January 26,1943

After my Taisho Training visit in Solano three days ago, I instructed SA Pablo Naval to see me that afternoon in my office in Bayombong.  In the privacy of my office, I instructed him “as soon as ready” to proceed to Baguio area where our Grla. Comdr., L.Col. Enriquez is “laying low in hiding” to give the following report: “Peace and order in Vizcaya is good as the guerrilla units there are under my complete control; my rapport with Japanese military authorities is also good with their blessing on our neighborhood association idea wherein Taisho Instructions were given twice, and the authorized assemblies gave us opportunity to further military training.  When I arrived in Bayombong early last Nov., there were a dozen American POWs that included L.Col. E. Warner, original 14th Inf. CO and L.Col. Theodore Kalakuka, emissary of Gen. Wainright in the surrender process after the fall of Corregidor.  Warner surrendered to Kalakuka and their combined efforts in collaboration with the Chief of Police of Jones, Isabela caused the capture of L.Col. G. Nakar, who, I understand, was executed.  Early last month two American POWs, L.Col. Kalakuka and a Lt. Ziegler, died of dysentery and malaria and were buried at the local Catholic Cemetery.  Before the end of last month all American POWs were transferred to Cabanatuan POW Camp.”  Since this report will be delivered verbally, I asked Naval to repeat what the message is and to my satisfaction, he covered all subjects verbatim.

Today, my being Actg. Sr. Inspector of Vizcaya ended with the arrival of Inspector Sergio Laurente ’21.  After a formal turnover this afternoon, I accompanied him to the Provincial Capitol to pay a social call on Gov. Quirino and other officials.  He was received cordially as he has a pleasing personality.  At the start of the war, Laurente was provincial PC Comdr. of Ilocos Sur and when the Japanese landed there Dec. 10,1941, he was taken by surprise, immediately captured and earned the distinction of being the first Filipino USAFFE to become POW.  From the way I size him up, I think we will have a very pleasant camaraderie although he graduated from the old PCA nineteen years before I graduated from PMA in 1940.


November 26, 1942

This morning I gave SA (Sp. Agent) Pablo Naval his first mission to contact LCol. Enriquez with following msg: “That I have visited all towns and met their officials; Aban, Asuncion & Naval have SA IDs; Units under control but laying low. I will be in Manila to get my family first week Dec to transfer them to Bayombong. While in Manila I would like to contact other associates, if possible. Peace and order good. Situation looks good”. As msg. is not in writing for security reason, I required Naval to repeat the msg. verbally and to my satisfaction he did it verbatim to my surprise. I am happy Naval is very intelligent and a safe courier.

This afternoon, Lt. Leandro Rosario, a surrendered Int. O. of Nakar, visited me with interesting revelations. That there are a few American POWs still in the local Japanese Army garrison who helped in the surrender campaign of guerrillas led by LCol. Theodore Kalakuka, emissary of Gen. Wainwright; LCol. E. Warner; Capt. Arnold A. Warning; Lt. Albert Ziegler; Lt. Hurley Hieb. Rosario said Warner surrendered to Kalakuka; but Warner was responsible for the capture of Nakar in Jones, Isabela with the help of the Chief of Police of Jones who earned ₱1,000.00 cash reward from the Japs. However, last Oct 31, Kalakuka died of cerebral malaria and buried at Bayombong Catholic Cemetery according to Rosario. Lt. Ziegler also died four days after my arrival in Bayombong due to dysentery. Lt. Rosario claims that LCol. Warner is also very sick with malaria.


September 14, 1942

In Negros, people who have some holdings are helpless against the marauders. They are compelled to flee to safer places as the armed bandits are on the loose, burning towns and centrals and killing those who come in their way.

It seems that there are two distinct groups operating separately. One is composed of former USAFFE men who did not surrender but went into hiding in the deep recesses of the mountains and are contented with burning sugar centrals which manufacture alcohol. Although they rarely attack the few Japanese outposts, they have caused a lot of damage.

The other band is a confederation of free-lance groups composed of or led by communists or bandits, and these are the ones committing the atrocities. The people are indignant over the vandalism of these groups, the outcome of which is only hunger, death and destruction, without contributing any benefit to the cause of debilitating enemy forces.

Fugitives from Negros have horrifying accounts of arson in their regions. The accounts could be exaggerated in some respects, but there is reliable information about the burning of sugar centrals, and the hearsay that the island of Negros, seen from the sea, is like a huge bonfire, is not entirely unfounded.

