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Tuesday, November 15th, 1898

… I had made a little memorandum the night before of the sort of paper I was inclined soon to suggest filing. It was in the nature of a statement as to the extra delays over matters which we had supposed settled in the protocol [concerning] the two questions of the Cuban debt and the annexation of the Philippines, on which the position of the American Commissioners was fixed. [I also referred] to the uselessness of spending more time unless those proposals were accepted. [I ended] with a statement that if they were ready [we should] proceed to details, [and if not we should] move for a final adjournment. I read these rough notes, and the members were generally inclined to think that something of that sort must come soon.

Mr. Moore now appeared with his memorandum. It also proved to take the form of a practical ultimatum. In the Philippine article it embodied a distinct offer of $20,000,000, thus going to the extreme limit the President had authorized. Senator Frye and I demurred almost simultaneously on the ground that with this we ought to secure also the island for cable purposes and a naval station in the Carolines, as well as guarantees for religious freedom, liberation of political prisoners, etc. On this a lively dispute sprang up, Senator Davis siding with us. Senator Gray and Judge Day insisted that it would be better to leave these matters out of the ultimatum altogether, confining it strictly to subjects embraced in the protocol. I pointed out that in my belief it would be far better for the popular reception of the treaty at home, as well as for its chances in the Senate, if this large payment of money were not conditioned solely upon acquiring what the American people thought we were already entitled to in the Philippines. I was quite willing that the offer should go into the proposal, but thought it ought to come at the close. I would leave the taking of the Philippines to rest primarily on the ground of the necessary indemnity. [I] would then ask for the Caroline island, for the liberation of political prisoners, religious freedom, etc. [I would] say in consideration of all these things, and of pacific improvements made in the Philippines, [that] the United States would be willing to pay, etc.

Judge Day, however, was even more than usually tenacious [about] confining the ultimatum absolutely to the questions in the protocol. [He wished to have] the acquisition of the Caroline Islands . . . subsequently negotiated for and made the subject of a separate payment. We all pointed out the disadvantage of enforcing our ultimatum, and then

coming in with the fresh requirements, as well as the certainty that by this method we should have to pay more than was really necessary. Secretary Moore rather sided with Judge Day as to the disadvantage of going outside the protocol in an ultimatum.

On our side all insisted on the disadvantages of having it begin all over again with a statement of fresh demands, which the Spaniards could claim took them by surprise. Finally, Judge Day proposed a phrase to follow the ultimatum, to the effect that when these were agreed to, the Commissioners “would be ready to treat with reference to,” etc.; and then proceed to enumerate the several points reserving the Islands’ religious liberty, freedom of political prisoners, and so on. To this Senators Frye and Davis and myself agreed, and Mr. Moore accordingly proceeded to change the tentative draft in this sense. We also desired a pledge for the open door to the Philippines, and a specific agreement with Spain that her merchandise should be admitted on the same terms with that of the United States. After the discussion was over, it seemed as if all hands were about as well satisfied with the conclusion we had reached as if each had had his own way.

No session in the afternoon, and I continued to nurse the cold, not always with comfort. It threatens to be rather more serious than the lasts.

Count Jean de Kergorlay made a long call, [which was] very interesting. Some question I had asked as to his not having tried for the [Chamber of] Deputies led to his expressing his views as to the present condition of rural France, particularly in the manufacturing regions. He deplored the Socialist tendencies and the increasing exactions of the working men and their unions. [They] were sure, he said, in the long run, to drive manufacturers largely out of France. The silk-weaving industry, for example, [might go] to Japan. He spoke of the wages as enormously increased. The hours of labor [were] greatly reduced, and the value of labor also reduced. [He noted] the lack of sympathy between the working men and their employers, the extraordinary advance in the mode of living, and in the expenditures of the working men. [He said] that in the manufacturing centres the liquor shops got the increase of wages. Thirty years ago he said the workingman rarely had meat more than twice a week, and then only salt pork. Now he had meat at least once a day and that almost always fresh meat, beef, veal, or mutton. He pictured the average day of a workingman as something like this: Before he started to work in the morning, a glass of brandy or of absinthe; work until nine o’clock, then a visit to the wine shop, [even if] he drank . . . the vilest cheap wine, which was not wine at all, but some sort of a chemical compound fortified with alcohol. Then a little more work and another visit to the wine shop about 11 o’clock; an hour for breakfast later on; and two more visits to the wine shop in the course of the afternoon. Formerly the workingman’s wife received all his wages and kept a tight grip on the purse. The change in their mode of living, however, had changed her also. Now she made childish expenditures for hats, gowns, and gougaws [sic] unfitted for her station. These expenditures cost her her moral control over the husband. Since she was no longer a model of economy, he refused to let her control his earnings and thus came to retain a large part spent in the wine shops. Altogether, Count Kergorlay was extremely despondent as to the future, anticipating obviously some sort of a crisis and a revolution.