paid originally for the land and had not spent any money on its development. (I interjected the view that as the Friar orders had then been the government they had practically given these lands to themselves, as was customary in Frailandia –that the situation was like a chapter out of Noli Me Tangere –“yes,” Quezon said, “except that now there is no Spanish Governor General to order out the troops.”) Quezon said he told Araneta he would not evict the tenants who had not paid rents and that he would not send the Constabulary to defend the Administrator; that, pending the purchase by the Government of these Friar lands (or alternative measures) he considered the tenants had more moral rights than the Friars –that if these people were dispossessed more “communism” would result; that he did not care to make any public statement of his views, because in this case there might be outbreaks instigated by demagogues.

During the morning, Quezon had signed the National Defense Act in the presence of Osmeña and MacArthur –movie taken of same.

Jim Ross told me he understood “Mike” Elizalde was out as head of the National Development Co.

December 20, 1935

7 p.m. in Malacañan with the President who was in good health and spirits. I complemented him on his message on economic planning –he enquired whether it has been well received in the foreign community. I gave him Colin Hoskins’ plan on organization for the economic council &c. Then I asked him what was the matter with the Manila RR. bond purchase? He said it has been held up to enquire of the United States Government as to whether they considered that the Philippine Government was resposible for the principal of these bonds; they had replied thru the High Commissioner in the affirmative –so Quezon said the bill would go through because this meant that the United States would act on the maturity of the bonds and seize the Customs House. He said that if the American Government had decided this Government was not responsible for the principal, he was going to say to the English that he had been in favour of purchase but the Legislature demands better terms. I told him that this Government was not responsible for principal of these bonds –that just as we had bought the railroad we could sell it. Then he said Confesor (Assemblyman) had told him of F. Theo Roger’s (of Free Press) story that I had come out here to get what I could for the English! He said that he had authorized Confesor to state the true facts in the Legislature –that this impugned his honor as well as my own– that he would put Rogers in prison if he printed such a gross libel. He asked me to bring him the memorandum on these bonds which I had prepared for him on December 6, which I did. We then talked a lot about England and the English –I told him to consult me if he had any questions up with the English, since I understood them better than most Americans who were misled by their bland manner and assumed innocence. That what they understood and respected was force and power. Quezon admires the English character. He asked me if I thought the Empire was essential to the continued existence of England as a great power and I said yes!

We then discussed colonization and land problems in the Philippines. He advocates spending money on roads to open up new sections of Mindanao, so that settlers will move in of their own accord. He does not advise spending money on settling people in a wild country; said he would provide transportation for volunteer settlers.

The President also said that instead of continuing the former cusrom of purchase of the Friar Lands in the provinces around Manila, he wanted to get fair treatment for the tenants; that previous purchases of these lands had not helped because outside speculators had intervened, and had secured the lands; he asked me to acquire a copy of Gladstone’s “F.F.F.” law for Ireland of about sixty years ago, when he settled the Irish agrarian problem. (Fixed Tenure, Fixed Rent and Freedom of Transfer). Told him I would go to ask Blunt, the English Consul General. He also asked me to get Blunt’s reaction to the interview he had given the London Times representative who came with Blunt a few days ago –not for publication– he told the Times man he would have to deny the interview if published.

We also talked over plans for the reorganization of the government. We agreed that this time time it must be a real reorganization and radical. He said he had only been in charge for a month and was already sure the present government was most inefficiently organized. He announced that he wanted me to sit with his three commissioners. He asked me which of two alternatives he should choose — (1) to have investigation & report by his three commissioners or (2) to just call in Department Secretaries and tell them they could only have so much appropriation, and must reorganize their Departments. I told him (1) was more scientific, and advised him to proceed with (1) and afterwards apply (2). I asked him how radical the reorganization was to be? –did he, for example, approve of the plan of reducing the number of provinces to 28? He said “no” –that the saving of a couple of millions would not compensate for the dimunition of energy and progress which would result. I then asked him whether he would approve of abolishing the elective city council of Manila and substituting a Board of appointed managers with the Alcalde as its chairman –latter to be elected? He said “yes.”

