April 15, 1973
Woke up at 9:00 A.M. Went skiing in the bay next to Talaga which had many and was rough. Returned at 1:30 P.M. Mass, lunch rest and meditation at 3:30 P.M.
Visited the beach house at 5:00 P.M.
Am reading “The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain” by Pierre Broue and Emile Temime.
That a civil war followed the Generals Revolution was due to the strong communist organization supported by the socialists who proudly joined up with them –and the support of Rivera of the Republicans –although Franco’s Falangists or “Nationalists” were supported by Germany and Italy.
The book marks out how much against their [illegible] the Communists by their predelection to violence created the need for the “Generals Revolution” and again contributed the final opposition to the Revolution.
This should be a lesson to us.
April 15th (Con’t)
In the conference which I held with the “Originals” (with Col. , the J-3 and Gen. Tamayo, Chief of Logistics included) at 4:00 pm, Saturday, April 14th, I informed them:
1. That I had written a Political Testament which I directed them to follow, indicating the successor to me in case of my death or disability; that this was necessary in view of the fact that even now there was rivalry among various leaders; that it was necessary to continue our policies even if I should not be capable or around to lead, otherwise our constitutional revolution would ultimately fail; that even Alexander’s empire had broken up because he had merely said, “To the strongest belongs his empire”; and that I assessed the various personalities aspiring for leadership.
2. There was need to review our pledge to our commitment because there is now apparent weakening of the elements of our revolution. A corruption and loss of ideals has set in. This is a repetition of my
April 15th (Con’t)
The government plan is to concentrate forces (actually 5 to 7 battalions) in each province in the order of priority and liquidate the rebellion in that order.
In the meantime we should not be lured to fight a war of attrition or to send out small patrols as we did in Luzon.
Even Sulu has to wait. For the order of priority is 1. Cotabato 2. Basilan 3. Zamboanga Sur if it has deteriorated 4. Sulu.
In the meantime, our forces in Sulu must contain the enemy and keep it occupied or off-balance.
The three battalions now in Basilan should be sufficient to finish the campaign there.
I have noticed a tendency of the officers and men to utilize the tactics they learned in Luzon almost invariably even when meeting a massed enemy in a set-piece conventional situation. This has resulted in casualties if not total liquidation of small squad-strength units.
April 15th (Con’t)
warnings specially to PC Chief, Gen. Ramos.
He called a command conference.
Example: Extortion by PC in Surigao Sur of Georgia Pacific. Thus the CG of Metrocom, Gen. Alfredo Montoya, is reported openly and publicly embracing and kissing an Australian blonde in the golf links of Wack Wack while his security was running beside his golf cart where he and his lady love were riding and a helicopter above came to a landing, thereby publicly calling attention to the indiscretion. This was supposed to have taken place a month ago and was confirmed by Bert Sabido, an eyewitness, and Mentong Disini.
3. The critique of the Mindanao, Sulu operations. It involves a change from small unit deep penetration operations to larger unit employment and Inter services coordination specially air and navy.
4. Our policies —
We should allow the rebels to continue the mistake of trying to hold ground thus lose their mobility.
The rebels should be lured to fight a conventional war and concentrate forces so they can be hit by all services as a profitable target.