The better-organized guerillas are those of Panay, under the leadership of Governor Confesor of Iloilo who, since the first day of the Japanese occupation, had already raised the banner of rebellion and refused to obey the surrender order issued by General Wainwright. With a sufficiently numerous and disciplined force, he is able to keep the Japanese garrisons in check. Almost the whole island of Panay is under his domination, as his forces practically encircle Iloilo. They descend from the mountains like an irrepressible avalanche upon the towns on the plains, and there are many new recruits eager to swell their ranks.

The Japanese, however, unhesitatingly and mercilessly avenged themselves on the poor inhabitants. They have burned a number of towns in the course of their retreat, or punished them in reprisal upon their return. Whenever a Japanese gets killed, the military would retort in kind, barricading the town with machine guns for hours, burning it to the ground and killing the “culprits”. Actually, the culprits would have already fled to the mountains before the return of the avengers.


July 3, 1942

Met Lt. Col. Carlos Romulo, editor of Quezon’s paper the Herald in Manila–noted orator–a.d.c. to MacArthur, i.e., “press agent”–still very shaky, said he was wounded once on Bataan (?). He corrected the newspaper interview ascribed to him on landing at San Francisco. He did not correct the statements to the effect that he was in the United States “on a mission for General MacArthur,” nor that he was the “last man to escape from Bataan”; but did give a correct rendering of the Domei agency announcement concerning the burning of Cebu–that it was to show the Filipinos that all further resistance should cease–not that it was punishment for sniping, in which even women were said to have taken part from upper windows of houses when the army of occupation entered Cebu.

“Further resistance” probably refers to the guerrilla bands, or remnants of the army still active in the high mountains of Cebu, and perhaps also in Luzon and Mindanao.

Quezon tells me that a “high official” of the Red Cross reported to him that the Japanese are treating their prisoners in the Philippines well.

Reports come from Australia that the danger from the Japanese has not lessened–only that their present interest is turned elsewhere. Some think the enemy could take Australia and New Zealand whenever they wished.

“Nonong” (Manuel Quezon, Jr.) celebrates his sixteenth birthday. He tells me that “Calle F. B. Harrison” in Pasay has had its name changed by the Japanese.

Chat with Osmeña. He says that there were 5,000 troops in Negros; 5,000 in Cebu; 5,000 in Panay and 30,000 in Mindanao–all units of the Philippine Army, with high officers who were all Americans. Believes General Sharp, tho unwilling to surrender, probably did so when Lieutenant General Wainwright expressed his desire that he should do so.

Osmeña has always been interested in pushing the settlement of Mindanao by Christian Filipinos, but believes that in all these years they have only persuaded some 50,000 of them to go down there.

Osmeña was the founder of the Nacionalista party and its first president. Since 1907 they were permitted by the American Governors General to agitate for independence.

At the convention of Governors of Provinces in 1906, Osmeña, from Cebu, Quezon from Tayabas, Veyra from Leyte, Luna from La Union, and Gabaldon from Nueva Ecija were the only Nacionalistas, but ran the convention in spite of the fact that all the rest were Progresistas. Governor General Smith was in charge during these years. The principales of Negros proposed establishing a “Republic of Negros,” and Smith did not object so long as they stayed under the American flag. Tells the story of Smith’s first attempt to speak Spanish. It was at this banquet in Negros, and after the customary large number of courses, a lady beside him asked: “Quiere Su Excelencia tomar una siesta ahora?” He replied: “Si Señora, con usted,” thinking the siesta was a name for ice cream.

Quezon on the subject of protocol: “I have never been much interested in it. I prefer the theory of Don Quixote, who when he appointed Sancho Panza Governor of Baratari, was given a dinner by the latter. Sancho invited him to sit at the head of the table, but Don Quixote replied: ‘Wherever I sit will be the head of the table. “‘

The subject, however, is of great importance to Osmeña. Taft has fixed Osmena’s status as Speaker of the Assembly when opening the first Philippine Assembly, by declaring that, after the Governor General, the Speaker of the Assembly was the second man in the Philippines.

