June 13, 1942

At Waldorf-Astoria.

Story of Lt. Colonel Andres Soriano:

Soriano said that it did a great injustice to Aguinaldo to call him a fifth columnist. The General was perfectly loyal.

Bombing of air fields:

“The bombing of Baguio was at 7:30 a.m. on December 8th; these enemy planes then turned northwards and bombed the Cagayan valley–Aparri, Tuguegarao and Iligan.

“At about the same hour, Davao was bombed.

“Next they came over Clark Field–not a fighter up to oppose them. Many of the officers were at luncheon when the Japanese struck. They said: ‘We don’t know how it happened.’ At that time, 17 B-40s were destroyed on the ground at Clark Field. Explanation: the wires to detectors had been cut by enemy agents.”

Soriano, when I asked about the American planes which, according to Quezon had taken the air when news came of the bombing of Baguio at 7:30, said they were probably some planes which were en route for Mindanao at that time, and were recalled.

By the 10th & 11th of December, almost all our planes (80%) were destroyed–“it was worse than Pearl Harbor.”

“Three-quarters of an hour after they struck at Clark Field they were over Iba Field–all the officers were having luncheon.

“MacArthur took command of all the armies on July 20 (?). He did not have five months in which to pull them together. General Lewis Brereton arrived early in November, a very amiable man–he found a Brigadier General in command of the air force, an officer of the old laissez faire school. They put him in command of the fighter planes, when they should have shipped him off home.” Those fighter planes were ready to start for Formosa, and actually started, “I don’t know why they were recalled to the ground–some of them may have been included in the squadron which started for Davao that morning and had been recalled.

“After December 10th or 11th, the Japanese were entirely masters of the air, unopposed. I understand that the Americans had 38 four engine bombers, and about 170 other planes in the Philippines before the invasion.

“Supplies for besieged armies on Corregidor & Bataan: An officer told me: ‘All through the battle of Bataan we expected relief and reinforcements, though we knew the American Pacific Squadron had been temporarily put out of action at Pearl Harbor. On my first trip back from the front at Bataan to see General Sutherland on Corregidor the boys in the trenches had asked me to bring them food, tobacco and whiskey. This was on February 3rd; on February 18th I was again sent from the front on an errand to Corregidor, and this time all that the boys asked me to bring back was only “good news”–i.e., of relief coming. We all expected help until we heard President Roosevelt’s address on February 22nd. The truth about the sending of supplies is as follows: three convoys started from Australia. The first was diverted to Singapore; the second to the Dutch East Indies, and the third, consisting of three cargo boats started at last for the Philippines. Two of the vessels turned back and went to the West coast of Australia–to Brisbane. One boat, the Moro vessel Doñañate (?) got through to Cebu; it carried 1,000 tons of sugar and 1,000 tons of rice, both commodities we already had in the Visayas, so it was like carrying coals to Newcastle. Very little of this got through to Corregidor and Bataan, because of the blockade. Another vessel went aground near Leyte but the cargo was salvaged. We understood that after Pearl Harbor, the American Navy could not convoy supplies to us. Nor, of course, could they strike directly at the Japanese Navy as had always been the plan.’

“On Dec. 1st, Quezon sent for Admiral Hart, and questioned him. Hart seemed very confident. He thought that if the Japanese ever cut the communications between the mainland (U.S.) and the Philippines, it would, at the most, be 18 days before it was re-established.

“Of the airplanes sent from the United States via Australia in the months just preceding Pearl Harbor, the bombers, which could fly all the way, got through to the Philippines. A shipment of 200 fighters intended for the Philippines, had inexperienced young boys as pilots and crews, and they smashed up 180 of these 200 planes in Australia. ”

Soriano’s account of important visitors to the Philippines just before, based on which, Quezon had believed that there was a well prepared plan worked out for the defense of the Far East. Quezon was not really consulted, or informed in detail, but he had every reason to think that the defenses of the Philippines were.

“Quezon saw Duff Cooper and was not at all impressed by him. General Sir Brooke Popham was in Manila several times from the end of 1940 to April 1941. He conferred only with Sayre, Grunert and Hart.