As I was leaving, he asked me if I would keep notes and write up an account of these months afterwards. I replied that I was already doing so. I also told that if at any time my presence became embarrassing to him on account of the attacks on me by the old imperialists, just to send me on a mission abroad and I would not come back. He replied that he and I would continue to work here together until we had accomplished something substantial.

I then went to home of A.P. Blunt, British Consul General –he did not get there until 8 o’clock, having been at work in his office, getting off in the mail all his reports on governmental development here. Promised to write the Foreign Office for “F.F.F.” on Irish lands. When asked what his reactions were to the President’s interview with the London Times, Blunt said Quezon was very broad minded, and amazingly frank. I denied that I knew what Quezon had said in the interview –Blunt said he had been embarrassed by the President’s raising the question of Roy Howard’s statement that if the United States abandoned the Philippines, the Filipinos would get under England’s wing. He said Quezon had stated he could run a better government here than anybody else had done –I agreed. As I left, Blunt asked me in a casual voice what had happened about the purchase of the Manila RR. bonds –I said there had been “a hitch.” He eagerly enquired “what hitch?” I said it had been caused by Vicente Villamin’s speech –“ah!” he said “they fear the wily English bankers, whereas our fellows would rather get this agreement now than perhaps lose everything later.” I replied that there was much to be said on each side, but I really thought the deal would go through –(it passed the Legislature just about that time).

While I was at Malacañan, Quezon talked at length about his letting out the American Justices of the Philippine Supreme Court –under the Constitution he had the power not to accept their resignations until July 1st next, and he was considering assenting to Chief Justice Avanceña’s request to retain them that long, when the Bulletin published an editorial attacking him for thinking of letting the Justices out. Thereupon he sent to Avanceña to enquire whether the six month’s retention of those Justices was essential to the Court –Chief Justice Avanceña replied he could not really say so– thus the resignations are to be accepted as of January 1st. He wrote a letter for the press explaining that he is thus conforming to the spirit of the Constitution. He says Malcolm is behind the drive –he dislikes him as unreliable. Quezon then spoke of the unparalleled generosity of the retirement gratuities given by the Filipinos to those Justices –Malcolm was to receive 60,000 pesos!

Wrote an address for the banquet tonight of the Political Science Club of the University of the Philippines. Got home to find Doria greatly upset over a scurrilous attack on me in a letter pretended to be from a Filipino to the Bulletin. I hope this campaign does not discourage both Doria & Quezon! I have never answered (nor read, if possible to avoid) any newspaper attacks!

Reception this p.m. at James Ross’. Dinner of Political Science Club of U.P. at the Cosmos Club –sat between Bocobo, President of the University and ex-Judge de Joya –speech.

December 10, 1935

Long talk with A.D. Williams at Malacañan about the reorganization of the government. He gave me a chart showing a reduction in the number of the provinces, based on topography and roads –which would save nearly half of the expenditures on provincial governments. We discussed many bureaus and buildings for the same. He said that the retirement of surplus officials as proposed by the law of two years ago was not carried out. I asked him if he would serve on a committee to work out a plan, if I could get Palma also? He consented.

Saw Quezon for one hour in Pasay –says he has had frightful pains in his stomach, and thinks that milk does not agree with him; therefore, he ate a dinner of oysters, fish, chicken, four vegetables, and a sweet! An awful diet for stomach ulcers! Then he became very natural and lively. Said his 1st pardon had been for adultery, and that he would not allow a man to remain in prison for an offense he had so often committed himself. I told him he must cast responsibility for administration on his cabinet –said he proposed to do so, and that is why he has just announced the rule of only two cabinet meetings a week, because they had fallen into the habit of not giving an increase of salary to an employee without cabinet consent. I told him there was much corruption in the government. He agreed and said that was why he had jumped so hard on the Director of Commerce, in connection with the importation of rice –as a warning to all minor employees. We arranged a program for a committee to reorganize the government. Then I asked him about nationalization of industries. He said they must do it; but should begin by an economic review, and then inform the public. If capital was not forthcoming to start the necessary industries, the government would undertake them, and later offer them at public auction to private business.