Leonard Wood, when Department Commander in the Army had raised the question with Governor General Forbes–Wood was unwilling to allow precedence over the Department to a Filipino. Osmeña cabled Quezon then the Resident Commissioner in Washington and Quezon went to see the Secretary of War adding that “Tho I considered my mission a silly one, yet the duty was imposed on me by my leaders.” He reported to the Secretary of War that Osmeña believed Wood was trying to undo the fiat of Taft, and that he (Osmeña) would consider such action a humiliation to him and to his people. “Personally,” said Quezon, “I never consider it important where they place me.” The War Department ducked the issue, ruling that when the Speaker was invited, the Commanding General should not be present and vice versa. This was in 1910-11. Quezon added: “Wood could not stand the idea of a Filipino being put ahead of him. I never regard such matters as important unless done with the purpose of humiliating me or my race.”

Quezon continued: “When McNutt was first sent in 1936 [sic] as High Commissioner to the Philippines, I was in Europe. The Japanese Consul gave a fiesta at which he toasted the President of the Philippines before proposing a toast to the High Commissioner (McNutt).” This Quezon considered as of no importance, and it was certainly not an official attempt of the Japanese to play politics in the Philippines. “The Americans in Manila had been pushing McNutt to assert himself, and got him crazy.” So, he sent circulars to all the Consuls in the Philippines calling their attention to the correct order of precedence, and instructing them to route all official correspondence with the Commonwealth Government through his office.

“In Washington, they had a Cabinet meeting to discuss the press furore over this matter, for they feared it would give trouble. Vice President Garner said: ‘I’m afraid we’ve sent a trouble maker there.’ President Roosevelt replied: ‘I wouldn’t say that, but he seems to be indiscreet.’

“I was in Paris at this time, but refused to be quoted as being mixed up in this damned nonsense. When I arrived in New York all the newspaper men were on to me on this question. I told them: ‘Gentlemen, all I wish to tell you is this: if there is a toast, and I am given the opportunity of drinking it, all I care about is that there should be enough to drink.’

“The President was relieved when he learned of this reply. But I feared that with McNutt I might have another Wood-Quezon fight on my hands in Manila. Before arriving home, I carefully wrote out my speech. The banquet of welcome, attended by some 1,500-2,000 people was dramatic enough for we had an earthquake during it. I told them: ‘In order that there may be no misunderstanding among the people, I consider it important on this occasion to state what I consider to be the rights of the President of the Commonwealth in relation to those of the American High Commissioner. The latter, as the representative of the President, occupies the highest place. But all the power and responsibility of this government, except in the matter of foreign affairs, rests in the President of the Philippines. In these matters, I am the boss. I will welcome any suggestions from the High Commissioner and no doubt his suggestions will exercise great influence on our decisions.” (Wm. H. Anderson’s book contains 20-30 pp. on this.)

Quezon next described his first lesson as a young member of the first Philippine Assembly in 1908 on how to act when attacked by the press. A local newspaper in Manila had attacked him in its morning issue and a friend rushed into his bedroom and awakened him with the article. He leapt out of bed, rushed through his dressing and ran to the office of the paper, asking to see Salazar, the editor. He shoved the paper before him and asked him if he had written it. “Yes,” so he pushed it into Salazar’s mouth who went over backward with his chair. Alemany rushed in to protest, and Quezon raging, asked him if he had anything to do with it, so Alemany fled. Then Salazar challenged Quezon to a duel and Quezon replied: “To hell with you and your duel.” He then went into the composing and printing room and told the workmen in Tagalog that they ought to quit working for such scoundrels.

The next morning, all the press attacked Quezon. He began to be ashamed and to think that after all he was disgraced. He went down to attend the session of the Assembly in the marble hall of the Ayuntamiento, and at the door met Governor General Smith, who “was himself a fighting Irishman”–Smith said to him: “Well, young man, you had quite a good time yesterday. Let me offer you a piece of advice–there is nothing worse than being ignored by the press; if they won’t praise you, pay them to attack you.” Osmeña said nothing to Quezon about the incident.

Visit to President Coolidge. Former Governor General Forbes told Quezon that in due time, Coolidge would be recognized as the greatest President next to Lincoln. Quezon remarked to me that he thought he was the worst “not even except Harding.” He described a visit with Osmeña to Coolidge in the White House. It was Osmeña’s first President; he bought a suit for the occasion and bowed low when entering the presence. Quezon continued: “After 10 minutes I saw that Sergio was beginning to revise his estimate. This was not one of Coolidge’s best days. He drawled and gulped and nobody could make sense out of anything he said. When we left the White House, Sergio said ‘Chico! Caramba! so that’s a President of the United States.'”