The Dutch Chief of Staff who after visiting the United States from Batavia, became Commander-in-Chief for the Netherlands East Indies when his chief was killed in an air accident. He visited the Philippines.

“Litvinoff came to Manila about November 1st or a little later. Quezon was ill, and Litvinoff was only there for two days, but the President saw him and was very much impressed by him.”

Then Kurusu, whom they all knew in Manila because he had been Consul General there in my time, came through on his mission to the United States about the middle of November.

In October 1941, the Secretary of the Colonies and the Secretary of Finance of the Netherlands East Indies made a trip across the Philippines.

Soriano had had reservations for the September Clipper from the United States to the Philippines but became so uneasy over international relations that he left America on July 29th instead.

After MacArthur had been given Supreme Command there was real co-operation established with the American Army, which had been rather sore theretofore with General MacArthur because he had accepted service with the Filipinos. Soriano thinks, however, that MacArthur was glad to take Filipino Command, otherwise he would lose rank as Lieutenant General at the end of his extended term (five years) as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and would have had to step down and become a young Major General. (As a matter of fact, he became the Field Marshal of the Philippine Army.) General Grunert was coming to the end of his term as Department Commander of the Philippines; he had been offish with MacArthur because he worked with the Filipinos, and the Department Commander had been an “ally” of Sayre. Now Grunert is very friendly with Quezon.

The Americans in Manila, after Soriano arrived back there were still “asleep at the switch”; only a small percentage of them were awake to the seriousness of the situation. Right up to the 1st of December many people thought that nothing was going to happen. Quezon was one of the few who seemed aware of the danger, tho he was not informed as to the real strength of Japan. He kept cool-headed. He realized the situation after Secretary Knox’s ballon d’essai statement of November 11th and Secretary Hull’s comprehensive and sweeping statement of November 26th to the two Japanese Ambassadors in Washington.

In Manila during those last weeks some of the Americans feared that the Filipinos would not support them–these were the “Old Timers” who had always looked down on the Filipinos. In Soriano’s opinion there was absolutely no justification for this fear among the “Old Timers.” He did feel some uncertainty as to the real though concealed sentiments of some of the members of the Legislature. Possibly some of the Filipino lawyers who had as clients the more important Japanese financial interests in the Philippines were luke-warm, or followed the line of least resistance. He also suspected the real feelings of some of the professional Filipinos who had taken their degrees in Japan. The only pro-Japanese Filipinos of whose sentiments he was sure were two Filipino businessmen he named.

“In September, military supplies from the United States began to trickle in; there was a very noticeable increase of them by November, when bomber squadrons arrived. Nearly everybody thought that the crisis would not come before Spring and this would have given MacArthur a real chance of success. Even with the small air force we had there at the moment of invasion we could have gone far to stop the Japanese landings at Lingayen Bay and Guman Bay (e. coast Bicols), if we had learned the lesson of the battle of Crete. We might also, with our limited air force intact, have been able to keep the Asiatic fleet in our waters and thus impede the invasion. This would have served to stop the Japanese on their way to Singapore.

“We could have preserved the bulk of our air force if we had dug shelters for them in the hills around the air fields. There was a perfect opportunity for this at Stotsenburg, for example. This was what MacArthur did with the few rickety planes he had left, on the air fields he constructed on Mariveles Bay during the siege of Bataan. With the immense amount of mining machinery we already had in the Philippines we could easily have dug out shelters of our air defenses and airplanes.”

I asked Soriano whether the Spaniards in the Philippines had to be watched. He replied: “Perhaps I am partial, but in my opinion the great bulk of the Spaniards then in the Philippines were entirely loyal. They are, of course, extremely influential in the Islands.”

About the disastrous campaign on Malaya, Soriano said that the acid criticisms of the Australian General Gordon Bennet were probably correct. Soriano, who was educated in England, said that the Englishmen of the colonies are probably of a somewhat lower social stratum–it was their arrogance and that of their women which led to disaster. The especial harshness of the Japanese towards the English was due to championship of the Asiatic races. They humiliated the English because of their political and personal bossiness towards Asiatics. They are leading a race movement for their fellow Asiatics. (N.B. “Old Timers” and the policy of “Prestige in the Philippines.” F.B.H.)

