Thursday, January 4, 1940

Segundo-Daily Reminder - 1940_Page_006


General Conference at Malacanang — 10:30-1:00

Subject — Defensibility of Islands —

Present: Sec. Sison, McA, Sutherland, Lim, Garcia, Segundo, [illegible], De Jesus, Magtoto — President Q Presiding–

Discussion — Pres. outlines history of McA. [illegible] Defensibility of Islands —

McA. quizzed by the Pres. on basis of his plan — Does it envision US.N. employment

McA. says no — He pretends his plan is self sufficient. He outlines Far Eastern balance of power as the thing that will insure independence. His opinion is six months of war, after that intervention by US or other power. He fails to answer Pres. Q on question of Mindanao —

Gen. Staff — opinion on budget reduction presented.



Called as witness. Quintero case.

Wednesday, January 3, 1940

Segundo-Daily Reminder - 1940_Page_005

Breakfast at Malacanang — 7:30 —

Present — Sec. Sison, Morato, Garcia, Segundo, President.

Subject of discussion — Army budget and possibilities —

Gen. Staff conference — 10:00 re budget reduction

I was detailed to write the report.



Worked all night in connection with Gen. Staff report re budget reduction.

Friday, June 2, 1939

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_052

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_053

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_054

[page 1]

Meeting at MacArthur’s Office. Present. His staff and the general staff.

Macarthur talks at length on the history of scattered camps, trying to justify their establishment. He recognizes however the fact that in as much as the president relieves him of the political phase of the national defense, he (MacArthur) has no more alternative. He appointed a preparatory committee consisting of Eisenhower, Southerland and myself to present recommendation in a month. MacArthur insinuated that the subject of concentration was brought to the president’s attention not thru him. This was a wrong procedure, he says as when a subject is presented to the president, there should be combined agreements and opinion of all the military men concerned. Divided opinions of military men

[page 2]

on military subject always destroys the effectiveness. At the end of the conference, Lim said that when the president calls for the information direct from us, we don’t have the alternative but give the information to him, insinuating thereby that the question of concentration was asked by the president himself. This insinuation of Lim is false as Lim himself used the concentration issue as one of the causes of his resignation by claiming that on this vital issue, he would not agree with the military advisers office. (On our way to Malacañan, Lim made a remark to me in which he implied that he was the author of the concentration. This is more of Lims habitual lies. I wrote the study originally

[page 3]

without consultation with Lim. There are several other cases where Lim tried to steal credit for original ideas.

June 1, 1939 Thursday

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_049

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_050

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_051

[page 1]


Meeting at Malacañan. Present — President and Secretary Vargas, the full staff of the Military Adviser and the members of the general staff. Valdez, Lim Garcia and myself. The pres. addresses the council by saying that from time to time he will call this body together and discuss important matter in the manner of a war council. He talked on three subjects, namely concentration, cadres for training purposes (my general study) compulsory R.O.T.C. units for all universities and quartering R.O.T.C. cadets in government owned barracks. On the subject of concentration, he says that as a result of his inspection he is virtually convinced that concentration is the proper thing. MacArthur tried to present his side by saying that the scattered cadres were decided upon in order to develop nationalism in the various localities. The pres. stopped him short by saying that the development of nationalism

[page 2]

among the people is a political phase of the national defense and not a military phase, and as the political head of the nation, he is charged with this mission and the MacArthur confine himself strictly to the military phase. He told MacArthur that in his national defense planning he should disregard political influences. The president himself will face the legislature and the people in such subject. After the discussion, MacArthur promised to present to him in a month a plan for concentration. (MacArthur argument in developing nationalism by the scattered cadres is falacious. A man develops nationalism irrespective of where he trains and the influence of such a soldier is the same whether he trains at home or in some other locality) On the subject of compulsory R.O.T.C. trainings for all universities, the president says that his secretary of justice has rendered his opinion that the

[page 3]

president is empowered to compell all universities to establish R.O.T.C. units. MacArthur remarked that it was probably necessary to compell them as he was advised by the general staff of the willingness of the heads of the institution to establish on invitation such R.O.T.C. units; nevertheless the president says that he is going to issue an executive order compelling all institution to establish R.O.T.C. units. On the subject of quartering cadets in government owned barracks, MacArthur said that he will have that subject more closely studied, and a report will be rendered to the president.