Quezon’s revision of Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill: The provision of the indefinite retention of the American Army in the Philippines after independence was granted seemed to Quezon to make “independence” (a) futile–for had not the Army “betrayed” an American Governor General? What would they do when a Filipino became the head of state? “Suppose Don Sergio for example were the first President of an independent Philippines, what would happen? Directly after his inauguration he would perhaps wish to rest after the ceremonies and take a drive. He would go to Fort McKinley, outside Manila, and perhaps be halted by a sentry and turned back.”

The provision was moreover (b) dangerous--and would be liable to create incidents between the United States and the Philippines. Moreover, though at the time they naturally did not make this statement, there was the challenge to Japan in the continued presence of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. He thinks this requirement was a product of American imperialism.

So, he wired Osmeña and Roxas in Washington to await his arrival there and added that if they could convince him that the bill was wise, he would support it. This they failed to do. Senator Harry Hawes, one of the joint authors of the act, gave a luncheon for the Philippine delegation at which Joe Robinson, the floor leader of the Senate was present. Having listened to the discussion at the table, Robinson finally said with some show of anger–and he was a man of sudden anger and violence: “I’ve had enough of all this–you can take the law as it is, or leave it.” Quezon rose and said: “Then I’m through, we won’t accept the law.” He left and returned at once to the Philippines. Before Robinson’s death, a little later, the senator paid a handsome tribute to Quezon.

Upon his return to Manila, Quezon got the legislature to reject the law by more than a two-thirds’ vote. He told the caucus that they would have to “get rid” of Osmeña (the Vice President) as head of the senate (sic) and of Roxas as Speaker. There was much hesitation among them since the people were so anxious for independence that there was general support for the law. So Quezon told them: “You leave it to me–the popular support here for Osmeña and Roxas will not last thirty days.” Then Quezon offered his own resignation as President of Senate, which was refused by a large majority. Roxas, that evening, did not wait for the vote; he resigned as Speaker of the House of his own accord. He was “chaired” by the students at the University and said later that “he had fallen from the speakership into the arms of the people.” Quezon commented publicly that when Roxas had fallen into the arms of the students, he had picked out those of a pretty girl in the crowd–Quezon added that he wouldn’t mind that kind of a fall, himself. During the controversy, Quezon made no personal attacks nor reflections on either Osmeña or Roxas. The Hare-Hawes-Cutting law was overwhelmingly rejected by the legislature.

Religious Instruction in the Public Schools: Taft as the first Civil Governor had passed a law permitting this, but it was very ambiguous in its terms, and never put into effect. (N.B. this, and Taft’s visit to the Vatican, plus the “Friar Land Purchases” had a great deal to do with the re-election of Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. I was campaigning on the state ticket in New York in that election and knew of the immense activity–undercover–of the Catholic priests against our ticket headed by Alton B. Parker. F.B.H.)

Quezon says that when Laurel, Roxas and Recto were framing the constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, Taft’s “religious instruction” proposition was inserted in the articles. The first session of the National Assembly, in the early winter of 1935-6, passed by 90 votes a law to this effect. Quezon vetoed the act on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Avanceña, whose advice he took privately, backed him up, but the act was never re-passed over Quezon’s veto, so never came before the courts. Avanceña went down to his home province of Iloilo to explain this matter to his sisters, who had brought him up and educated him. They had kept a school there since Spanish days, and were intensely religious. Avanceña did not broach the subject to his sisters but went to the priests who were those who “confessed” them, and explained to them the constitutional point. Then, after satisfying them, he arranged with them to come to dinner and to have one of them raise the question quite casually at the table.

Quezon was dictating to Canceran the chapter of his book on his birth and childhood. Great was my surprise at the primitive conditions at Baler 60 years ago: no market–everybody raised, or shot or caught their own food or exchanged their crops for venison and pork. Few shotguns; most of the people were armed only with spears or bow and arrows, etc. He replied: “Inferiority complex of the Filipinos never has permitted them to tell the truth about their primitive conditions in Spanish days. I shall be the first.” (Vivid contrast here with the profusion, extravagance and disregard of expenditure in which he has lived during the Commonwealth; instead of resenting this, the Filipino are probably proud of all this reckless display–I’ve never heard him express the view that anything he wanted was too expensive. F.B.H.)


June 22, 1942

Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon returned from a conference with Secretary Ickes, whom he greatly likes.