“The Filipino Scouts were the back-bone of our armies–I consider them the equals of any crack regiment in any army in the world.

“The Philippine Army were mostly draftees–some divisions were fairly trained–most of them were just barely trained. The young Filipino officers, the first class to graduate from their Military Academy at Baguio, were excellent; many of them were killed.

“When I was commissioned, I reported to General Jones at Fort McKinley; he was the commander of the Southern Luzon forces. An officer of the Philippine forces was not considered the equal of an American officer. We managed to secure the same pay for the Filipinos.

“On Bataan, relations became excellent between American and Filipino officers; no distinction was made; promotions and citations were equal.

“Vicente Lim, and Generals Capinpin and Francisco, in the front line were really fine soldiers. General Segundo, tho he had been at the best military schools in the U.S., was always uncertain–he should not have fallen back at the first day’s battle at Morong. Quezon had previously disciplined him by sending him for a year to Mindanao, and then called him up to command the Military Academy at Baguio. He lost all his batteries and equipment at Morong. Lim, Capinpin and Francisco are all three prisoners of the Japanese now. Homma’s Chief of Staff really did commit hara-kiri.

“Colonel Juan Moran, a brother of the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, who was Chief of Staff of the 11th Division, did an excellent job.

“The 26th Cavalry, the 45th and 57th Infantry and 24th Field Artillery were Scouts.

“A Philippine division contains only 7,500 men.

“We could have licked the Japs at the beginning, if we had been properly equipped. After the battle of Malaya, no. If we had had an adequate air force, we would have thrown out the Japanese, they cannot stand up against air attack–not even the Manchurian veterans. What enabled us to stand so long on Bataan against such odds, was our artillery. The Japanese simply will not stand artillery fire.

“The Japanese soldier with his bushido and fanaticism is individually better than the German; the Jap is more of a savage, while the German is, in comparison, more civilized.

“The technique and minute preparation of the German and Japanese armies are about equal.”

The Americans in Manila behaved with dignity, and the civilian population conducted themselves well, noticeably so when, after the first two or three days, the enemy had complete control of the air.

In the battles in the Philippines the draftees had to be steadied by the Scouts when infiltration occurred–almost all troops are shaken when fired on from the flanks and from the rear, and think themselves cut off from their base. (Soriano suggests we do not praise the draftees too highly since that they might provoke answers from Americans.)

“A French-American pigeon keeper or trainer (Soriano called him pigeonnier) at Fort McKinley, whom they called ‘Frenchy,’ (named Saulnier), made so good on Bataan, calling out the range for the soldiers that he was finally put in command of a battalion–much to the surprise of the commanding officer, who, however, acquiesced when told what this boy had done.

“The Filipinos had shown great ability in jungle fighting when they were drawn from the frontier type, but not so much so the ilustrados or “white collar” men. Once on the Tuol River in W. Bataan about 3 kilometers from Bagao, a Filipino 2d Lieut, (later Captain), in command of a company, found that they were surrounded by a larger force of Japanese. He had only two platoons, and recognized his inferiority in numbers and equipment. He lay in ambush for 24 hours without food. Knowing the Japanese tactics of reopening their attack just after sunset, he took the initiative and succeeded in making contact on both flanks. They killed a great part of the Japanese platoons around them; 25 or 30 Japanese corpses were found, and he lost only 6. (n.b.) This happened on the 8-9th of February.

“Negritos–(they often saw them); Negritos have learned to speak Tagalog. Used them sometimes as guides, but found them so unrealiable that we quit. They served the Japanese just as willingly. Many of them were killed. We came across a former constabulary soldier from the lowlands named Mariano Daiit, who was living among the Negritos–he had a patch of camotes and some papaya trees. He was a very loyal guide for my commanding officer, General Jones. Once when General Jones and I and two young officers, with only 67 men were surrounded, Mariano, as always, found a way out for us. When we withdrew to Matic, we were no longer able to find Mariano and fear he fell into the hands of the Japanese and suffered the fate they often meted out to civilian assistants.