Next Day. June 2.

Thursday, May 18, 1939

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_044

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_046

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_047

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_048


[page 1]

The president calls for me to be at Camp Claudio early. I was there before he called. We inspected the horses and the stables. He saw the troops drilled. He asked me about the troop commander and I reported that the troop commander was about to be tried and probably he would be dismissed. He asked me of the offense and I said that it was immorality. My impression was that he is inclined to be lenient for offenders of this kind. I had his horse saddled up and the jump arranged. I gave him a demonstration on [illegible] and he was very much drilled.

At 9:30 he comes to headquarters to inspect.He looked over some offices downstairs and that came to Valdez office. We had a conference on the subject of concentration. P[illegible] wa present at this conference. He asked several questions. He asked

[page 2]

to what extent we could reduce the number of trainees. I expressed the opinion that we should not reduce too much the number of trainees as the number figured is for local defense. On his suggestion that we have only a few thousand trainees near Manila, I said that policy would be disastrous. If we had only a few thousand concentrated near Manila, it would be necessary to give them plenty of mobility so that they could be moved to the threatened area quickly. This is contradictory to the MacArthur plan of local defense where the reservist of one locality defend that locality.

We are invited to luncheon at 1 oclock. We did not leave the palace until 4:30. He talked on various subject. The Montilla case the recall of the Scout officers, the case of Laconico and Villareal, the case of Torres. On the subject of Laconico and Villareal he said that

[page 3]

Valdes brought my letter of protest to him accusing me of disloyalty in view of the fact that I tried to protest a decision which had already been rendered. The president said he could not understand how I could be accused of disloyalty for presenting my views. It was only after I had known the decision that I could express my opinion. He said he sent for MacArthur to find out the practice in the U.S. army whether a subordinate who express his opinion is considered disloyal. MacArthur told him “No,” provided such opinion were expressed thru proper channel. He told MacArthur he was glad of such advice as he was determined that such an expression by a subordinate did not constitute disloyalty and that he would have issued an order that it was not disloyal if in the U.S. Army, such act was considered disloyal. He looked at me said

[page 4]

“Segundo that was a strong letter.” He quoted my statement avout personal circumstances and personal liason. He did not understand what I meant so he asked Sec. Vargas what I meant and Vargas said that Laconico is Santos aid and the son-in-law of Assemblyman Alano, then he understood. He ordered the name of Laconico removed from the list right away. Later we talked about Villareal and I said Villareal was not the best to go to school. The President said that it was only thru my letter that he knew such things were happening.

He spoke about the 6 hr. conference with MacArthur, the one published in the papers. He did not want the subject of this conference published or communicated to anyone. It was about the creation of the Department of National Defense.

Wednesday, May 17, 1939

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_040

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_041

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_042

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_043

[This entry is written in the hand of Lourdes, daughter of the author, and seems to have been dictated by the author]

[page 1]

Lim takes his oath. The Military Adviser’s Office, all the Philippine Army officers from Lt Col up and all the officers of the Constabulary from [?] up in Manila except Gen Francisco, present. Members of the Cabinet also present. After the oath taking and picture taking, the President directs that all P.A. and Constabulary officers remain. He starts by saying that what he was going to say was the result of his intuition and that nobody had told him. He said he was going to talk with his “corazon en tu mano.” He felt that there was no full cooperation between the Scout Officers and the Const. Officers. He said the Scout Officers fill [feel] themselves superior because of their training and Const. Officers are jealous and suspicious because the Scout Officers are getting the rank away from them. At the beginning of the Nat. Def there were only two sources from which I could draw the officer personnel with which to build the Army — the Constabulary & the Scouts. The Constabulary had proven to be good police officers. Since the P.I. Army is the same gov’t, I did not doubt their loyalty since the Scout Officers were officers of the [illegible] I was not sure of their loyalty but