Quezon then said he had told Roy Howard that, except Taft, I had been the only Governor General who had done anything permanent for the islands. That his break with Osmeña had started with his objection to the latter’s “pussyfooting” and support of Wood. That Wood tried to sell the Philippine National Bank and the Manila Railroad; that if he had done so, it would have lost 100,000,000 pesos for the Philippines; that his fight with Wood killed Wood, and nearly killed him (Quezon). (Doria had had a conversation this same day with Roy Howard’s son, Jack, who on this trip south spoke of the extreme loyalty of Quezon to me –[adding that Ora Smith would weep copious tears and at the next instant knife a man in the back).]

President Quezon spoke well of Foley of the Philippine National Bank and of Yulo. Said he (Q) was informed of a lot which goes on, because he has three agents in Tom’s Dixie Kitchen; that he knows all the racketeers in his Government, and will outwit them. He added that he was going to direct only the policies of the government, but I wonder?

December 1, 1935

Sunday a.m. Malacañan Palace was thrown open to the public by the President’s orders—crowds of tao sightseers—Quezon’s about to leave on Banahao for Zamboanga with Roy Howard and his family as guests.  He had originally invited Jim Ross and me on this trip but did not renew the invitation, for which, at the moment, I am relieved. I asked him to fix definitely my status, and he cordially agreed to make my appointment as one of his “technical advisers” valid tomorrow –salary 15,000 pesos which he said was the same as that of the Vice-President and next to his own, the largest under the government. Read to me two editorials in the Tribune of that date unfriendly to his government and asked me to see Alejandro Roces, as his friend, and call his attention to his promise to support the administration. Also listened to my opinion on the proposed purchase of the Manila RR. bonds. Said it was much the same as Foley’s –whom he asked me to see. I expressed a desire to begin a study of papers on propositions to reform the Government now on file in Malacañan. He looked well, and is still on a milk diet. Said he would be back from the Southern Islands by Saturday next.

At 6 p.m. Doria gave a party at the Polo Club for Mrs. Stevenson, Mrs. Walford, Mr. & Mrs. Peters, Count Churruca, Correa, Lea, and Mr. & Mrs. Satterfield.

November 26, 1935

Long talk with Rafferty in the morning re industrialization in the Philippines.

Golf at Wack-Wack with Jim Rockwell in the afternoon.

Appointment at 7 o’clock at Malacañan with Quezon. He has a sala (or office) next to his bedroom over the front door (where my bedroom used to be, but now reconstructed). He was cheerful and in good form; very friendly. He said he was off tomorrow for a couple of days in Laguna to look into this Encallado banditry. I told him it sounded like the days of Rizal’s books; he said the Constabulary had slipped back in the last few years –thought it a defect in Governor General Murphy’s administration. (Later Osmeña and I expressed to one another a wish that Quezon might not be known to take the matter too seriously.)

Quezon again voiced his irritation with Major General Parker. I said I was sorry to see General MacIntyre leave; he said that he, too, was sorry, but that MacIntyre was determined to leave and retire as Trade Commissioner. He had been quite knocked out by the recent death of his wife. Quezon plans to manage so that MacIntyre remains in the service.

We then discussed my appointment as Adviser on Communications and he asked me also to help him in the reorganization of the government. He is to put me in touch with Quirino and Paez on the purchase of the Manila RR. bonds from the English.

9:30 pm ball at Malacañan—about fifty extremely nice people—the only Americans there besides ourselves were Roy Howard, his wife and son and the High Commissioner and family. The dance was given for Judge Murphy who returns home tomorrow.

Had many interesting conversations —with General Valdes, Miguel Unson and Colonel Paulino Santos. The latter is opposed to the appointment of Moros to govern Moros; said it is better to give positions to bright Moros such as fiscal etc., to serve up here in Manila.

Teahan was amusing about the boredom of Baguio. Osmeña danced every dance; Quezon only one tango. Drinks were served on the balcony; Garfinkel, a.d.c., says that no drinks were offered at big parties following the custom initiated by Governor General Wood. I arranged, at wish of Quezon, to have Nick Kaminsky stay on as superintendent at Malacañan. Ah King whom I brought from Shanghai as my servant was installed again at the Palace as number one “boy”.