“When the Japanese High Command got behind in their program, their army became much more brutal. They changed their propaganda by leaflets, and began to call on the Filipino troops to kill the ‘real enemy,’ their American officers. They also changed their treatment of their Filipino prisoners–at first they used to strip off their uniforms, kicked them in the ass and told them to ‘get out.’ Many of them came back to us. As a rule they treated their military captives well, tho they perpetrated savagery upon civilians caught with the troops. When their program fell behind, they changed noticeably; they still took the uniforms, but used the soldiers as cargadores; sometimes they bayoneted their military captives, acting with complete savagery.

“We took very few prisoners, for two principal but very different reasons. First, many of them killed themselves rather than become prisoners. Second, our men often found that a Japanese offer of surrender was only a ruse, or bait, to lead us up to machine gun nests. After several of those experiences, we could not control our boys.”

At one time, the Japanese effected a landing at three places on the S.W. coast of Bataan peninsula, but they were driven off or destroyed.

By the end of the war, the town of Mariveles had been completely destroyed. A vast “all-weather” airport had been established at Mariveles; this was finished just before the surrender of Bataan. It had caves into which the planes could be pushed.

Soriano further suggested that, for the purposes of Quezon’s book the question of stressing atrocities by the Japanese be carefully considered. Will the American public demand the gruesome? He mentioned the weight of other considerations in this matter. He, personally, saw corpses of Filipino men and women mutilated by the Japanese and thrown by them into the Abo-Abo River in Bataan. He told also how one Vicente Logarta (?), a newspaper man from Cebu, left Manila on February 25th and went to the province of Bulacan, where he found that out of 176 cases of rape of girls aged from eleven to sixteen years, 110 had died. There was, as yet, very little information as to what took place in the provinces; it is not believed, however, that such savagery had been shown there as took place in Hong Kong. (Query: had the abundant supply of liquor in Hong Kong something to do with that?)

May 25, 1942

Lt. Col. Jesse T. Trayvick USA, Wainwright’s emissary traveling under a flag of truce accompanied by a representative of Gen. Homma, did not find difficulties delivering the “surrender orders” to Visayas-Mindanao USFIP CG, W. F. Sharp who, in turn, immediately issued written surrender orders to all his subordinates:  B/Gen. Albert Christie, Panay; Col. Roger Hilsman, Negros; Col. Irvin Schrader, Cebu; Col. Arthur Grimes, Bohol and Col. Ted Carrol, Samar-Leyte.  It is reported that all USA personnel and a few hundred Filipinos surrendered in compliance with Gen. Wainwright’s orders but many PA units led by their O’s, specially in Panay and Negros refused to surrender.  In Panay where the bulk of the 61st Div. is assigned are my classmates Lts. Amos Francia, Ramon Gelvezon and Pedro M Yap who believe Gen. Wainwright had no more authority to give orders after he became a POW.  Apparently, they were able to convince their Philippine superiors like Majors Macario Peralta and Nick Velarde and so when their Div. Comdr. Christie told them about the surrender at Mt. Baloy, Peralta and Velarde categorically replied their refusal stating their plans to continue to fight the enemy.  Gen. Christie seemed to understand and even left the remaining funds to the Div. Fin. O.  Meanwhile, in Negros my classmates there are Lts. Uldarico Baclagon, Abenir Bornales and Epifanio Segovia and they also were able to convince their superiors, Captains Ernesto Mata and Salvador Abcede, to disregard the surrender orders of Col. Hillsman.  In Southern Luzon and Bicol Area, surrender emissary B/Gen. G. Francisco delivered the orders and like in the Visayas, only the Americans and a few Filipino USFIP members complied and surrendered.

January 20, 1942 – Tuesday

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After breakfast, we left with General Francisco to Juanting Point along the Manila Bay coast of Bataan to inspect our coast defenses. I inspected the 75mm self propelled guns, and machine gun emplacements. Some of the boys were R.O.T.C. Their enthusiasm and morale were excellent.

From this place, I went to Hospital N-2 at Cabcaben, with Major Gonzalez Roxas and Manolo Nieto. There I saw Lieutenant San Agustin and other officers. I stayed with them a while to cheer them up. The beds are placed on the ground and in the open. I hope this war ends before the rainy season, otherwise it is going to be a problem.