[page 2]

by _______ I inferred that they were also loyal because loyalty to America doesn’t mean their loyalty to their own country. And I was very glad indeed when a delegation of these officers came to see me to offer their services. In this visit of their repres. I gathered from the conversation that they were apprehensive of the future of the Nat. Def. unless a man of mil training was selected as chief-of-staff. You know, I appointed Santos, a retired major of the Constabulary, without any mil training, passing over Gen Valdes who was then Chief of Const. and several Cols and Lt. Cols. senior to him. This was a test of loyalty for the senior Const. officers and also for the Scouts, because of their stand as to who the chief of staff should be. I found that the Const. officers were loyal, & I was very glad indeed when the Scout officers volunteered their services for then I was doubly sure of their loyalty despite the Santos selection. Then happened the unfortunate incident when sev. of the Scout officers left the Phil. Army. I was mad and I told Gen. MacArthur to get rid of all the Scout officers but I started my own investigation & found that there was a misunderstanding more our fault than theirs. We did not keep

[page 3]

our side of the bargain; we did not live up to our promise. The officers that stayed after this proved themselves again to be loyal to the gov’t. I am going to get back most of these officers who left the Phil. Army –not all of them. You of Const. have no kick. Some of you have received two or three promotions. Were it not for the Phil. army many of you would die majors whereas many of you are Cols & Lt Cols today. The Const. are not trained in a mil. sense. Naturally, they do not do the mil. work of this army. Most of the Scout officers were trained as young men in the U.S. They served long years in the U.S. Army, doing nothing but mil. work. Some of them have had further schooling in U.S. Army Schools. They each have the the experience of commanding big bodies of troops. I don’t understand why misunderstanding should arise and I want both groups of officers to feel alike & equal in manhood and worthiness. I found many liars and crooks among the Const. officers, [?] of courts-martial who don’t appreciate the seriousness of lying and cheating, & I want to get rid of these officers. This is the only way we can build our army, as no army is better than its corp of officers. I am going to clean up this army of all its

[page 4]

crooks! I want you to honor, respect & love that uniform, love it more than your wife, your children & home. By your own sense of honor you should refuse to associate with these liars and crooks who are wearing this uniform and you should clean them up yourselves! He concluded by saying he wanted to thank the Mil. Adv. for his services, & the Scout officers for their loyalty

& the former Const. officers for their loyalty.

He mentioned about the the ultimate goal of the man who goes to U.S.M.A. by saying that preparation is for his own people & not for the U.S. this is shown by the fact that Annapolis grads are not commissioned in the US Navy.

In talking about the Scout officers that left the Phil. Army, he mentioned the fact that these Scout officers are not given the rank that used to be given to Amer. officers detailed in the Const. He said that any Capt. detailed in the Const. was made a full Col. The reason for this is clear he said. These Amer. officers were temporarily assigned to the Const, whereas these Scout officers are to occupy permanent position in the Phil. Army.

Saturday, April 23, 1939

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_038

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_039

[page 1]

I decide to quit the Philippine Army today. I will write Valdez my feelings about the selection of Laconico to the FA school. I will assert broadly that he could not pass the course, and will not be a credit to the PA or to the Filipino people.

In my letter to the President requesting relief I will state — I am subjected to a severe strain amidst a surroundings where decisions are made not on sound military precepts but on expediencies, where reward is given not on the demonstrated result of effort but on how close you are to those who that make decisions, where honesty and convictions are not the basis of decisions but the desire to please. My character rebels under these surroundings and I can not give my best to my work. I lose faith in

[page 2]

the future of the army unless more strict adherence to principles is made I work on only one  principle — that principle of carrying out a military objective on the basis of righ and wrong. I have only one standard. I can not function in an atmosphere of varying standards.

I will tell the President — In this my last act as an officer of the Philippine Army I want to thank the President for reposing in me his confidence as shown by my commission and in the several conferences on important matters in which he sought my opinions.

Friday April 21, 1939

Segundo-Desk Private-1938_Page_037

Col. Eisenhower comes to see me today. He talks first about an inspection report. We then talk about our troubles. He tells me of MacArthur’s wrong ideas because he does not want to disagree with anyone. His pay is too great and he would not lose it for anything. Col E tells me that he has taken more on the chin than I have, that MacA has called him an ingrate and other names when he E chooses to disagree with him. He gives me a straight code thus — When money consideration looms larger than your desire to do the right thing you have nothing left in you. I tell him about what Manzano said some years ago and how I resented Manzano’s remarks about their honesty. I asked him about my future in this army and he said that I am singled out for something great by Pres. Q himself.