He is getting more interested every day in composing ideas for his book, which I am glad to see. Today, he expressed his wish not to have any controversial subjects in this war story, but will save them for the biography he wishes to write later. He may insert Japanese atrocity stories of their invasion of the Philippines, but only “as told to him”–not as being of his knowledge true. This settles neatly a ticklish question of policy.

Quezon observed that Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles is more “effective” than our old friend Hull, and believes it best to sound him out first on any plans for the future of the Philippines.

Stated that he had told ex-Vice Governor Hayden that in his book he had been so kind about him that he felt he could say in criticism only that Hayden appeared to be an adherent of Governor General Wood–“You are still a Republican”–Hayden reddened. Quezon told him that the theory that Leonard Wood had “saved” Philippine finances was ridiculous. “If I had not stopped him, he would have thrown away assets worth three hundred million pesos in the Philippines.” Hayden replied “I suppose you mean the railroad, bank, etc.”

Lord Halifax had given Quezon a luncheon. This was the day after Quezon’s first appearance upon the Pacific War Council. Halifax said to Quezon at luncheon: “I liked your remark to the press.” Quezon said he liked Lady Halifax better than he did her husband. She had told Halifax after luncheon: “You’d better have a talk with President Quezon–You may learn something.”

Mrs. Quezon who was then present with us, had just attended a luncheon given for her by Mrs. Sayre. Sayre is about to resign as High Commissioner. She told Mrs. Quezon that there had been a broadcast from Manila in May arranged by the Japanese. In it an American lady told how the American civilian prisoners at Santo Tomas in Manila were allowed to establish their own form of government; had their own entertainments and their own schools for their children. Exercise was allowed daily in Santo Tomas grounds etc. She then added that their chief concern was that they had no milk for their children–at this point a Japanese spokesman interrupted and said: “That is the fault of the Americans for destroying all supplies before we arrived.” I asked Mrs. Quezon if it was true that they had destroyed all the food supplies before going to Corregidor, and she replied “Of course.”

I then asked Quezon further about his famous luncheon with the Japanese Emperor in 1937–whether the Emperor had offered him any “special treaties” (n.b. this was one of the questions recently submitted to Quezon by the Cosmopolitan). He said “no.” I asked him whether Ambassador Grew’s annoyance with this whole affair had not changed the United States Government’s attitude toward Quezon for a time. He said not; that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were all right, but that he might have had some enemies, like Stanley Hornbeck, the “Far Eastern expert” in the State Department. Denied that the State Department had interfered to spoil his subsequent trip to Mexico; that the Mexican President had sent him his gorgeous $500,000 train,–“like a hotel” to convey him to Mexico City.

Told the story of his shift in plans during his escape to Australia in going from Dumaguete by speed boat with Lieutenant Bulkeley across to Mindanao. Wainwright had wired him that there were five Japanese destroyers in the straits, and it was inadvisable to go now–better to postpone. But Colonel Soriano together with Major Fernando of the Philippine Army Air Corps had just spent several hours in one of those old planes off Negros waters. They had sighted only one Japanese destroyer, which at 6 p.m. had gone off towards the Sulu Sea. So, after midnight, when he and his family, having received Wainwright’s warning message, had gotten nearly all the way back from Dumaguete to Bais (20 miles), Soriano caught up with them in the dark, and he and Bulkeley advised Quezon to turn around again and take the chance of getting across that night to Mindanao. Quezon accepted.

To an enquiry as to whether Mrs Quezon ever expressed her opinions about such decisions on this dangerous voyage; he replied: “Never; she always did just what I decided.” I then enquired how he had felt about the possibility of his capture by the Japanese? He said he did his best to avoid capture, but he always felt that if taken by them, they would treat him with every consideration, and probably put him right back in Malacañan.

He added that he thought Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos had gotten caught by the Japanese in Cebu. (N.B. they shot him there).

Exchange of cables between Quezon in Corregidor and Roosevelt: Quezon advised him that he was in grave doubts as to whether he should encourage his people to further resistance since he was satisfied that the United States could not relieve them; that he did not see why a nation which could not protect them should expect further demonstrations of loyalty from them. Roosevelt in reply, said he understood Quezon’s feelings and expressed his regret that he could not do much at the moment. He said: “go ahead and join them if you feel you must.” This scared MacArthur. Quezon says: “If he had refused, I would have gone back to Manila.” Roosevelt also promised to retake the Philippines and give them their independence and protect it. This was more than the Filipinos had ever had offered them before: a pledge that all the resources and man power of United States were back of this promise of protected independence. So Quezon replied: “I abide by your decision.”