From here I took the command car and followed a mountain trail to Barrio San Jose, North of Mariveles, to inspect the Command Post of Major Turingan. We arrived at 2:40 p.m. General Francisco and the other officers were already there. We had luncheon and then we returned by launch to the rock (Corregidor).

President conferred with Captain Lino Conejero.

January 19, 1942 – Monday

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Got up at 6 a.m. Shaved & dressed. Took launch Baler at 7 a.m. for Cabcaben. Arrived there 7:30 a.m. Lieutenant Monsod aide to General Francisco & Major Javallera came to meet us. Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Nieto, and Major Romulo were with me. We took the command car and proceed to General Francisco’s Command Post we had breakfast there. Then we left on our inspection tour.

The first place I inspected was the Philippine Constabulary collecting station. I saw Colonel Luna and all the other Medical Officers with him. It is the best place of all I have been. Nice clean running water; good large trees which serve the double purpose of shade from the sun and from enemy airplanes.

From there I visited the Headquarters of the Philippine Army which is just across the road. Very nice and quiet place also. Well protected from Airplane attacks. I discussed some matters with them. I saw all the officers there. The morale is excellent, the spirit is high.

They were all anxious to know how soon would the help come. I told them that I have the pre-sentiment, the hunch, that I will return to Manila at the end of February this year.

It was already 11:20 a.m., so we decided to have luncheon at Colonel Luna’s place. After luncheon we proceeded on our tour of inspection. The first Command Post. we stopped was General Selleck’s. He was reconnoitering. This is the second time I missed him.

Then we went to General Segundo’s Command Post. near Morong. It is situated a few kilometers from Morong, on the side of the mountain. We had to do some steep climbing to reach his place. It was about 2:30 p.m. We found him eating his luncheon as he had just returned from the battle line. He explained to us the situation. “During the morning”, he said “a group of about 300 Japanese tried to make a landing in the beach. Our artillery saw it and let them have a taste of our shells. They ran away leaving about 150 dead and their guns”. At 3 p.m. he took us to his main battle line. We reached our line which was in the south-side of the Morong river. I visited all the machine gun nests and spoke to the boys. The morale was excellent. They were anxious to see the enemy and let him have it. Then we climbed the hill and saw our batteries of 75mm and 155mm guns. I spoke to Lieutenant Menties an American in command of the batteries. He said that he would stick to his gun alive or dead and “Believe me”, he added “when this baby (155) starts firing someone is going to get hurt.”

As I was afraid to be caught by darkness in the mountain road, we returned to General Segundo’s Command Post, dropped him at the entrance and the proceeded to General Steven’s Command Post at Km. 148, Pilar Bagac Road Trail 7, 3 Km. South to the Interior. We arrived there 5 minutes after a Japanese plane had circled the place and dropped 4 bombs. No damage done, only two telephone wires cut. No casualties. I saw him, Major Velasquez, Captain Papa, and other officers. I did not see General Bluemel as I had been informed that he had left with his division for the main battle line at Abucay.

We proceeded then to General Capinpin’s Command Post at Guitol — six kms to the interior of Balanga. We had to cross an extensive sugar cane field. After we had driven about ten minute, some Filipino soldiers yelled at us: “Be careful for snipers.” I paid no attention. A little farther we were stopped by an American soldier, who warned us that some snipers had infiltrated our lines and were shooting from the sugar cane. I saw some Philippine Army soldiers and one officer waiting. I asked them what they were doing and they replied that they were waiting for a truck to take them to General Capinpin’s place. I told them to stand on the running boards of my command car and shoot at the first sign of snipers. After a few minutes my guide (2nd Lieutenant Subido) said “there is the entrance to General Capinpin’s Command Post”. I jumped out of the car and suddenly I saw a large number of our soldiers attacking from my left. Unknowingly, I was standing two yards in front of a machine gun. The gunner said “Sir, please move away, I am going to start shooting.” Then firing came from our right. I then realized that we had been caught between 2 firing lines. I jumped back into the car, and my guide suggested that we escape through a back road leading to Balanga. We did. Nieto and I held our pistols in our hands ready to shoot in case of necessity. We were able to leave unhurt from that danger.

