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[Illegible] April 29, 1942

Upon returning to Lagao [illegible] Assistant Overseer [illegible] who [illegible] a telephone conversation with [illegible] that Japanese [illegible] at Camp Luna [illegible] I immediately left for [illegible] Overseer Vargas [illegible] with Captain Olivares, who is in charge of the farms of Lanao district. The Captain showed me the [illegible] between General Fort and Colonel Duque and [illegible] had been intercepted by Radio Operator [illegible]. In the Conference are agreed that in the event of an enemy landing at Dadiangas, all bodegas and the administration building and houses should be burned, but that the settlers houses would be left untouched as they have no military value whatsoever. We also agreed on a courier service to be dispatched by Supervising Overseer Fajardo and Overseer Vargas to Tupi, since there is no telephone service between Klinan and [illegible]. This courier service on horseback shall continue from district to district until [illegible] and [illegible].

Left Klinan and Tupi, stopping at Polomolok for conference with Overseer Jimenez. We talked about final steps to be taken in the event of actual enemy invasion of Dadiangas. Overseer Jimenez told me that his settlers had agreed among themselves not to leave their barrio homes even in case of actual enemy landing unless they hear advanced information about actual atrocities committed by the enemy on defenseless civilians. On the latter case they would evacuate to the hills as planned for them by the administration.

The landings made by the Japanese at Cotabato, Parang, and Malabang proved the theory I have held to since the beginning of the war in as far as enemy activity in the island of Mindanao is concerned. I have always been of the opinion contrary to that of other high ranking army officers in Mindanao, that the enemy will not attempt to land their troops at Dadiangas harbor and then proceed towards the USAFFE troops 300 kilometers away. This latter tactics would be the least practical and the most expensive. Rather, I opined, the enemy would land at directly the places they have actually landed in, and in conversation with these army officers I even went as far as to suggest that they strengthen their positions in Parang and Malabang.