I asked him why he supposed Roosevelt had refused the joint recommendation of himself and MacArthur. He replied that he did not know the President’s reasons. Osmena and Roxas had said at the time that he would reject it. Roosevelt was not moved by imperialism nor by vested interests, nor by anything of that sort. Probably he was actuated by unwillingness to recognize anything Japan had done by force (vide Manchuria). Quezon thinks that in Washington only the Chief of Staff (General Marshall) who received the message from MacArthur in private code, and Roosevelt himself, knew about this request for immediate independence.

When Quezon finally got to the White House, Roosevelt was chiefly concerned about Quezon’s health. Roosevelt never made any reference to their exchange of cables.

Quezon added that, so far as he was aware, the Japanese had never made a direct offer to the United States Government to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines, but many times they made such an offer to him personally.

“It was not that I apprehended personally ill treatment from the Japanese” said Quezon; “What made me stand was because I had raised the Philippine Army–a citizen army–I had mobilized them in this war. The question for me was whether having called them, I should go with this army, or stay behind in Manila with my people. I was between the Devil and the deep sea. So I decided that I should go where the army did. That was my hardest decision–my greatest moral torture. I proposed by cable to President Roosevelt that the United States Government should advise the Japanese that they had granted independence to the Philippines. This should have been done before the invasion and immediately after the first Japanese attack by air. The Japanese had repeatedly offered to guarantee the neutrality of an independent Philippines. This was what they thought should be done.” Quezon is going to propose the passage by Congress of a Joint Resolution, as they did in the case of Cuba, that “the Philippines are and of right out to be independent” and that “the United States would use their armed forces to protect them.”

When asked by Shuster to try to describe his own frame of mind when he was told at 5:30 a.m. Dec. 8 of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Quezon said he had never believed that the Japanese would dare to do it; but since they had done so, it was at once evident that they were infinitely more powerful than had been supposed– therefore he immediately perceived that the Philippines were probably doomed.

In Washington the other day, he asked the Chinese Ambassador whether the Japanese had not fooled all the rest of the world by pretending to be weak. The ambassador just laughed. Quezon says that if consulted, he would have advised the Chinese to take a leaf from the Japanese book on cunning. The Japanese had been checked in their expansion plans three times, (after each of their three successful wars), by the concert of Great Powers–each time they “bowed their head” and submitted. Finally, after waiting nearly half a century, their chance had come, and they took it. So, if the Chinese, at the time the “China Incident” broke had pretended to submit, then allowed themselves to be armed and trained by the Japanese, they would only have had to wait their chance.


June 15-16, 1942

Quezon tells me that when he went to Corregidor on December 24 last, part of the “doubts” about the policy he should adopt were based upon the possibility of a declaration by the Japanese of Philippine independence. This thought was, for him, a “nightmare.” We would have been left in an impossible situation, for if he accepted, the United States would have turned against him, and if he refused, his own people might have repudiated him. He thought that if, after the Burma campaign, the Japanese had proclaimed the independence of India, it would have started a revolution there.

It was not until he got to the Visayas after February 20th and had talked to people down there, and especially with those who at the risk of their lives, had escaped from Luzon, that he was able to gauge the real sentiments of his people. Among these was Tomas Confesor, who had escaped from Bauang in a boat provided by the “Quisling” Mayor of the town, who had been selected by the Japanese to replace the constitutionally appointed mayor, since the latter had been killing all the Japs he could get at. “Incidentally,” said Quezon, “these Filipino ‘Quislings’ were like those Filipino officials appointed by the American Army during the Philippine insurrection–they would do everything in their power to aid their own fellow countrymen.”

At my request, Quezon told me of his conversation in Malacañan with Litvinoff, the Russian diplomat, just before the war. The Russian warned him very seriously: “Be on your guard”–the same advice he then gave to General MacArthur and to Admiral Hart. Quezon thought highly of Litvinoff and says he believes the Russians knew more about Japan than the Japanese knew of Russia.