Earlier, in the afternoon, I had been informed that Lieutenant Primitivo San Agustin had been wounded, so I went to Limay where Hospital N-1 is located. I found that he was admitted on January 6, and left on January 12. No one could inform me of his disposition. I concluded that he had been transferred. As I was in the Limay Hospital, the ambulance arrived bringing Colonel Hudson, who had been wounded at Guitol, just in the place where we had been standing. He was bleeding profusely from his side. We then returned to General Francisco’s Command Post arriving there at 11:15 p.m. It is very hard to drive in those roads at night with black-out lights. The roads are not wide and the traffic is tremendously heavy.

We had dinner at 11:30 p.m. and then we went to bed. I was so tired that I just washed my face and hands and went to sleep.

January 11, 1942

HQ, Intelligence

Bataan

Still aide to Gen. de Jesus. Am also assistant plans and training officer under Col. Torralba, former head of Camp Murphy. The general has also retained Fred.

Our new headquarters is located on the side of a high hill above a swift stream. There are a lot of tall trees with huge trunks and branches here.

The men are now putting up tents for the officers, building fox-holes and shelters. Signal Corps people are fixing the radio, connecting telephone lines and installing transmitters.

Our telephone-call is “Molave.” Col. Willoughby in Corregidor is Bat 102. Gen. Francisco is “Rainbow.”

Operatives for various Luzon provinces have already been selected and given instructions. I talked to agents for Manila: Gave them Mr. Romulo’s message.

The “spies” will go to enemy territory by “banca” from Limay to Hagonoy marshes. Some will pass through Corregidor, Fort Frank and Drum and then to Cavite.

Col. Manuel Roxas phoned from Corregidor and said that our service could draw as much money as needed from funds of Philippine Commonwealth Government. Part of our job is to secure information on political trends.

Went to Philippine Department headquarters this morning. Got P7,000 from Col. Fisher, G-2, chief, HPQ. I told him the money was going to be given to operatives who were leaving this afternoon for Manila.

I asked Fisher if he had any news about the convoy. He said he had none and he sounded somewhat gloomy.

While Fisher was counting the money, I sat down with a couple of American officers to listen to Radio Manila. The announcer was reading the news in Tagalog and I translated it for them. The radio announced that Kuala Lumpur, capital of Federated Malay States was in Japanese hands. The announcer said in Tagalog that the next objective was Singapore.

I asked one of the Americans when he thought the convoy would arrive. He said “I’m afraid they’ve forgotten us back home.” Then he started to reminisce about life in the States, how he used to spend the day fishing and driving his Ford coupe, which is very cheap in the States.

The other American was thinking of his wife. He said: “I know if I were in the States right now, I’d be fighting with the Mrs. and I’d be telling myself, why don’t I go over to Bataan and fight the Japs. Now that I’m here, I tell myself, why am I so far from home, and I miss my wife’s fighting after all. Oh hell, its that fellow Adam that started all this. Why did he ever eat that apple!”

Japs bombed rear areas heavily today. They hit part of supply in Rodriguez Park and destroyed Navy warehouse in Mariveles. Several trucks in Little Baguio were strafed. Heavy artillery duel in Western Sector. Wainwright must be having a busy time. Lines of Segundo, Brower, Stevens, Shalleck are holding. Japanese are trying to penetrate Mt. Natib. The enemy is adept at infiltration tactics. He crawls quietly through the lines under cover of darkness.

The general said in staff meeting this evening that Japs were using firecrackers in some sectors to “scare the boys.” In some sectors, the General said the Japs installed amplifiers and exhorted Filipino boys to turn against Americans. “the boys,” he said, “replied with machine-gun fire.” The General said that in other fronts, the Japs crawled into our lines, climbed trees and started sniping at officers. The Japs are quite good in jungle fighting because of their experience in China, according to the General.

Signal corps men have memorized new code. They will also cross Bay and establish transmitters in enemy territory to give accurate reports on Jap movements.

The General recommended me for promotion to 1st lieutenant in Corregidor.

Must stop writing. There is an air-raid.

January 11, 1942 -Sunday

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Got up at 7:30 a.m., dressed with the same wet clothes and wet shoes, took breakfast and proceeded on my journey of inspection of the front. We drove South to Mariveles, and went to the camp of Philippine Army Headquarters ten kilometers north of Mariveles hidden under a forest. I talked to the officers who met me at the road. As I was talking with them 3 Japanese planes arrived and flew over us. We ordered all officers and men to remain quiet under the trees so as not to attract their attention. A few minutes later we heard the Anti-aircraft guns in action in Mariveles, followed by the explosions of the bombs dropped there. Half an hour later, I proceeded. I visited the Command Post of Colonel Castañeda in the interior of the forest. While we were talking to him, 3 Japanese planes flew very low, quite close to the tree tops. We remained very quiet. Colonel Castañeda pointed out a small foxhole to me just in front of me. “Sir”, he said, “jump in if necessary”. The planes continued.

From Colonel Castañeda’s post we went to General Selleck’s Command Post. It was being installed and arranged. I warned the men not to cut too many branches from the trees as that would expose their situation to the enemy. I told them to cut the under-brush only. We saw Colonel Salvador Reyes.

We missed the Command Post of General Steven’s 71st Division which we passed because General Francisco’s aide was not familiar with the Command Post. The road from Mariveles to Bagac is mountainous and beautiful. The dust was terrible. I passed General Wainwright’s Command Post. I was informed that he was out on inspection. When we were near Balanga we saw a Philippine Army car on the road. I asked the driver what he was doing and he informed us that he was pumping his tire. He warned us to be careful as the Japanese were bombarding the airfield at the entrance of Balanga. As we reached the landing field which is close to the road we saw eight big craters in the runway. We believed that we were safe and continued to Balanga two kilometers away. No sooner had we stopped our car to speak to the Captain commanding the Philippine Constabulary at Bataan, when a bomb dropped nearby. We rushed to a nearby house for shelter. Two thirds of the town has been destroyed by incendiary and demolition bombs. A few minutes later we decided to proceed to Limay. As we started, several bombs fell again near the place. Instead of stopping we rushed out of the town. We saw several U.S. army cars hiding under trees waiting for that plane to leave.

We reached Limay where the U.S. Army Field Hospital is. We proceeded to Lamao Point where our off-shore patrol is stationed, arriving at 2:30 p.m. Captain Jurado prepared an impromptu luncheon with tinapa of Bangus and rice. At 4:30 p.m. our launch Baler arrived and we left for Corregidor. On our way back we suddenly heard Anti Aircraft gun shots. I looked up and saw a solitary Japanese plane flying very high en route to Manila. How I envied that Japanese pilot. We arrived Corregidor at 5:30 p.m.

January 10, 1942 -Saturday

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Left Corregidor at 5:30 p.m. with Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Nieto & Leon Ma. Guerrero in a Q Boat (N-111) for Cabcaben. We arrived at 6 p.m. after a very rough trip. The waves were so big and the wind so strong that we get wet when we tried to give speed to the boat at Cabcaben it was not possible to dock. We asked for a small boat, but it was a flat-bottom one, and Colonel Nieto & I almost capsized. We got very wet. Later the Banca used by Lieutenant Guerrero sunk, he and our clothes got wet. General Francisco met us there & drove us to his Command Post about 1 ½ hours drive through the forest & zigzags. Spent the night in his camp.

August 29, 1941

All ten Military Districts in the Philippines are extra busy since yesterday.  One Infantry Regiment and Key O’s and EM of other organic units of EACH of the Phil. Army Divisions started reporting yesterday as ordered to their respective  Mobilization Centers  for  training. The PA Reserves being called to active duty (CAD) are expected to number 75,000 by 1 Dec ’41;  100,000 by 1 Jan ’42; and 200,000 by 1 Apr ’42.

Also, additional senior O’s selected to train at CGSS, Baguio to open Sept. 1 are: B/Gen. Guillermo Francisco; Col. Simeon de Jesus; Lt. Cols. Santiago Guevarra, Ricardo Poblete; Claro Lizardo; Paciano Tangco; Claro Lizardo; Irineo Buenconsejo;  Rafael Jalandoni; Calixto Duque;  Tomas Domaoal; Fidel Cruz; Bienvenido Alba; Patricio Borromeo; Majors Jaime Velasquez; and Emmanuel Cepeda. They are prospective Division Comdrs. or Staff O’s for the Divisions being mobilized.