To turn back to a description of public sentiment in the Philippines, Quezon said he had known of course that he could get the Filipinos to raise an army, and he did. He also had been positive that he could bring the Filipinos into the war against Japan if their country were invaded–and he did so. But further than that, he could not tell, without full consultation with them, whether they would take any part in the “rising tide of color,” which is a movement sponsored by Japan as “Asia for the Asiatics.” But when he got out of Corregidor he learned how profound and widespread among the people was the spirit of resistance to the Japanese, and how deep was the hatred of the Filipinos for then. They had even threatened to kill Vargas, though they well knew that he, Quezon, had asked Vargas to stay there and care for Filipino interests as acting Mayor of Greater Manila. That if the Japanese now withdrew most of their forces from the Philippines for use elsewhere, leaving only a small garrison in the Islands, the Filipinos would kill every one of them. “For the first time I realized that we are really foreigners in the Orient.” He attributes this largely to their Christian religion. He stressed how deep was now the devotion to the United States of the Filipinos altho they were very angry at the “Old Timers.”

He still thinks that if the independence of the Philippines had been declared by Japan; that would have caused a revolution in India.

Quezon is seriously considering a plan for declaration of independence of the Philippines now. (N.B. that is what Quezon and MacArthur advised President Roosevelt to do in their Christmas cablegrams from Corregidor).

Quezon repeated his talk with Roosevelt at the signing of the United Nations pact in the White House yesterday by Quezon and by Mexico. This, he thinks is conclusive recognition of the Philippines as a “separate nation.” He thereupon asked Roosevelt if he was going to be admitted as a member of the Pacific War Council. Roosevelt replied that “Halifax wants India to have a seat there.” Quezon instantly answered that there would be a meeting of the Pacific War Council on Wednesday. (Quezon remarked to me that an appointment by the British Government of an Indian to sit on this council would be that of a sort of Quisling.)

So on Tuesday morning Quezon went to see Sumner Welles who spent an hour and ten minutes telling him in perfect Spanish how the Philippines deserved a seat on the Pacific War Council. He said he would find out what Roosevelt had meant, and would let Quezon know by telephone; which he did.

The Philippine President then turned, as he often did, to reflections on the very close co-operation he had enjoyed with General Douglas MacArthur during critical days in the Philippines. He recalled that in all circumstances, and at all times, the general had the most perfect manners and offered him every proper official deference; even later, when they were in Australia, he would never ride on the right of the seat in the motor car. In Melbourne, “where I was nothing, MacArthur would always come to my house to see me. If I visited his office, he would come down the ten stories from his office and stand until I was seated in the motor. He would never give promotions nor send orders to any of my people without first referring the matter to me. This was different from the methods of General Wainwright, who had succeeded to the command on Corregidor when MacArthur was ordered to Australia; he had promoted Manuel Roxas from the rank of Colonel to that of Brigadier General after I left Corregidor. I had deputized Roxas to act for me, but was not consulted as to his promotion, and I objected. The promotion was then not effected. I was the only authority who could fix the ranks in the Philippine Army. Unfortunately, I never had a chance to explain this to Roxas since I then lost all communication with him while he was in the mountains of Mindanao.

“Among my closest advisers during the invasion all, Santos, Osmeña, Yulo, Roxas, etc. played a man’s part. Roxas and Osmeña were the strongest among them for our sticking to the United States.

“As for General Lim, I found that a meeting during that time of strain was necessary with MacArthur, Lim and General Valdes, to curb Lim’s proposals, and to show them that they must not take their important orders from MacArthur while he was only my adviser without consulting me. During that brief period before MacArthur was given full command of the armies, I kept the sole authority to decide important questions.”


May 25, 1942

Lt. Col. Jesse T. Trayvick USA, Wainwright’s emissary traveling under a flag of truce accompanied by a representative of Gen. Homma, did not find difficulties delivering the “surrender orders” to Visayas-Mindanao USFIP CG, W. F. Sharp who, in turn, immediately issued written surrender orders to all his subordinates:  B/Gen. Albert Christie, Panay; Col. Roger Hilsman, Negros; Col. Irvin Schrader, Cebu; Col. Arthur Grimes, Bohol and Col. Ted Carrol, Samar-Leyte.  It is reported that all USA personnel and a few hundred Filipinos surrendered in compliance with Gen. Wainwright’s orders but many PA units led by their O’s, specially in Panay and Negros refused to surrender.  In Panay where the bulk of the 61st Div. is assigned are my classmates Lts. Amos Francia, Ramon Gelvezon and Pedro M Yap who believe Gen. Wainwright had no more authority to give orders after he became a POW.  Apparently, they were able to convince their Philippine superiors like Majors Macario Peralta and Nick Velarde and so when their Div. Comdr. Christie told them about the surrender at Mt. Baloy, Peralta and Velarde categorically replied their refusal stating their plans to continue to fight the enemy.  Gen. Christie seemed to understand and even left the remaining funds to the Div. Fin. O.  Meanwhile, in Negros my classmates there are Lts. Uldarico Baclagon, Abenir Bornales and Epifanio Segovia and they also were able to convince their superiors, Captains Ernesto Mata and Salvador Abcede, to disregard the surrender orders of Col. Hillsman.  In Southern Luzon and Bicol Area, surrender emissary B/Gen. G. Francisco delivered the orders and like in the Visayas, only the Americans and a few Filipino USFIP members complied and surrendered.