Manila News report says  US Sec of State Hull warns Japan to leave the Pacific open to US Shipping.  Also Hitler and Mussolini met and formulated plans to counter US aid to  Allies.

May 27, 1941

Briefly, the situation in the Philippines, a US territory with a Commonwealth Gov’t. led by Pres. Quezon, whose legislature passed CA #1, Defense Act, is progressing well towards the 1946 Independence.  Defense law framed by Advisors MacArthur & Eisenhower anchors on Phil. Army (PA) with sea  going sv (OSP) and air (PAAC) as mere branches like Inf., Arty., CAC etc.  PC as  nucleus, PMA replaced PCA to produce Reg O’s for regular army. Defense patterned after Swiss citizen army conscript concept. Phil. divided to 10 Mil. areas with various Training Cadres, each area to produce 4,000 trained men per year.

By 1946, we will have 400,000 citizen army, 250 planes and 50 Torpedo boats.  Reserve O’s will come from ROTC or other O’s Schools.  PA C/S is Maj. Gen. Basilio Valdes; C,PC B/Gen G. Francisco.

Peace and order, civil service excellent. Every young man is eager to join the military, trainees enthusiastic and many high school grads want to go to PMA.  Our Class ’40 graduated last year and ’41 two months ago.  I  selected the OSP for we are a maritime country. We graduated from OSP School last March and are now busy undergoing  extensive sea duty training aboard three Q-Boats.  When we graduated from PMA  in 1940, the 79 members of the class went:  29 to Inf; 17 PAAC; 10 OSP; CAC & CE 7 each; SigC 2; Cav 1.  Nobody chose PC.  MacArthur still Mil. Advisor;  Eisenhower left in 1939 for CONUS replaced by Sutherland; Lt. Sidney L. Huff, Navy Advisor.

Our 3-Q Boat Training Cruise arrived noon at Muelle del Codo, Port Area Manila, where the Off-Shore Patrol HQ and facilities are located. It was a most enlightening training as student Os were rotated  in asgmts as Navigator, Gunnery, Engineering, Mess & Fin, ExO and CO posts.  We were 15 student Os namely Lts. Nestor Reinoso ’34; Simeon Castro and A. Navarrete both ’35; J. Magluyan ’37; M. Castillo ’38; A. Palencia & S. Nuval ’38; C. J. Albert ’39; and R. Alcaraz, H. Alano, F. Apolinario, A. C. Campo, Q. Evangelista, C. Montemayor, L. Picar all ’40. Lt. R. Olbes, our PMA Baron requested transfer to CE as he was always sea sick.

We visited Iloilo, Bacolod, Cebu, Luisan, Malampaya and western Palawan.  Was fascinated with overwhelming amount of fish in Malampaya Sound, the Tabon bird whose eggs seem to be bigger than the bird itself  and the tiny Mouse Deer we saw in Balabac.  Our Training was under the eagle eye of C, OSP Capt. Jose V. Andrada USNA ’31.

Let me comment briefly on my branch of service, Off-Shore Patrol (OSP), the youngest, born  Feb. 9, 1939 pioneered by Capt. Andrada ’31, Lt. A. Pecson ’33 and Lt. M. Castillo ’38 all USNA grads. Our facilities are located at Muelle del Codo adjacent to Engineer Island, Port Area, Manila.  Andrada handpicked his Os as when he interviewed us personally before grad at PMA. We have three British made motor tropedo boats we called Q-Boats. This is the Commonwealth’s entire navy in the making envisioned by MacArthur.

The first two Q-Boats were imported from England but the third was made in Engineer Island with engines imported from England. Eight Q-Boats are under construction and it is projected that by 1946, we will have a total of 50 Q-Boats. Assisting us in this program are Lt. Sidney Huff, USN and Chief Torpedo man Wm. Mooney USN.  British technicians from Thornycroft are Sam Howard and John Herndon.  Lt. Huff is also in the staff of Gen. MacArthur.