May 20, 1942

Lt. Col. Nakar’s unsurrendered USFIP Unit in NL were remnants of 11th & 71st Div. cut off from Bataan, reorganized per Gen. MacArthur’s order as 14th Inf. under Lt. Col. Everett Warner USA last Jan 24 to operate as guerrillas in Cagayan Valley. When Bataan surrendered, Warner and fellow USA O’s gave up so Gen. Wainwright appointed Nakar ’32 as new CO, with Maj. Manuel Enriquez ’34, my Tac. O. at PMA, as ExO. Other O’s with him are Lts. Ed Navarro ’40; Melito Bulan ’41; Tanabe, Nery & Quines all ’42.

Today, I learned from Judge Roldan that Lt. Col. Kalakuka USA travelling under a flag of truce accompanied by a ranking Jap O. located Nakar in Cagayan Valley and tried to serve the surrender orders from Gen Wainwright. Nakar directed my classmate, now Capt. Ed Navarro to meet Kalakuka in Bayombong. Instead of following Nakar’s orders, Navarro went to Enriquez and together saw Nakar in Jones, Isabela. Navarro convinced Nakar and Enriquez that after Gen. Wainwright surrendered, he lost his authority completely. And so Nakar agreed with Navarro, his Unit did not surrender and managed to report accordingly by radio to MacArthur in Australia.

Judge Roldan also informed me that the former mobilization center facilities of the 91st Div. in Cabanatuan is being prepared for the transfer there of the American prisoners in Camp O’Donnell thereby leaving only Filipino POWs in Capas. With the kind of info I am getting from the Judge, I am convinced he has underground connect — a brave and patriotic Judge.


May 10,1942

I learned today that even if Gen. Jonathan Wainwright attempted to surrender only Corregidor and the surrounding Fortresses at Caballo, Carabao and El Fraile Island, (Forts Mills, Frank, Drum & James) he was forced by victorious Gen. Masaharu Homma to surrender USFIP all over the Phil.  Accordingly, the hapless vanquished commander issued surrender orders to key USFIP Commanders with the following officers directed to serve said “Surrender Orders,” Lt. Col. Kalakuka USA to Lt. Col. Guillermo Nakar ’32, Comdr. 14th Inf, in Cagayan Valley; Col. Jesse T. Trayvick, Jr. USA to Maj. Gen. W. F. Sharp, CG Vis-Min Forces; and Brig. Gen. Guillermo B. Francisco ’08 to Southern Luzon & Bicol Regions.  These representatives of Gen. Wainwright are accompanied by ranking Japanese officers and provided adequate land and air transportation.

Wainwright’s surrender orders became a favorite topic of private discussions among officers at Malolos POW Camp.  To the question, if you were Col. Nakar, and you received the written order, will you surrender?  I am happy to note that after heated private discussions, all Philippine Military Academy graduates were unanimous in disobeying the order.  Two reserve officers have strong reservations that if they disobey the “lawful order of their superior” they can be liable for court martial later.  It will be interesting to find out how those concerned actually reacted later.

As a lasting tribute to the courageous gunners who manned those big guns at Corregidor and also to immortalize the names of the twenty batteries that fought valiantly against the enemy for 26 continuous days and nights since the Fall of Bataan, here they are in alphabetical order:  Batteries Chenny; Crockett; Cushing; Geary; Gruggs; Hamilton; Hanna; Hearn; James; Kysor; Monja; Maxwell; Morrison;  Ramsay; Rock Point; Smith; Stockade; Sunset; Way; and Wheeler.  My everlasting Salute to both Comrade Gunners and Batteries!